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Director Notes
COL Benjamin Miller
Director, USANCA
This year has already proven to be of major importance to us in the nuclear and
CWMD community. Many efforts across the government and the Department of Defense
(DoD) are shaping the future direction of our nation and its capabilities. Earlier this year,
the President directed DoD to undergo a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The team
was formed from across the government agencies and departments where they work
to provide the President with a new NPR aligned with his goals and national objectives.
USANCA, representing the Army, participates in these discussions and assists in
answering questions and debates surrounding nuclear weapons, their role, their use, and
ensuring the Army’s equities are being addressed as the team develops this critical policy
document. This important work will continue into 2022 when we should see its publication
sometime after the new year.
In November the Secretary of Defense directed the DoD to undertake the first
comprehensive Biodefense Posture Review (BPR). The objective of this review is to
posture the Department to prepare for and respond to the full spectrum of biological
threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or from a deliberate attack. The BPR
is underway and USANCA is the Army lead for this effort; providing the Army’s collective
input on biological defense in the following areas: 1) strategy, policy, & partnerships, 2)
capability and capacity, 3) total force readiness, and 4) industrial base and supply chain.
The BPR will also continue into next year with a final report expected in 2022.
In CWMD Readiness some major efforts are being pushed by the US European
Command (EUCOM) as they finish writing their CWMD Implementation plan (Iplan). This
Iplan was developed with assistance from both the US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) and USANCA as it responds to the final 2020 Office of the Secretary of
Defense CWMD/CBRN defense readiness assessment and subsequent USSOCOM
Senior Leader Seminar. The Iplan provides EUCOM with a way ahead to increase their
knowledge base, planning, and capability to conduct CWMD operations. As the demand
from Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) increase for this expertise, our role within
the CWMD community becomes even more essential to provide our leaders with options
and associated risks as they make decisions.
Not only are we assisting the GCCs as they look at CWMD, we also are working
through the Army Campaign plan for the modernization of CWMD readiness to shape
the future force. USANCA is spearheading an effort to provide a proof of concept to
Army leadership that would take a Brigade Combat Team through a life-cycle training
timeline and result in a trained and ready formation to plan, operate, and win in a WMD
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environment. This messages one of the Army’s major roles in deterrence for national
security - demonstrating we can operate in any environment under any condition, with
minimal effect to our force.
Along with our efforts through the Army Campaign Plan and Objective 7, Modernize
Conventional-Nuclear Integration, CWMD Readiness, and Biological Defense; our team at
USANCA was successful in obtaining resources to implement the Army Biological Defense
Strategy through its Army Biodefense Office of Primary Responsibility. We continue to
work with GCCs, ASCC, and DoD to refine and ensure our future force is ready and
capable to operate in this unique environment.
The CWMD Advisor Course continues to train and educate staff members on
specific training at the operational and strategic level addressing a shortfall identified by
DoD. Our instructors and administrators are working with many commands to provide this
course and are looking into mobile training team options for future editions. This course
provides Army personnel with the D1 skill identifier and is open to all DoD personnel. The
Theater Nuclear Operations Course and Seminar also support theater staffs and provide
training that focus on nuclear threats and the planning at the operational level for nuclear
use. The USANCA team of instructors continues to support GCCs, Theater Commands,
FCCs, and ASCCs along with working on new curriculum for future efforts across the
Army.
All these actions are in concert with what is being spearheaded with our Allies
and Partners. Earlier this fall, USANCA sent our U.S. Head of Delegation to the first “inperson” NATO Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Capability
Development Group (NATO CDG) meeting since the start of the pandemic. The meeting
included 60 delegates from 19 NATO and 6 partner nations. The NATO CDG received
higher level guidance from the tasking authorities and updates on the status/issues of
the standardization work executed by its seven subordinate panels. The U.S. offered to
assist NATO in development of a solution for CBRN Functional Service – a C2 capability
package for the NATO Command Structure.
The FA52 Nuclear and CWMD Officer Proponent and USANCA continues to foster
a diverse and inclusive community of FA52 professionals. Specific goals of the FA52
Diversity Program are to increase the percentage of female and minority FA52 officers
over a five-year period to meet or exceed the Army officer demographic and to increase
the number of FA52 officers from basic branches not typically associated with FA52. Most
recently, the FA52 Proponent established the Diversity and Inclusion Working Group
(DIWG) to enhance the education, outreach, and recruiting required for a more diverse
FA52 officer corps.
USANCA is working to support you, the CWMD community, and provide the expertise
for planning and operations, testing, policy, doctrine, effects analysis, and support for
CWMD requirements. We appreciate your thoughts and ideas. Let us know how to better
support you or improve the CWMD Journal.
Countering WMD Journal
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Keeping Me Awake at Night:

The Coming Nuclear and WMD Battlefield and the Urgency to
Improve Army Readiness
MG Bradley Gericke PhD, MAJ Thomas Halverson,
Mr. Stephen Carey, LTC Jason Wood
Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7

I

n war, land power ends campaigns. Warfare in the sea and air domains, now
ntegrated with those of cyber, space, and the electronic spectrum, enable ground
forces to bring overwhelming combat power to bear in new ways to terminate
the theater fight. History bears out the primacy of land power – in every major
conflict across the spectrum of conflict from OVERLORD to DESERT STORM
to IRAQI FREEDOM. U.S.-led coalition forces, when allowed to mobilize, deploy,
and position themselves at will, have triumphed. Our adversaries have watched
this template play out time and again. We must assume that they have learned
the lesson and will not permit the United States or our partners to mobilize and
deploy on extended timelines again. They have innovated to deny dominance of
any U.S.-led coalition force in a set-piece theater fight. Their operational response
will now almost certainly include novel approaches to employing weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) to terminate a theater fight on their terms or prevent the United
States from fighting it altogether.

Major General Gericke assumed responsibilities as the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy within the U.S. Army’s G-3/5/7
during July 2019. As the Army’s senior strategist, MG Gericke not only provides strategic assessment and advice to the Chief
of Staff and other Army senior leaders, he also oversees the training, education, and development of all the Army’s strategists
(Functional Area 59). In his prior assignment, MG Gericke served as the Deputy Director for Joint Strategic Planning in the Joint
Staff J-5. He received a BS in modern historical studies (Europe) from the United States Military Academy and an MA and Ph.D.
from Vanderbilt University. He also graduated with a MMAS in Strategy from the United States Army Command and General Staff
College and an MS in National Security Strategy from National Defense University.
Major Thomas Halverson is the Institutional Training Branch Chief at the United States Army Nuclear and Countering WMD
Agency (USANCA) located on Fort Belvoir, VA. He has a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering Science from the United States Military
Academy and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley. He was commissioned as an Infantry
Officer and now serves as a Functional Area 52, Nuclear and CWMD Officer. His email is thomas.m.halverson.mil@army.mil.
Mr. Stephen Carey is the CWMD Readiness Specialist at the United States Army Nuclear and Countering WMD Agency
(USANCA) located on Fort Belvoir, VA. He has M.A. in History from the University of Montana and a certificate in Conflict Analysis
and Resolution from George Mason University. He is a retired Infantry Officer and now serves in Career Program 60 as an Army
Strategist. His email is stephen.d.carey.civ@army.mil.
LTC Jason Wood is the Nuclear Employment Augmentation Team Branch Chief at the United States Army Nuclear and
Countering WMD Agency (USANCA) located on Fort Belvoir, VA. He has a B.S. in Mathematics from the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville and a M.S. of Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He was commissioned
as an Engineer Officer and now serves as a Nuclear and CWMD Officer (FA 52). His email is jason.c.wood2.mil@army.mil.
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This is not to rule out that our adversaries include in their planning the capability to wage war
through the intercontinental exchange of strategic nuclear weapons as in the infamous Mutually
Assured Destruction nightmare. Rather, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a WMD-armed
adversary would not employ a WMD capability at echelon, not just in extremis, but to avoid extremis in the first place when faced with a U.S.-led coalition. Nuclear weapons are an obvious choice,
but viable scenarios also include the employment of chemical weapons to interrupt U.S. force
employment, or the un-attributable release of a biological pathogens to sow international discord.
In 1991 the Iraqi government opted not to employ chemical weapons in the face of an offensive
campaign conducted against them by an overwhelming U.S.-led coalition. At the time, U.S. commanders were “baffled” by this decision.¹ Following his capture, interviews with Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein revealed that he held the Iraqi chemical weapons arsenal in reserve as a deterrent against the United States or Israeli WMD use.² Whatever the motivation in 1991, by the
time the Iraqi regime was destroyed by another U.S.-led coalition in 2003, one lesson emerged
from Saddam’s choice – WMD could provide a means to deny a coalition the time needed to build
combat power, and possibly end a limited conflict on beneficial terms. If this lesson is learned, our
adversaries will have concluded that employing WMD improves their chances of winning a theater
conflict. Given this recent history, it remains to assess if adversary modernization suggests WMD
are a key capability.
Nuclear weapons remain relevant to the modern strategy of the United States and its near-peer
adversaries who continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals. And while the United States employs only those delivery systems governed under the New START and in support of NATO, our
adversaries continue to develop and field a diverse array of short and intermediate range delivery
systems capable of employing nuclear and conventional payloads (so-called “dual-capable” systems³). This complicates “strategic calculus” by adding a custom-made nuclear capability for theater use that is practically impossible to separate from conventional arms posing urgent operational
challenges to the Army and U.S. coalition forces.
Like the development of dual-capable weapon systems, innovations in chemical weapons development and employment has the potential to provide asymmetric capabilities against a dominant coalition force in a theater context. Russia has likely employed covert fourth-generation agents (FGA)
in targeted attacks within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.⁴ In one example,
the 2018 assassination attempt that targeted Sergei Skripal employed FGA.5 While unsuccessful,
it killed one person unassociated with the attack and required a clean-up effort that involved more
than 600 personnel, cost more than $30M, and took more than one year to complete.6,7 These
chemical warfare agents, with low volatility and late onset of symptoms, pose unique detection
challenges that could be used to disrupt force projection and both strategic and operational maneuver. It does not take an active imagination to recognize the utility of their use.
Russian forces have fielded pharmaceutical-based agents, demonstrating a capability to quickly
and effectively neutralize unprotected personnel. In 2002 Russian forces employed a fentanyl-derived incapacitating agent in a counterterrorist hostage situation, killing all 40 terrorists and 130 of
the 800 hostages.8 Again, it is not difficult to see how an adversary could leverage such a capability
to impede the ability of a U.S.-led Joint Force to mobilize, deploy, and array forces.
In more recent memory, the COVID pandemic brought significant consequences to the U.S. Army
(and the rest of the DoD). Individual and collective training was put on hold or modified, multinational exercises were cancelled or moved into a virtual setting, and the might of the defense establishment turned its energies to mitigating the impact of a naturally-occurring virus.9 Across the world
our partners and adversaries alike were required to adapt. While the impacts of a future pandemic,
engineered or naturally-occurring, would certainly be felt globally, it is not difficult to see the potential for weaponized biological agents to prevent the United States and its Allies from bringing the
might of a coalition force to bear in a theater fight.
So, what can the Army do? Much can be done is the answer. Army forces enable the Joint Force to
terminate the theater fight not by employing WMD, but by maneuvering over the ground to destroy
Countering WMD Journal
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the enemy, seize and hold terrain, and mitigate the consequences of WMD employment by the enemy. As the Army orients on the future and its ability to achieve dominance in a multi-domain fight,
it must ensure that it modernizes forces and systems to meet emerging WMD challenges in order
to terminate the theater fight. The Army recognizes our critical role in deterring adversaries and the
possibility of theater WMD use. As part of Headquarters, Department of the Army G-3/5/7, the U.S.
Army Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA) leads Army efforts
to deter WMD use among our competitors and potential adversaries.
Institutional change begins with strategy. Central to related modernization efforts are a Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) Strategy, a new Biological Defense Strategy, and an effort to re-prioritize CBRN defense and survivability at all echelons. These efforts are driving change in several
areas that will show a lasting impact on our Soldiers and Army readiness. As with all Army missions
– doctrine, education, training, exercises and planning are key components in building this readiness. Fluency and understanding of WMD effects, adversary capabilities, and U.S. employment
of nuclear weapons must be prioritized or added to our leader development across the Total Army.
These efforts continue to bring key WMD concepts into our operational planning as an Army and
Joint Force. WMD-focused training and exercises at the theater strategic, operational and tactical
levels will ensure commanders and soldiers understand their role and the risks of conducting operations in a CBRN environment.
In April of 2021, the Army published the Army Biological Defense Strategy, which provides direction
for the Army as it looks at biological weapons and guides the synchronization of Department of
Defense and Army equities. Following its success, USANCA is leading development of the Army
CNI Strategy, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Strategy, and Survivability Strategy. The CNI Strategy will give direction on the integration of nuclear considerations into Army
processes and missions driving new or refined approaches in support of strategic objectives across
the spectrum of conflict – competition, crisis, and conflict. The Army, as part of the Joint Force, will
be able to secure national and theater objectives against a nuclear-armed adversary in support of
the U.S. strategic deterrent, and in the event deterrence fails, ensure Army lethality. The CWMD
Strategy and Survivability Strategy, when published, will provide clarity on the multi-domain Army’s
roles, responsibilities, and capabilities as applied as applied to operations to counter and survive
WMD threats.
All of these strategies will help focus efforts and ways to assist the Army, DoD, and other government partners in meeting strategic objectives. Producing strategies takes time and effort to address
the equities held by the many stakeholders. Far more challenging than developing strategies, however, is implementing them in this era of scarce resources. In a budget-constrained environment,
the Army must ensure that modernization efforts address innovations in adversary theater-focused
WMD capabilities while producing the multi-domain Army.
The Army is improving its ability to fight on the nuclear battlefield. In April 2020, the Joint Staff released Joint Publication 3-72 Nuclear Operations, which establishes a common lexicon for joint operations and reintroduces considerations of nuclear warfighting in a contemporary context. Nested
with this document, TRADOC is preparing to publish ATP 3-72 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures for Operations in a Nuclear Environment, which provides a basis for tactical commanders and staffs to plan for the impact of nuclear effects on the battlefield – a skill long atrophied
following the fall of the Soviet Union that seemingly removed our impetus for nuclear competition, and the attacks of September 11, 2001 that drove the nation to refocus on counter-terrorism.
Translating this emerging doctrine into understanding at the senior leader level, the Theater Nuclear Operations Executive Seminar (TNOES) facilitates discussion of theater integration of U.S.
nuclear capabilities into conventional operations including planning, targeting concepts, nuclear
weapon effects, and the impact of nuclear employment on the scheme of maneuver. The success
of TNOES has generated follow-on Army actions to develop a curriculum to integrate nuclear operations into PME at all echelons.
In addition to TNOES, The Army offers two theater-level courses that help educate the force in
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both nuclear and CWMD operations. The Theater Nuclear Operations Course (TNOC) educates
theater-level staff officers to plan for joint nuclear operations and targeting, and provides instruction
on impacts to conventional operations during U.S. nuclear employment. Separately, the CWMD
Advisor Course provides students with the analytical tools needed to solve problems posed by
WMD, CBRN materials, and dual-use materials. Successful graduates earn a D1 skill identifier and
use the knowledge gained to advise Combatant Commanders and staffs. These courses are only
the beginning.
With the emergence of the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept and the return to great power
competition, TRADOC’s Combined Arms Center (CAC) has updated the instruction given to Captains to include MDO to ensure they are ready to meet the challenges posed by changing environments today and in the future. USANCA has begun work with the CAC to update the Captain’s
Career Course curriculum to address nuclear operations and CWMD and is developing options for
other Professional Military Education at every echelon. This inclusion will pay dividends in the future by reducing the vulnerabilities our formations face from theater employment of WMD, ensuring
the MDO-ready force can fight, survive, and win on any battlefield.
As the Army refines its own doctrine, training, and education to address the theater risks posed by
WMD, we also support the Joint Force directly through assistance to Combatant Commands. In
2021 the Army took a leading role in helping USEUCOM write, coordinate, and publish a CWMD
and CBRN implementation plan that will enable theater forces to overcome gaps identified during
a 2019 OSD assessment. Key to success will be revised theater entry guidance that requires rotational units to integrate WMD challenges specific to the European theater into their pre-deployment
training and validation activities. Following the success of this effort, Army WMD experts will support USINDOPACOM in assessing land component readiness to overcome legacy and future WMD
threats from actors across the Pacific Theater.
To demonstrate the deterrent potential for ground forces at all echelons, the Army is conducting
a proof-of-concept in 2023 and 2024 that will demonstrate improved capabilities at echelon from
Land-Component Command to BCT to conduct large scale combat operations against a near-peer,
WMD-capable adversary. The 2023 effort is well into the planning phase and will focus primarily on
overcoming Russian WMD threats in the European theater. Initial planning is underway to follow
this European-focused pilot with a second effort in 2024 that demonstrates the capability of Army
formations to achieve multi-domain dominance in the face of Pacific-theater WMD threats.
These Army-wide efforts driven by HQDA G-3/5/7 will help ensure that our adversaries will not turn
to WMD to seek advantage. By demonstrating the will and ability of U.S. ground forces to overcome the challenges of WMD effects at the ASCC, Corps, Division, and BCT levels, the Army can
impose one of the most potent deterrents on our adversaries—the doubt that WMD will succeed
in terminating a theater conflict on beneficial terms. Success, though, depends on adapting and
changing priorities at all echelons of the Army. This will require re-prioritization of WMD-focused
training at every level of command, increased funding, and, the most important investment of all,
time to educate and train our soldiers to overcome this threat. Successfully adapting our priorities
and resources to address WMD threats will enable our divisions to converge and dominate across
all domains, and, where possible, end campaigns before they begin. If we fail to adapt, however,
the risk to our formations will increase as our adversaries continue to innovate, further reducing the
ability of our ground forces to overcome WMD threats to get into position, let alone win the fight.
It is imperative we develop, educate, train, and exercise with our Allies and Partners to bring them
with us in this pursuit of more effective deterrence. The United States and our partners must compete and campaign aggressively today as we build readiness for tomorrow’s contingences that, if
they come, will always involve the threat of WMD, and logically could witness WMD employment.
The more our Army and Joint force is capable of operating, fighting, and winning on the WMD battlefield the more we can secure the peace and win the first campaign of the next war.

We can be sure that in the future, as in the past, land power will terminate war.
We Must Be Ready.
Countering WMD Journal
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Metamaterial Technology for the Advancement of
Proliferation Detection
Christine Brockman, Minority Educational Institution Student Partnership
Program (MEISPP) Intern
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Research sponsored by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research &
Development (DNN R&D) Office of Proliferation Detection to further advance nuclear
proliferation detection technologies is constantly advancing. These technologies
include the development of materials and processes that are applicable to support
a variety of detection activities. “Materials by design” is an effort that is included in
this technological advancement; it encompasses the design and manufacture of
materials, processes, and complex systems for improved proliferation detection. These
concepts may include artificial intelligence and machine learning-aided design, the
progression of advanced manufacturing, and the development of metamaterials with
new advantageous properties.
Metamaterials can be defined as materials that derive their response from patterned structure.
These materials are engineered and designed to have properties that are not found in their
naturally occurring state. Further, metamaterials are designed using a combination of multiple
elements arranged in repeating patterns, at one or multiple scales, that need to be smaller than the
typical wavelength they aim to control.¹ The designed arrangement, shape, or orientation allows
for properties capable of manipulating electromagnetic waves to achieve new benefits that are
not present with conventional materials. Research and development of metamaterials has broad
applications within research relevant to proliferation detection missions, including the enhancement
of optical, radiation, and infrasound detectors. In particular, metamaterials may enable the reduction
of size, weight, and power of such systems and could improve overall sensitivity and specificity.
A metamaterial’s metasurface (the planar analog of a metamaterial) response can be customized
for a specific application through the microscopic design of the material layout. A basic example of
this is a split ring resonator, a structure that is a ring at subwavelength dimensions with a segment
removed from one side. As shown in Figure 1., this ring acts as an RLC circuit, with a resonance
frequency determined by its inductance and capacitance; the inductance and capacitance are
in turn determined by the ring geometry.² The variables shown in Figure 1 are used to calculate
the resonance frequency of the split ring. rav represents the average radius of the external split
ring resonator, d is the distance between the two resonators, and c represents the ring thickness.
The response of the split ring can then be modified by changing the dimensions of the ring. This
describes the principal concept of customizing and tuning a material in an effort to improve device
performance. Both 2-D and 3-D additive manufacturing techniques enable the rapid design and
development of metamaterials.
Ms. Christine Brockman participated in the Department of Energy’s Minority Educational Institution
Student Partnership Program (MEISPP) during Summer 2021. She interned for the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research & Development Office of
Proliferation Detection.She has a B.S. in Materials Science and Engineering from the Georgia Institute of
Technology and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Materials Science and Engineering from Oklahoma State
University. Her email address is christine.brockman@okstate.edu.
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Figure 1. Schematic of a double-turn split-ring resonator and
equivalent RLC tank circuit of a single split-ring resonator.²

There are several areas where metamaterials
have the potential to significantly impact proliferation detection missions. For example, metamaterial- and metasurface-based lenses and
color correctors can be used to replace lenses
within an optical system, enabling new functionality. Conventional refractive optical systems
rely on the combination of several, difficult to
fabricate lenses. They are generally bulky, costly, and time-consuming to manufacture with
high precision. However, “metalenses” based
on metasurfaces have been examined for the
creation of achromatic optical elements. Their
surfaces control phase delay as a function of
location, which is enabled via position-dependent lithographic patterning of a planar structure.³ Illustrated in Figure 2, metalenses can be
engineered with tailored dispersion for desired
achromatic focusing. To realize this, the phase
profile must satisfy an equation that accounts for
angular frequency, light speed, radial coordinate,
and focal length.⁴ Conventional diffractive lenses only satisfy the phase at the design frequency, leading to chromatic effects. However, with
the use of engineered metalenses, it is possible
to control the phase, resulting in an achromatic
focusing. Additionally, these materials provide
the advantage of weight reduction when compared to conventional optics, as their design is
thin. These optical components show potential
for modification and improvement of proliferation detection optical systems.

Figure 2. Schematic of the achromatic metalens concept.
The metalens is designed to provide spatially dependent
group delays such that wavepackets from different locations
arrive simultaneously at the focus. t1 and t2 represent complex transmission coefficients for each wavepacket. The yellow line represents the spherical wavefront.³
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Recent studies have also demonstrated that
metamaterials facilitate improved functionality
for scintillators, a core, background technology
for radiation detection. They provide a comparably low-cost method to identify the presence
of radiation. Scintillators convert high-energy
radiation to a near-visible or visible light. This is
achieved via radioluminescence, a method for
producing an isotropic burst of low-energy photons. A portion of this light then travels through
the scintillator crystal and is subsequently analyzed as an electrical signal produced by the
photodetector.⁴ In modern designs, this photodetector is typically a silicon photomultiplier.
Scintillators are also commonly used in medical
imaging, specifically Positron Emission Tomography (PET), where thousands of scintillator detectors are arranged to record correlation pairs
generated by absorbed biologically active radioisotopes.⁵ However, scintillators sometimes lack
the capability to differentiate between types of
radiation, identify the location of the radiation
source, or precisely measure the emission energy spectrum of that source. With the use of
metamaterials, scintillator performance can be
improved. Specifically, metasurface cladding on
the exterior of a scintillator can prevent signal
loss by reducing the transmission of light out
of the scintillator, which results in an improvement in signal and timing resolution. Improving
timing resolution can lead to enhanced signal
discrimination. A reduction in time resolution
would also lead to fewer random events being
recorded, leading to an improvement in the signal-to-noise ratio.⁶ By control of the shape, size,
and relative location of each structure within the
reflection metasurface, the relative phase introduced by induced dipoles to incident light can
be controlled. Metamaterial enhanced detection
may also provide a method to enable improved
detector efficiency by controlling detector bandwidth or improving detector response through
resonant interaction. Metasurfaces have also
allowed for the customization of spectroscopy
systems, as they have been used for entirely
solid-state miniaturized spectrometers where
the dispersive element is integrated monolithically with the detector.⁷
Currently, a developing research project sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
R&D Office of Proliferation Detection focuses on
the design of a neutron detector that uses an
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anisotropic scintillator metamaterial (ASMM).8
Figure 3 shows a graphic of the detector design.
Neutrons are a signature of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). This detector will integrate the metamaterial scintillator into a fully
functioning detector that will locate and characterize SNM. Existing instruments, such as thermal neutron detectors, can identify the presence
of neutrons, but limitations occur with the ability
to locate sources or measure the neutron spectrum to characterize sources. This ASMM neutron detector can identify the presence of SNM,
point to the location of the material, and characterize the composition using spectroscopy.⁸
These capabilities align with nonproliferation
missions, as this technology will help monitor
SNM under safeguards or treaty verification, as
well as in emergency scenarios. In safeguards
or treaty verification, identifying the location
of SNM or using spectroscopy to characterize
SNM can prevent tampering or spoofing. Recognizing the source location can also reduce
backgrounds in interrogation measurements.
This ongoing technological development is an
improved alternative to existing neutron detection technologies while offering lower cost and
complexity.

liferation detection due to the ability to control
and detect infrasound waves and vibrations
through a range of frequencies. Natural infrasound can travel far distances, making it an invaluable resource for monitoring seismic phenomena such as nuclear explosions, volcanic
eruptions, and severe storms.⁹ In infrasound
detection, sensors can be employed for the
detection of nuclear explosions.10 Typically,
pressure sensors are used to capture waves,
but they cannot encode the direction of arrival. This information is critical when the source
location is unknown beforehand. Capturing
this information would require the implementation of sensors with apertures ranging from
tens of meters to kilometers depending on the
wavelengths of interest. This can be impractical in many cases, depending on locations
that may lack the space. With a sensor based
on acoustic metamaterials, a much smaller
footprint can be achieved, expanding the locations where the sensor can be deployed.
Metamaterial-based sensors use arrays of
sensitive microbarometers to identify the location of infrasound sources and detect the direction of arrival. Metamaterials also offer additional possibilities in wave control because
infrasound frequencies are very low with correspondingly large wavelengths. For this application, sub-wavelength control is essential
to having devices of a practical size.⁹ These
concepts have only recently been extended to
infrasound, and further research continues to
investigate the applicability.

Metamaterials currently have the potential to
immediately impact NNSA missions and national security. This area of materials development has progressed to many applications.
Metasurfaces can be designed to modify signals, optical modeling software developed
for metamaterial design has shown potential
for signal inversion, and metamaterials have
made
it increasingly possible to obtain details
Figure 3. ASMM neutron detector design. Composed
of alternating microscopic zones (50x50x50 microns) of of a hidden target when compared to using opscintillators small enough to give the detector sensitivity to
tical probes alone. Extensive work performed
the angle between a neutron-induced proton recoil and the
at
U.S. National Laboratories has explored the
long axis or “grain” of the zones. (J. Brodsky, 2020. Used
applicability
of metamaterials; there exists the
with permission)
ability of metamaterials to enhance developAnother group of metamaterials, aside from ment within proliferation detection, and they
those for optical and electromagnetic applica- can be realized in technology through further
tions, is acoustic metamaterials. Acoustic meta- research and implementation.
materials are of interest in the context of proCountering WMD Journal
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The Fate of the USS Arkansas (BB-33) in
Crossroads Baker
Jeremy Best, Maj, USMC (R) and Christopher Mauney, PhD, Scientist
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Summary
Using the extensive data that was recorded during Operation Crossroads in
1946, staff at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) conducted an analysis to
determine the fate of the USS Arkansas during test Baker. The recorded data
are checked with a basic physics calculation and a calculation using a modern
hydrodynamic physics code. These methods help to understand and validate
that the USS Arkansas was not lifted vertically stern-high into the water column,
in contrast to the myth based on the photograph showing a mysterious dark
streak in the water column, long thought to be the Arkansas.
Operation Crossroads
Operation Crossroads had its origins before the first atomic bomb test was executed in the New
Mexico desert in 1945. Operation Crossroads started as a rare collaboration between the Chiefs
of the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Ordinance (Department of the Navy) which both decided
that as the second world war was ending in the European theater, and the Pacific campaign was
reaching its climax, that the best way to disposition the many ships held by the United States (including captured vessels) was to conduct full-scale explosive tests to obtain data on survivability
of naval vessels in wartime. The intent was to substantially expand the data and understanding
from small-scale explosive tests already conducted, leading to better ship design in the future [1].
This planning for full-scale destructive testing of naval vessels took on a different perspective after
the Trinity test on 16 July 1945, the first ever atomic device detonation. Only three weeks after this
momentous and successful test, the first atomic bomb used in combat was dropped on Hiroshima,
Japan. Following the second atomic bomb dropped at Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, and the unconditional surrender of Japan on 14 August 1945, the war was officially ended.
“On 1 October 1945, Vice Admiral Cochrane and Vice Admiral Hussey sent another letter to the
Chief of Naval Operations stating that the appearance of the atomic bomb 'has made it imperative
.Jeremy Best, Maj USMC (ret) is a Program Manager at Los Alamos National Laboratory, in Los Alamos,
New Mexico. He has a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Oklahoma, and a M.S. in
Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology. While on active duty he was previously
assigned as a Physics Instructor at the United States Naval Academy. His email address is jbest@lanl.
gov.
Christopher Mauney is a staff scientist with HPC-ENV at Los Alamos National Laboratory. He has a
B.S. in computer science from University of North Carolina at Wilmington, and a Ph.D. in physics from
Oregon State University. He conducted his post-doc also at Los Alamos with the CCS-2 division. His
email address is mauneyc@lanl.gov.
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that a program of full-scale testing be undertaken to determine the effects of this type of bomb,
both underwater and above water, against ships
of various types'”[1].
Following presidential approval, the Joint Chiefs
created Task Force One on 11 January 1946,
commanded by Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy.
Vice Admiral Blandy chose the Bikini Atoll in the
western Pacific due to its remote location, the infrastructure there and in the surrounding islands
left after World War II and its ease of use for this
type of testing.
Crossroads Able

The USS Arkansas, situated approximately 620
yds from the actual zero point, suffered substantial damage from test Able. There was considerable damage to the starboard side and stern
superstructure. The blast hit at an apparent
120-degree angle from the bow and about 30
degrees up from water level. The deck plating in
the stern area was buckled and dished, particularly on the starboard side, where the blast originated from. This blast also heavily damaged
the boiler stack indicating heavy air shock to the
entire ship. The boilers inside were heavily damaged, which would have significantly impaired
the ship’s mobility [4]. This blast likely dislodged
any caked-on stack soot that would have been
packed in the exhaust stack and allowed it to
be in a loose, powdered form that could easily become lofted from a subsequent transverse
shock.

The first experimental test of an air-dropped
atomic weapon, and only the second full scale
atomic test in history, Operation Crossroads,
shot Able (Figure 1) served many purposes.
The first was evaluating the effects of this type of
weapon on ships of various types, classes, and Crossroads Baker
orientations in the target array. The second was
training for bomber crews in atomic weapons
handling and delivery. The third was creating
a collaboration between the Navy, the Army Air
Corps, and the newly named Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in conducting large-scale nuclear weapon experiments.

This test was conducted on 30 June 1946, with
a Mark 3 “Fat Man”-style implosion device nicknamed “Gilda” dropped from the specially modified B-29 “Dave’s Dream” and detonated 523 ft
above the target array of ships. The blast was
equivalent to approximately 21 kilotons of TNT
[2]. The bomb missed the intended mark (USS
Nevada) by approximately 615 yards to the
Figure 2., Crossroads Baker Test Photo (LANL Archives)
west-northwest, detonating 50 yards from the
The underwater nuclear test named Crossroads
USS Gilliam (APA-57) [3].
Baker (Figure 2) was conducted on 25 July
1946 to study the effects of an underwater nuclear blast on ships of various classes and orientations to the blast. This test was also conducted with a Mark 3 “Fat Man”-style implosion
device moored 90 ft underwater at a depth of
180 ft from surface to ocean bottom. This blast
produced the equivalent explosive yield of 21
kT of TNT [2]. This was the first underwater test
of a nuclear device, and only the third recorded nuclear experiment to date. The target array
shown in Figure 3 was set up to allow data collection for all types of available ships. Most of
these ships were old, obsolete, and due to be
Figure 1, Crossroads Able Test Photo, (LANL Archives)
decommissioned. The device was suspended
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beneath LSM-60 (Landing Ship Mechanized), which was destroyed in the initial shockwave travelling upward and the subsequent high-velocity water column. The nearest ship to LSM-60 was the
USS Arkansas (BB-33). She was located 223 yds from the center of the burst, angled just over 10
degrees from the starboard beam or 107 degrees relative bearing. Figure 3 shows the relative position of the bow pointing generally east. The Arkansas was moored by both bow and stern mooring
anchors to maintain her relative orientation to the blast, which is nearly starboard broadside to the
zero point [1]. These mooring anchors provided significant resistance to lateral as well as vertical
movement.

Figure 3., Crossroads Baker Ship Target Array (LANL Archives)

The USS Arkansas
The Battleship USS Arkansas BB-33, shown here underway in Figure 4, was a Wyoming class
battleship commissioned in September 1912. She was 562 ft long, had a 106 ft beam and 30 ft
draft [1,8]. Throughout her long career, she served in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. She spent
most of World War I escorting ships across the Atlantic and training Naval Academy midshipmen
in their summer cruises. During World War II the Arkansas participated in the invasion of Normandy in the Atlantic, as well as the battles at Iwo Jima and Okinawa in the Pacific. After the end of
World War II, the Arkansas was designated obsolete and was set for decommissioning. As a final
service to the nation, she was added to the target array for Operation Crossroads. She was sunk
within seconds of the detonation of the Baker device due to severe hull buckling and collapse on
the starboard side (nearest the blast); her port side was significantly less damaged. The Arkansas
now lies at the bottom of the lagoon along with the 13 other ships sunk in the test series including
the carrier USS Saratoga; three submarines: USS Pilotfish, USS Skipjack, and USS Apogon, and
several other ships [8].
Countering WMD Journal
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Figure 4. USS Arkansas BB-33: USS Arkansas Underway,
https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/us-navy-ships/battleships/arkansas-bb-33/80-G-229753.html

Test Data from Baker
The overall purpose of Operation Crossroads was to obtain data on the effects of nuclear explosives on naval vessels above and below the water. During the Crossroads tests, there were many
data collection efforts. One was to obtain pressure data in the water, and in the ships that were in
the array. Some ships were more instrumented than others. Unfortunately, the pressure data from
the Arkansas, like other ships closer to surface zero in the Baker test, was lost when the ship was
sunk [5,6]. As an alternative to direct pressure gauge measurements, the pressure in the water
around the blast was recorded, and is presented here as a reference for further calculations shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: Values of peak pressure in the water halfway between surface and the bottom [5].

The water velocity directly above bomb was recorded at around 11,000 ft/sec. The pressure gauges just below the surface of the water measured 4800 psi at 835 ft from zero point for <1 millisecond. [6]. These data points are important for the following basic physics calculation.
Physics Calculations
Here is the basic physics equation and relationship to determine approximate theoretical relationships and expected values. This is what is colloquially referred to as a “back of the envelope”
calculation.
Force = mass * acceleration = pressure * area
The USS Arkansas displaced 26,000 tons = 23586803 kg (mass) and had a projected area of A=
29,916 ft² = 2779 m². This simple geometry uses flat plates to approximate the hull of the Arkansas
in the water. 4800 psi = 3.309E7 Pa. Rearranging the terms above, we see that:
3.309E7 Pa * 2779 m² = 9.19805E10 Newtons (N) = 23586803 kg * acceleration
9.19805E10 N / 23586803 kg = 3900 m/s² = 398 g
This acceleration of ~400 g estimated here to have hit the Arkansas from the bottom lines up
very well with the maximum recorded accelerations from other ships that were instrumented with
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indenter gauges, putty gauges, and reed-type acceleration gauges. The ships closest to the zero
point of Baker that were not sunk were the USS Pensacola, USS New York, and USS Nevada [3].
Regardless of their distance from the zero point, the ~400 g shocks were not of sufficient duration—
less than a millisecond—to cause substantial lift to any of the ships in target array [3,6]. This can
be understood in the analogy of a punch vs a shove. The longer duration of the shove will cause
substantial movement. To lift a warship like the Arkansas, the duration of the acceleration would
have to be much longer than the millisecond that was recorded in this test.
As the Arkansas was anchored to the sea floor, both bow and stern, this provided substantial
resistance to any lifting and tipping movements caused by the blast. The resistance from the
mooring anchors possibly resulted in an increase in the damage experienced by the Arkansas
from shot Baker. These facts, and the physics calculated above, make it clear that the Arkansas
wasn’t going anywhere but down. Due to the mass of water falling from the large water column, the
Arkansas is assumed to have been swamped and pushed into the lagoon bottom with substantial
force. She now rests inverted on the bottom of the lagoon showing the damage from the blast. The
mooring anchors are still attached to the bow and stern, indicating further proof that she was not
lifted vertically into the water column [8].
Hydrodynamic Physics Simulation
When looking into the fate of the USS Arkansas, the authors wanted to exercise the capability of Los
Alamos High Performance Computing (HPC) using a validated and well-understood hydrodynamic
multi-physics code. This simulation provides a good validation of the code, relative to the data
collected as well as visible proof that the code can simulate a complex underwater burst. For this
calculation, the authors used the Cassio code, a LANL designed hydrodynamic physics code, using
the inputs constructed from available references as well as NV-209, the official unclassified test
history [2]. Cassio is an Eulerian-mesh code with adaptive mesh refinement (AMR) constructed
at each time-step to place maximal computational power where the physics is most dynamic. Due
to the complications of simulating the geometry of a 3D ship on the water on a 2D axisymmetric
computational grid, along with the mooring lines holding her down, the author’s simulated the blast
in the code without the USS Arkansas in the simulation.
Figure 5 shows a density color plot of the explosion at different time steps. The pressure plot and

Figure 5: Cassio Simulation of Crossroads Baker in Density Color
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corresponding data corresponds to the pressures recorded in the test (not shown here). This was
done primarily to understand and have a 1st order validation of the code and how it is calculating
the blast in the water. Having a way to visualize the test and understand the data was very valuable
to have high confidence in the conclusions presented below. Although there is not a way to provide
a direct comparison, the photographs in Figure 6 taken from the film “Bombs at Bikini” correlate
visually to the simulation.

Figure 6: Time sequence photos of Crossroads Baker (from film Operation Crossroads (LANL Archives))

Conclusion
After review of the USS Arkansas, the two shots Able and Baker, and the shock data from both of
those tests, we were able to understand the forces, shock duration, and acceleration that happened
during the test. The large inertial mass of the battleship, her broadside orientation to the blast, the
limited momentum transfer-short pulse duration of the water shock, and the fact that she was
moored to the bottom of the lagoon by both bow and stern gives confidence to the conclusion that
the USS Arkansas was not thrown substantially into the bulk of the water column.
The data from the hydrodynamic simulation lines up well with recorded data from test Baker. The
basic physics calculation also validates the forces and accelerations likely experienced by the USS
Arkansas. This provides a point of validation for the code as well as helping to definitively bust the
myth of the dark patch in Figure 2 being the USS Arkansas on end.
What caused the dark patch in the photograph that has sparked the myth and the debate? The
consensus among many experts here at LANL and those who study this is that the soot from the
boilers on the Arkansas was shaken loose from the Crossroads Able test and was pushed out of the
stacks as the pressure wave from the Baker test hit the bottom of the ship and travelled up through
it, leaving the cloud of soot mixing with the water vapor just above the ship in the photograph.
Many thanks to historian Alan Carr, and retired scientist Tom Kunkle for their substantial
contributions to this article.
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Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons on the Future
Battlefield
Ms. Angela Sheffield, Student, Eisenhower School, National Defense University
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Introduction
United States policy and national security strategy recognize the existential threat
of nuclear weapons and the tenuous peace they preserve: nuclear weapons are
the most piowerful instruments of war and the ultimate strategic deterrent. While
certain nuclear weapon types are indeed so powerful that the detonation of a
single warhead may cause such horrific damage as to induce an adversary to
stand down, other nuclear weapon types produce significantly more limited effects.
While nuclear doctrine of the Cold War-era threat hinged on an exchange of nuclear
super bombs between the Soviet Union and the United States, contemporary
conflict and competition requires a more nuanced approach that flexes the range
of the nuclear deterrent.
Current U.S. nuclear doctrine defined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
references “modest supplements” to the United States’ non-strategic nuclear
weapons capability and terms for their use.¹ In 2021, Secretary of Defense
Lloyd Austin introduced the concept of integrated deterrence, outlining the need
for combined nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence and conflict
escalation, potentially including battlefield use of lower yield nuclear weapons.²
The forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is likely to include references for
nuclear weapons use in a theater context. As U.S. nuclear and deterrence doctrine
evolve to address the challenges of the current era of strategic competition, U.S.
military war planners must be prepared for the potential employment of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons and become experts in their ethical use. The United
States and its allies should consider a hybrid framework that draws on utilitarianism
and just war theory to evaluate courses of military action that include the use of
non-strategic nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
Ms. Angela Sheffield is a student at the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy at
the National Defense University. She is on detail from the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), where she serves as the Senior Program Manager for Data Science and
Artificial Intelligence at the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development. Ms.
Sheffield has a B.S. in Economics from the United States Air Force Academy and a M.S. in Operations
Research from Kansas State University. Prior to joining NNSA, Ms. Sheffield led project teams at DOE’s
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop modeling and simulation and data science
methodologies to inform CWMD policy and operations. Ms. Sheffield joined PNNL after a distinguished
career as an Operations Research Analyst in the U.S. Air Force. She specialized in the research and
development and technical intelligence of U.S. and adversary weapon systems. Her email address is
angela.m.sheffield.stu@ndu.edu.
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Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
There is no agreed upon definition for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some distinguish
strategic from non-strategic nuclear weapons
based on strict interpretation of arms control
policy: weapons not covered by the New START
treaty are considered “non-strategic.”³ Others
make the distinction based on delivery system
and whether the weapon has intercontinental
range.⁴ A third definition reflects both the
intended effect of the nuclear weapon and
its technical specifications.⁵ According to this
definition, non-strategic nuclear weapons are
typically low in yield and designed to produce
limited destructive effects in order to achieve
specific, tactical objectives on a battlefield.⁷ The
use of the term “non-strategic nuclear weapons”
in this paper aligns most closely with this third
definition. A strategic attack is “specifically
selected to achieve national strategic objectives”
and “seeks to weaken the adversary’s ability or
will to engage in conflict … without necessarily
having to achieve operational objectives as a
precondition.” In contrast, tactical operations are
limited in scope, directly support a commander’s
scheme of maneuver, and are limited to an area
of military operations.⁸
In general, an explosion is the extremely rapid
release of energy and vigorous expansion of
high-temperature and high-pressure gasses
caused by a reaction. Conventional explosions
are created by a chemical reaction; nuclear
explosions by nuclear fission and nuclear fusion
reactions.⁹ The energy released by a nuclear
explosion produces four types of destructive
effects: blast, thermal radiation, and initial and
residual nuclear radiation. Electro-Magnetic
Pulse (EMP) will not be addressed with regards
to non-strategic nuclear weapons. The explosive
blast itself is the primary destructive force in
a nuclear detonation.10 In this way, nuclear
weapons are similar to conventional weapons.
However, the blast produced by a nuclear
explosion can be thousands (or millions) of times
more powerful than a conventional explosion and
requires significantly less explosive material.11
The nuclear weapon yield, or the amount of
energy produced by the explosive blast, is
measured by the kilotons of trinitrotoluene
(TNT) required for a conventional explosion that
releases the same amount of blast energy.12 For

example, a one kiloton nuclear weapon yields
the same explosive power as 1,000 metric
tons of TNT. A nuclear weapon is typically
considered non-strategic at yields between 1
and 10 kilotons.13 For comparison, the 2020
conventional explosion in Beirut produced a
blast equivalent to about 300 tons of TNT; the
1921 explosion of a fertilizer plant in Oppau,
Germany that killed 565 people was equivalent
to a 1 kiloton blast; and the nuclear bombs
dropped on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945 produced
an estimated 15-kiloton blast.14
In addition to the blast, nuclear explosions
emit thermal radiation: light and heat that can
cause injury to the unshielded and spark fires.
Additionally, a nuclear blast produces harmful
initial and residual (fallout) nuclear radiation.
Though the range of initial radiation can extend
beyond the range of the blast, most within range
of the initial nuclear radiation are likely to be
destroyed by the blast itself. The explosion also
disperses very small radioactive particulates
over the local blast area. These particulates
produce ionizing radiation at extremely high
dose rates in the hours immediately following
the blast, posing a significant health hazard
to those exposed to the particulates. While it
may take months or years for the radioactive
material to completely decay away, the residual
radiation decays to levels low enough to permit
movement in and through the area within weeks,
days, or even hours, depending on the yield of
the nuclear weapon.15 The extent of residual
radiation can be mitigated in the way the weapon
is employed.16
U.S. Nuclear Doctrine.
The foremost objective of U.S. nuclear policy
and strategy is to deter aggression and
preserve peace.17 U.S. nuclear deterrence
strategy has evolved since the development
of nuclear weapons, characterized by two
predominant approaches: the straightforward
concept of symmetric deterrence that dominated
Cold War nuclear strategy and tailored
deterrence strategies, which were introduced
during Kennedy administration and gained
prominence with the collapse of the Soviet
Union.18 The development of second generation,
thermonuclear bombs within five years of the
Japan bombings introduced nuclear weapons
with yields thousands of times more powerful
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than the original A-bomb.19 Combined with
long-range, accurate delivery platforms, these
sophisticated nuclear weapons systems held
cities and valuable targets an ocean away at
constant risk of total annihilation.20 Great powers
pursued robust second-strike capabilities,
capable of delivering a retaliatory strike at levels
of unacceptable destruction, even following a
debilitating nuclear attack.21 The guarantee of
massive nuclear reprisal set the doctrine of Cold
War-era deterrence.
A more complex threat landscape emerged
with the fall of the Iron Curtain, marked by the
rise of regional nuclear powers, increasing
sophistication of conventional weapons, and
the proliferation of non-nuclear weapons of
mass destruction.22 To match these demands,
the United States adopted a more nuanced
approach that emphasizes the design of specific
deterrence strategies tailored to each situation
or threat and broadens deterrence to include
non-nuclear capabilities.23 The evolution of
deterrence culminates in the emerging strategy
of integrated deterrence, which seeks to
seamlessly combine conventional and nuclear
military capabilities with emerging technologies
and across all domains of operation.24, 25
According to U.S. nuclear policy, tailored
deterrence requires increased diversity in
nuclear capabilities to expand flexibility
and enable limited, graduated response.26
Specifically, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) outlines the use of non-strategic nuclear
weapons to fill any perceived gaps in U.S.
deterrence capability and increase flexibility in
deterring regional aggression.27 Though the
United States recognizes the complementary
role of non-nuclear capabilities in deterrence,
they “cannot replace U.S. nuclear forces for this
purpose.”28 While the 2018 NPR does not enable
“nuclear war-fighting,” U.S. policy recognizes
the use of nuclear weapons “should deterrence
fail” and calls for the integration of nuclear and
conventional forces to “respond with whatever
force is necessary in a nuclear environment.”
According to theory, these capabilities, in turn,
further increase deterrence.29
Russian Nuclear Doctrine

the 2018 NPR highlights elements of U.S.
nuclear strategy developed in response to the
purported Russian strategy of “escalate to deescalate”: coercing the end of a conventional
conflict through the limited use of nuclear
weapons.30 However, Western scholars of
nuclear deterrence and Russian strategy do not
agree that “escalate to de-escalate” accurately
describes Russian nuclear doctrine.31
In 2020, Russia released its Basic Principles
of State Policy of the Russian Federation on
Nuclear Deterrence, the first open publication
on Russian nuclear doctrine and posture. Basic
Principles describes the primary aim of Russia’s
nuclear forces as defensive by nature: to
provide sufficient deterrence from nuclear or
conventional war and guarantee protection and
integrity of the state.32 According to declared
policy, the Russian Federation considers
nuclear weapons “exclusively” as a means of
deterrence.33 However, Russia maintains the
right to use nuclear weapons as “an extreme
and compelled” measure in response to the
use of nuclear weapons, other weapons of
mass destruction, or the use of conventional
weapons when the “very existence of the state
is in jeopardy”.34
While this transparent description of Russian
strategy does not completely repudiate the
concept of “escalate to de-escalate,” they
present a more complete description of the
goals of Russian nuclear doctrine: to control
escalation and end conflict – whether nuclear
or conventional – on terms favorable to
Russia, particularly in a regional conflict and
to ensure the integrity of the Russian territory.
U.S. Air Force General John E. Hyten, when
serving as the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, explained that Russian doctrine
is not “escalate to de-escalate, it’s escalate
to win.”35 While Russian president Vladimir
Putin assures that Russian nuclear use policy
is “all very clear and specific”36, comments by
Russian officials sometimes present options
for nuclear use beyond this doctrine. In reality,
Russian nuclear doctrine serves as guidance for
policy and organization of the Russian defense
departments, not a manual for how to wage
war.37

In many ways, U.S. interpretation of Russian
nuclear and deterrence doctrine informs U.S. Whatever the true nature of Russia’s nuclenuclear policy and strategy. For example, ar strategy may be, there is an emphasis on
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Figure 1, Russian troops load a missile onto an Iskander-M
launcher during a 2016 exercise.38

nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine
and modernization.39 Russia maintains a diverse and modernized arsenal of strategic and
non-strategic nuclear weapons and is currently
in the middle of a decades-long program to further modernize its nuclear forces.40 The range
of capabilities afforded by this modern nuclear force would enable the flexibility required to
implement a deterrence doctrine that extends
beyond simple deterrence and toward ensuring success in a regional warfighting.41 These
principles were demonstrated in the Grom 2019
strategic command staff exercise, which tested
Russia’s defensive reaction to conflict escalation42 with integrated strategic and non-strategic
capabilities.43
Framing the Ethics of Non-Strategic Nuclear
Weapon Use
Academics, decisionmakers, and historians
have engaged in debate on the ethics of nuclear weapons since their only operational use by
the United States against the Japanese cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indelibly influenced by
this history, nuclear ethics typically centers on
the effects of use of nuclear weapons against
a civilian populace, the perceived indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapon effects, and an
assumption that a nuclear explosion will cause
mass human destruction and environmental
damage.44 While decisionmakers must contemplate these very real consequences when
considering the use of strategic nuclear weapons, they do not apply to the same degree
when framing the ethics of non-strategic nuclear
weapons on the battlefield.

Utilitarianism frames challenges and choices
by their outcomes, seeking the greatest good
and the least harm to the largest number of
people.45 Decisionmakers applying a utilitarian
framework enumerate and quantify the costs
and benefits of each course of action and
choose the alternative that maximizes the ratio
of good to bad.46 Utilitarianism is widely used to
address strategic challenges facing government
decisionmakers including policy decisions,
judicial choices, and crisis management such
as disaster response.47 However, decision
makers applying utilitarianism must beware of
its shortcomings in practice: undervaluing longterm and indirect effects and the inclination to
determine, ultimately, that ends justify whatever
means.48
Decisionmakers can leverage utilitarianism
to evaluate the use of non-strategic nuclear
weapons on the battlefield because the most
significant effects – the destructive and harmful
effects produced by the explosion itself – are
predictable and quantifiable. Furthermore,
decisionmakers can pragmatically compare the
use of non-strategic nuclear weapons against
alternative courses of action, such as the use of
conventional weapons. However, utilitarianism
alone is an insufficient tool in framing the use
of non-strategic nuclear weapons as it may
fail to adequately capture indirect externalities
and long-term effects of a nuclear explosion of
any size. More importantly, utilitarianism alone
is incompatible with just war tradition and laws
of conflict, which prescribe foundational ethical
and legal principles that guide the United States
in warfare.
Putting Theory to Practice
Just war tradition defines a set of rules shared
between people at war.49 These rules have
evolved into the treaty and international laws
governing armed conflict.50
To frame the
challenge of non-strategic nuclear weapons and
evaluate the ethics of their use on the battlefield,
decisionmakers begin with just war tradition
and the law of armed conflict, then leverage
utilitarianism to assess potential courses of
action against the criteria established in these
conventions. The first condition of just war, jus
ad bellum, defines rules that justify going to
war.51 Decisionmakers should use the remaining
criteria of jus in bellum, just conduct in war,
and jus post bellum, just conduct during post-
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war reconstruction, as guidance to sufficiently these effects requires theoretical, probabilistic
enumerate short and long-term consequences projection and is extremely difficult to validate.
of a tactical nuclear strike.
Planning Now for the War of the Future
Within the criteria that define jus in bellum The complex issue of non-strategic nuclear
decisionmakers should consider the benefits weapons demands analysis using more than
of the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons – one ethical lens. National security policymakers
the likelihood of achieving the tactical military and planners should leverage an approach
outcome – against its negative effects. Though that draws on numerous frameworks, such
it is hard to imagine, the preponderance of direct as utilitarianism and just war theory, to
effects produced by a non-strategic nuclear thoroughly and effectively evaluate military
weapon would be confined to the battlefield. actions that employ non-strategic nuclear
Nonetheless, incidental harm to civilians is weapons. Operational planners should apply
inevitable. Decisionmakers should weigh the use this framework iteratively to evaluate specific
of non-strategic nuclear weapons against criteria courses of action, using the results to tailor new
delineated in legal codes mandating distinction alternatives. Decisionmakers, policymakers,
between civilian and military targets, restraining and operational planners should practice this
disproportionate incidental harm to civilian life or assessment now to build capacity and muscle
objects, and prohibiting the use of weapons that memory in the ethical use of these instruments
cause unnecessary suffering.52 Jus post bellum of war.
offers a useful prompt to consider the long-term The era of Great Power Competition demands
effects of nuclear battle, such as denied access integrated and highly calibrated implementation
to land and long-term environmental effects of of U.S. military capabilities to meet national
radiation to water and soil.53 In accordance with security
challenges
across
competition,
utilitarian philosophy, decisionmakers should change, conflict, and crisis.57 This will require
select options that achieve military objectives a sophisticated and practiced understanding
with the least harm rather than options that bring of the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in
more decisive military victory.54
deterring nuclear and conventional conflict and,
Realistically, the use of a non-strategic nuclear
weapon during conflict will also produce
indirect effects beyond the kinetic effects of
the weapon. These indirect effects are likely
to be greater in scale than the tactical aims for
which the weapon was intended. This concept
of disproportionate effects underpins nuclear
deterrence theory. For example, the U.S. Joint
Publication on Nuclear Doctrine explains that
the “employment of nuclear weapons can
radically alter or accelerate the course of a
campaign. A nuclear weapon could be brought
into the campaign […] to escalate the conflict
to sue for peace on more favorable terms.55”
Decisionmakers should consider that the use of
a non-strategic nuclear weapon in conflict may
preclude further harm resulting from continuing
warfare; official adoption of this strategy may
deter future conflict. However, the introduction
of a nuclear weapon would fundamentally and
unpredictably alter a conflict, a consideration
reflected in statements by U.S. and Russian
policymakers that a nuclear war cannot be
won and should never be fought.56 As is often
the case with complex problems, analyzing
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should deterrence fail, achieving U.S. national
objectives at the lowest level of damage
possible. U.S. decisionmakers and operational
planners must become experts in all manners of
potential warfare with great power competitors
to ensure the comprehensive effectiveness of
the United States’ nuclear deterrent should it
face non-strategic nuclear weapons in conflict.

Figure 2,Unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic
missile launches during an operational test.58
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Introduction
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency Counter WMD Technologies Department (DTRA-RD/CX)
within the Research & Development Directorate is focused on providing the National Security Enterprise with improved tools and methods supporting critical functions across the kill chain in order
to hold adversary WMD weapons, facilities, systems, infrastructure, and networks at risk. This mission focus includes the full gamut of WMD and enabling technologies, addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives weapons, as well as delivery systems (e.g., missiles)
and protective systems (e.g., underground facilities). These research and development activities
are aligned with doctrine set forth in Joint Publication 3-40, “Joint Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” 27 November 2019. As these new tools and methods are transitioned to partners,
one precept remains inviolable: a trained specialist is always in the loop, whether for target characterization, weaponeering¹ solution development, or attack planning to meet Commander’s intent.
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The critical kill chain functions remain much as
they have been since World War II: identify the
target, characterize the target and its vulnerabilities, evaluate weapons performance against
the target to achieve the desired outcome, plan
and execute an attack, and assess results. Driving R&D for new tools and methods supporting
these functions is the sheer number of targets,
the increasing sophistication of our potential adversaries, emerging technologies enabling new
threat modalities, and the growing awareness
among adversaries of US capabilities, tactics,
and weapons systems performance.
The Combatant Commands and the National-level Agencies have increased the tempo of
surveillance and collection activities in response
to the increase in number of targets. In turn, this
has resulted in expanding data repositories, but
the analytic processes to convert data in these
repositories into useful information has struggled to keep up. The problem is exacerbated,
especially as the data repositories migrate to
the cloud, through lack of common standards for
data structures, query syntax, and expressions
of uncertainty, adding additional complexity to
the analysis workflows.

problems consisting of a hand full of entities, not
thousands, as is the case, with underground facilities today. Grouping across such a large population also relies strongly on the metadata associated with the individual targets, not just the
parameters input into weapons effects models.
This metadata may be resident in separate data
repositories, further complicating the analyst’s
job.
Three current programs under the Counter WMD
Technologies Department illustrate how DTRARD/CX is tackling these challenging problems
through application of advanced technologies
such as High-Performance Computing-enabled
modeling, Machine Learning for information extraction, and optimization strategies for evaluating courses of action.
Hard Target Characterization
An advanced technology enhancement to the
Underground Target Analysis System (UTAS) is
under development by the Target Assessment
Technologies Division (CXA) within CX. DTRA
is a founding partner addressing the global proliferation of underground facilities (UGF). CXA
contributes engineering-domain expertise to
develop characterizations of adversary UGFs,
and research and development efforts to realize
improvements in fidelity and confidence in the
characterizations, as well as process improvements to increase analytic throughput in a resource-constrained environment. Under current
workflows, characterizations are labor-intensive
with focus placed on addressing priority target
requirements. Typically, these priority requirements address some of the most complex and
unique adversary UGFs. This impacts scheduling and executing the characterizations and requires analytic insights gained through years of
experience. As a corollary, the lower-priority targets tend to be less complex and more broadly
similar where automated tools can more effectively be applied.

Emerging technologies – whether for improvised explosive devices, novel chemical or biological warfare agent production, or other WMD
– require developing in-depth understanding of
acquisition pathways, and both stochastic and
deterministic science-based modeling tools for
weapons effects analysis, collateral damage
predictions, and sensitivity studies. Analyzing
emerging acquisition pathways is important for
identifying critical node vulnerabilities to disrupt
an adversary’s capabilities short of full-scale
conflict. As stated in JP 3-40, “WMD defeat involves the Joint Force Commander employing
tailored capabilities to neutralize or destroy
weapons and agents; delivery systems, and
materials, facilities, and processes, including
the functional or structural defeat of hardened
The starting point for any characterization, autotargets.#2 The programs discussed below directmated or not, is to query databases across the
ly address these requirements.
Federated intelligence and warfighter commuWhere a number of targets can logically be nities. Many of these databases are migrating
grouped into populations of similar entities, the to the cloud, where software agents can readily
time-tested approach of developing templates perform the ingest and filtering functions. Data
can yield useful preliminary analysis results in includes terrain, imagery, geology, and allsupport of these mission objectives. Historically, source intelligence. Functional flows supporting
applying templates has been used to address DTRA’s automated Hard Target characteriza-
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tions are shown in Figure 1. Software agents are being coded in modern software development
frameworks and applied in the classified version of Amazon Web Services, C2S.

Figure 1. Intelligence information and technical data flow from “the Cloud” to support DTRA’s automated target
characterization process, yielding a three dimensional model suitable for use with existing weaponeering tools.
<Author created>

Central to machine-aided target characterization is the development of automated feature
extraction from the data collated by the agents,
such as dimensional information, orientation,
and placement of externally-observable features into the terrain. The approach followed
incorporates the development and training of
four different, independent Machine Learning
(ML) algorithms, integrated into an ensemble
to yield increased confidence in the results and
guard against hidden flaws in any one particular ML routine. Training and validation data sets
for the ML routines are carefully curated from
relevant historical characterizations, as well as
high-fidelity domestic ground-based geospatial
data collected at surrogate accessible UGFs.
Data sets are further partitioned to account for
possible biases associated with regional variations in construction practices. Algorithms for
the ML routines and management of information
records are implemented in Python, C++, and
Java.
Following the extraction of relevant features, information is conveyed to an expert system, Automated Reasoner, to create visualizations of the
UGF based on the observable features using a
ruleset developed through extensive analysis of
historical characterizations and interviews with

domain experts. Visualizations, after review by
an experienced analyst, serve as the basis for
generating a three-dimensional UTAS-compatible model of the UGF. Validated UTAS models
are approved for use in evaluating weapons
effects against the target. Automated characterization tool development is also closely coordinated with the efforts to automate weapon-target interaction calculations, discussed below, to
ensure compatibility in data structures, definitions, and assumptions.
The objective architecture for automated characterization includes a user interface Workbench, process auditing, and mandatory manual
review gates. The current development schedule is focused on transitioning the Version 1.0
tool, addressing a high-priority target class, to
partners for acceptance and integration into approved workflows in FY22. Spiral development
will continue to add additional target classes to
the automated tool set capability.
Automated Target-Weapon Interaction Calculations
Another program under CX is applying advanced
technologies to yield process improvements for
evaluation of weapons effects applied against
targets. The genesis of this project parallels
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the rationale underlying automated target characterizations, that of addressing ever-growing
backlogs of target planning requirements. The
weapons effects calculation tool development
program builds upon the foundation of DTRA’s
combat-proven Integrated Munitions Effects Assessment (IMEA) weaponeering tool for hard
and/or CWMD targets.

of fuzing and aimpoint selection. The Wizard
also allows a timely evaluation of a larger solution space than is practical following historical
analyst-intensive procedures. This Wizard has
proven an effective enabler for beginning weaponeers to better shoulder some of the workload
in CCMD targeting cells. Current development
has shifted to incorporate more modern techniIMEA is a suite of moderate-fidelity phys- cal approaches to realize speed and scope imics-based codes accessible through a shared provements for all users, not just the beginners.
user interface. The codes run on high-end desk- This effort has now implemented technology to
top PCs and are supported by a server-based quickly estimate the outcomes generated from
calculation engine for intensive operations such the penetration and cratering codes in IMEA.
as Monte Carlo simulations. Candidate weap- The models in IMEA are of course traceable to
oneering solutions are assessed using a sto- first-principles and incorporate extensive testing
chastic approach to account for uncertainties in data. This approach has resulted in up to five
the input data (e.g., the target characterization orders of magnitude decrease in the execution
generated using traditional methods or the ma- time for conducting a weapons effects assesschine-aided characterization tool) and decision ment.
theory optimization to address missing information required for rigorous evaluation of courses of It is also important from an ethical perspective
action. User selections in the analysis are weap- to recognize these tools are not a targeting or
on type, fuzing, aimpoint, and delivery geometry. engagement system but rather an automated
The large number of candidate attack solutions planning and decision-support system. A human
results in long execution times, problematic is always in the loop to formulate the courses
when the weaponeering process is constrained of action to hold the target at risk and address
by the timelines required by active combat oper- Commander’s intent.
ations. Inevitably, the experienced analyst has to Further development in this area is planned to
make judgement-driven decisions to down-se- expand the scope of target-weapon interactions
lect attack options prior to actual evaluation in addressed by the modules to include air blast,
IMEA. “Proper weaponeering and hazard mod- fragmentation, and equipment damage scenarieling help the Joint Force Commander employ os. Interface modifications are planned incorpothe proper resources, understand the potential rating Natural Language Processing, virtual reconsequences of execution, and minimize col- ality, and visualization aids to increase efficiency
lateral damage.” Targeteers and battle staff al- in the decision-making process. The techniques
ready address these needs: the automated tools proven in this effort are also extensible to othunder development by DTRA are intended as a er difficult problems such as non-kinetic defeat
force multiplier. Weaponeering by analysts with methods.
limited experience, unable to make these expert Functional Defeat
decisions, can become either an unacceptable
commitment of resources per individual target, Functional defeat planning under CXA is a
portfolio of modeling, testing, and solution deor generates solutions of uncertain utility.
velopment efforts collectively focused on WMD
With the dual objectives of achieving greater targets to expand options to meet Commandweaponeering throughput, and of enabling be- er’s intent beyond air-delivered kinetic attacks.
ginning analysts to become more productive These efforts were initiated in response to spequickly, the machine-aided target-weapon in- cific high priority mission requirements; on-goteraction calculation engine effort is implement- ing development is expanding scope of targets
ing extensions operating on top of the baseline (pathways), range of possible actions (innovaIMEA environment. The first iteration of this was tive non-kinetic mechanisms), and fidelity of vulthe development of a “Warfighter Wizard” that nerability models in response to additional rapapplies optimization techniques to the choice idly-emerging CCMD requirements.
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The US national counter-WMD strategy defines
pathway defeat as “comprising operations and
activities to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise
complicate networks, links, and nodes that support the conceptualization, development, production, and proliferation of WMD.”³ These operations and activities can be applied across the
full range of the conflict continuum, from clandestine operations through engagement with
near-peer armed forces. Developing courses of
action (COA) within this conflict space requires a
high-fidelity understanding of process, material,
and equipment vulnerabilities, not just structural
vulnerabilities of the facility housing the WMD
process of interest. Furthermore, the entire
WMD acquisition pathway must be evaluated to
uncover any nodes that present favorable tradeoffs in mission risk/mission success to achieve
Commander’s intent. Minimizing collateral effects and consequences of action are other
key considerations in the evaluation of multiple
COAs for complex, difficult WMD targets.
Expanding options to deny, delay, or defeat
adversaries’ WMD programs by exploiting potential pathway vulnerabilities requires the
development of a modeling, testing, and analysis approach that parallels the historical developments underlying our current capability
to assess kinetic attacks. High-fidelity models,
expensive both in time and resources, are developed and run for select high-value pathway
nodes (which can include equipment or materials). The DTRA R&D efforts have developed
finite-element models, discrete simulations,
and other tools, and utilized custom code and
commercial software such as MATLAB® and
ANSYS®, to address problems across domains
spanning virtually every engineering and scientific discipline. These models and simulations
use a variety of computational resources, up to
and including a High-Performance Computing
(HPC) cluster to predict responses from a variety of attack vectors. CXA partners with other
DTRA Departments as well as external organizations across the Federal Government to design and conduct tests to validate model outputs.
Where CCMD needs require and time permits,
validated high-fidelity models are used to evaluate specific solutions. The models are also used
to enable a suite of decision support tools to address the broader problem set in counter-WMD
missions.

A key axiom of the functional defeat program is
the focus on defeating a capability, not simply
a singular target entity. Expressed differently,
the WMD pathway associated with a capability
is an abstraction, but each instantiation of that
pathway is composed of entities that function
as a System of Systems (SoS). Developing a
course of action against a capability examines
the ensemble of vulnerabilities within this SoS
which may consist of nodes of a process (e.g.,
manufacturing) located in a single facility or of
nodes distributed across multiple locations. Current functional defeat analysis capabilities are
limited to addressing at most a few nodes and/
or locations, based on the maturity of the tools
and methods. Solution sets also evaluate reconstitution times, as defeat modalities against
many WMD targets do not necessarily seek
comprehensive structural defeat – Commander’s intent may be to functionally defeat a capability for some duration while other objectives in
the OPLAN are addressed. CXA research has
developed a Dynamic Failure Analysis Logic
Tree allowing for evaluation not only of singular
vulnerabilities but of cumulative and combined
multi-node actions. Optimization methods for
courses of action to counter these adversary
SoS capabilities must take into account additional degrees of freedom within the parameter
space to achieve convergence to a solution, or
small family of solutions, that minimizes mission
risk and maximizes mission success.
Future Complex Threat Network Defeat Research and Development
There are clear opportunities for each of the
three research domains discussed above to
leverage development tools, Machine Learning
and Artificial Intelligence concepts, and optimization methods to address the broader scope
of Complex Threat Networks (CTN). Analyzing
Threat Networks for vulnerabilities and defeat
strategies is an integral component of the Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) in support of the Joint Force
Commander. Many threat networks can coexist, interact, and provide cross support within
the Operating Environment. Analysis of many
of these networks can be accomplished using
graph-based numerical assessment tools such
as CARVER.4 Complex threat networks can require more sophisticated methods, such as the
counter-WMD problem sets discussed above. A
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threat network can exhibit complexity from an analytic perspective for several reasons: transnational presence; close association with other networks, increasing the challenge to correctly associate
nodes and links; and the need to apply physics-based modeling tools for nodal analysis. Joint
Publication 3-25, “Countering Threat Networks,” 21 December 2016, provides Doctrinal guidance
for addressing these challenging problems. In particular when analyzing complex threat networks,
it “must be noted…that conventional targeting is usually done during military operations/conflict,
whereas much of the threat network targeting [analysis] is done by [United States Government]
departments and agencies.”⁵ As a Combat Support Agency, DTRA’s Research and Development
programs continue to contribute to this mission.
Figure 2 illustrates numerous analytic disciplines that are being applied to the analysis of complex
threat networks. The specific techniques current CX R&D programs have used are highlighted in
each of the seven disciplines. There are rich opportunities to expand upon current work to further
advance analytic capabilities in support of the JIPOE process. Future CX R&D activities include,
for example, drawing from the work in target characterizations to develop an ensemble of ML algorithms trained on the outputs of the functional defeat HPC finite element models to significantly
improve the speed at which vulnerability assessments are generated in support of COA optimization. Similarly, the equipment vulnerability models developed and validated as part of the functional
defeat work could be incorporated into the automated target-weapon interaction tools for kinetic
attacks. Each of the programs are working to increase the complexity of the problems they can

Figure 2. DTRA applies a rich portfolio of tools and methods to the problem of analyzing Complex Threat Networks,
generating inputs for the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) process in support of
Joint Force Commanders. The methods and tools used or in development are highlighted above in each of the seven
analytic domains. <Author created>

handle and to broaden their scope to include additional target classes or larger SoS.
Integrating these singular capabilities into a rich Threat Networks assessment capability will enable
analysis of vulnerabilities in the influence and support infrastructures enabling adversary capabilities across the counter-WMD problem space. “Deterring threat networks is a complex and difficult
challenge that is significantly different form classical notions of deterrence. Threat networks use
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asymmetric methods and weapons. They transcend operational areas, areas of influence, areas of
interest, and the information environment.”⁶ Doctrine recognizes these unique challenges, whereby “complex threat network planning and operations require extensive coordination as well as innovative, cross-cutting approaches that utilize all instruments of national power.”⁷ DTRA-RD/CX has
demonstrated significant progress in improving analytic tools supporting JIPOE for CTN, and continues to innovate in this problem space. Nevertheless, these advances remain tools to improve the
person-in-the-loop analyst capabilities, whether responding to deliberate planning requirements or
time sensitive targeting, rather than a step toward “SkyNet”.

Notes
1. Weaponeering is the term used to describe the process of developing physics-based responses to
application of weapons against aimpoints for a target. Attack planning, or targeting, takes the results
from these various calculations for weapons effects and integrates them along with Commander’s intent
to create courses of action, probability calculations for achieving the desired outcome, and identifies
execution parameters. CXA/CXS-developed tools directly support weaponeering and indirectly support
attack planning.
2. JP 3-40, “Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27 November
2019, page IV-8.
3. Ibid, page II-9.
4. The CARVER method assigns weights to a threat in the categories of Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability. These weights are then used in the JIPOE process to
evaluate Course of Action.
5. JP 3-25, “Countering Threat Networks,” 21 December 2016, page V-2.
6. Ibid, page I-4.
7. Ibid, page I-3.
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Bush Wars:
Chemical and Biological Warfare
in Southern Africa during the Cold War
MAJ Christopher J. Mihal
NNSA, Office of Systems Engineering and Integration NA-18
This article is dedicated to the memory of Hermanus Stephanus de Manielle and
Albert Max Bluhm

Introduction
“Now it is up to you, sir, to teach the wisdom”
– Former Selous Scout Timothy Bax, in a note to the author¹
Though the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare
as early as 1925, enforcement and international reaction when these attacks occur have varied.
Chemical weapons had previously been used in Africa in the Spanish Rif War of 1921-1927 and
the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-1936 with hardly a murmur in the international community,
setting precedent that not all chemical weapon use was truly egregious.² This has persisted in the
modern age, with significant discrepancies in the almost total lack of international reaction to approximately 30 alleged chemical weapon attacks in Sudan in 2016 contrasted with the immediate
condemnation of the attempted Russian poisoning of Sergei Skirpal in the United Kingdom. This
has led scholars to define a “hierarchy of victims” when it comes to chemical warfare, with white
Western citizens being at the top and others, most especially black Africans, as being almost beneath notice.³ Furthermore, chemical weapons programs, due to their generally localized effects,
historically did not have the international condemnation biological or nuclear weapons programs
did.4 The use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) against poor nations or indigenous
insurgent groups in particular may be effective, as these targeted groups typically do not have
the means by which to identify the agents used or differentiate them from naturally-occurring phenomenon. This fact has plagued Zimbabwe, for instance, in proving whether cholera and anthrax
outbreaks were deliberately caused by Rhodesian security forces or occurred naturally.⁵
As southern Africa decolonized and transitioned to majority rule, the minority governments of Portugal, Rhodesia, and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) all used CBW to maintain control over
their populations. The RSA, in its conflicts in Angola, would also allege that the Soviet Union and
Cuban forces augmenting the Angolans used CBW to counter the tactical superiority of the RSA.
Rhodesia and the RSA would extensively use CBW unconventionally to counter liberation movements within their borders. The continued ambiguity as to the use of CBW on the battlefield persists
and may never be conclusively proven. These case studies demonstrate the difficulty of controlling
CBW for the international community and are evidence that governments that are faced with their
very survival will use any means at their disposal, regardless of international opinion.
Major Christopher Mihal is the Executive Director at the National Nuclear Security Administration Office
of Systems Engineering and Integration NA-18, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He has a B.S. in History
from the United States Military Academy, a M.S in Engineering Management from the Missouri University
of Science and Technology, and a M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology.
He was previously assigned as an exchange officer with 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. His
email address is Christopher.mihal@nnsa.doe.gov.
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Background
"It is impossible to over-emphasise the malign effect that the Cold War had on Southern African affairs.”
Willem Steenkamp⁶

Southern Africa was a hotbed of revolutionary movements during the Cold War. While some states
– Zambia, Swaziland (now known as Eswatini), Botswana and Lesotho – all attained independence
relatively peacefully from the United Kingdom, other states had much more violent independence
struggles. Portugal’s government would fight a series of bloody wars to retain its empire until the
Carnation Revolution of 1975 formally ended the Portuguese Empire and granted those states –
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau – their independence.⁷ Rhodesia would unilaterally break
away from the United Kingdom and fight its own war against its black revolutionary movements,
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), as
well as battling Mozambique’s Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, who would rule
the country following the Portuguese withdrawal). Rhodesia’s war concluded in 1979 with the fall of
the white minority government and rebranding of Rhodesia as Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe’s
ZANU. Finally, the Republic of South Africa’s (RSA) illegal occupation of South-West Africa (now
Namibia) was contested by the South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), and the RSA
itself was faced with a series of guerilla movements aimed at ending apartheid, a system by which
South Africa was entirely dominated politically and socially by its white minority.
South Africa would also invade Angola, support counter-revolutionary movements in Mozambique,
and covertly destabilized Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.⁸ The
most prominent South African resistance movement was the African National Congress (ANC),
who would take power in the first fully open election in South Africa in 1994, though not after a
bloody near-civil war with a rival black liberation movement, the Inkatha Freedom Party. All the
myriad interconnected communist revolutionary movements in Africa provided support and sanctuary to one another, with the Soviet Union and Cuba backing all of them. See Figure 1 for a map of
southern Africa and the various blocs vying for power.

Figure 1: Map of Belligerents and Supporters in Africa during the Cold War (source: created by author)
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The insurgent movements in Angola, Rhodesia,
Guinea-Bissau, South-West Africa and the
RSA issued a joint statement in 1968 at the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Algiers
Assembly to condemn Rhodesia that announced
an alliance of rebel groups.⁹ In Angola the
three revolutionary movements that resisted
Portuguese occupation – the Movimento
Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), União
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
(UNITA) and the Frente Nacional de Libertação
de Angola (FNLA) - immediately began fighting
amongst themselves following independence in
1975. The FNLA rapidly collapsed, its remnants
merging with the South African Defence Force
(SADF) to form the core of the infamous 32
Battalion (Os Terriveis – The Terrible Ones).10
Meanwhile RSA and Cuban intervention on the
sides of UNITA and the MPLA prolonged the
Angolan civil war, which continued until 2002
with the death of Jonas Savimbi, leader of
UNITA.
The Portuguese struggle against its revolutionary
movements began in 1961, the same year the
ANC began its armed struggle against the RSA,
and the Rhodesian Bush War began in 1964.
South-West Africa’s revolt began in 1966. Finally,
in 1970, the RSA, Portugal and Rhodesia would
sign a secret alliance, known as Alcora,11 which
may have been an acronym for “Aliança Contra
as Rebeliões em Africa [Alliance Against the
Rebellions in Africa].”12 As the independence
wars drug on, the RSA continued to see its
allies – Portugal and Rhodesia – suffer defeat at
the hands of revolutionary movements backed
by the Soviet Union, with Portugal withdrawing
from Africa in 1975 and Rhodesia collapsing
in 1979. Under international isolation, the RSA
came to see itself as both abandoned by its
Western allies13 and thus as the last bastion
against a black communist takeover of Africa,
which led it to develop nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons in a desperate attempt to
stave off defeat.14 Nevertheless, South Africa’s
struggles would end with its withdrawal from
Angola in 1989/1990, granting of independence
to Namibia in 1990, and finally having free and
open elections in 1994. This ended apartheid
and, except for the Angolan civil war which
would drag on for almost another decade, the
major wars of Southern Africa.
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Chemical and Biological Warfare in Southern
Africa Overview
“One of the most serious errors, if not the most serious
error, committed by colonial powers in Africa, may have
been to ignore or under-estimate the cultural strength of
African peoples.” Amilcar Cabral, leader of Guinea-Bissau’s Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e
Cabo Verde (PAIGC), in a speech honoring the recently
assassinated leader of FRELIMO,
Dr. Eduardo Mondlane15

Portugal, Rhodesia, and the RSA all used CBW
against the insurgent movements that they were
fighting, with Portugal being the first country to
use CBW against insurgents.16 Portugal poisoned water supplies, drugged prisoners who
were then thrown out of aircraft and executed17, and extensively used defoliants to destroy
crops.18 Rhodesia in particular learned from
these examples, with Rhodesian special forces
unit the Selous Scouts repeatedly poisoning insurgent water supplies and providing insurgents
with poisoned clothing and food clandestinely.19
In several months of the Rhodesian war, more
insurgents died due to CBW than from conventional operations by Rhodesian military units.20
The RSA developed a nuclear program which
successfully produced six gun-type weapons
before being dismantled,21 as well as an extensive CBW program code-named Project Coast
under the direction of Dr. Wouter Basson.22 The
RSA’s biological weapons program became
the “second most sophisticated program”23 in
the world after the Soviet Union’s, though much
of South African CBW usage was in the form of
poisonings, executions of prisoners of war, and
clandestine insertions into food and water supplies, as the RSA apparently never quite mastered delivery systems for CBW agents – though
this is disputed and will be covered later.
Each of the four major belligerents in these
various interconnected conflicts, Portugal, Rhodesia, the RSA and the Soviet Union and its
proxies, will have their possible or actual CBW
usage in southern Africa described below. It is
important to note that, except for a few highly disputed incidents that will also be covered,
CBW use in these conflicts were almost always
of an unconventional nature. These include poisoning of water supplies, assassinations, and
distribution of contaminated food and clothing
to insurgents, as opposed to the more traditional chemical rounds delivered by artillery. These
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types of usage make classification of the chemical weapons difficult, as they do not fall in line
with the traditional first, second, third or fourth
generation nomenclature traditionally used to
classify battlefield chemical weapons.24
Portuguese CBW Usage

In 1970, only three countries would vote against
an international treaty banning herbicidal use in
war – Australia, the United States, and Portugal.33 Whether intentional or accidental, herbicides also made their way into water supplies
and poisoned both civilians and insurgents.34
Rhodesian CBW Usage

“The United Nations is useless . . . and also harmful.”
– Portuguese dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar25

Portugal’s attempts to maintain control over its
colonial possessions were noted as particularly brutal, although repression of the press often
meant Portuguese themselves knew little about
what occurred during these wars.26 Massacres
of civilians by Portuguese forces in Mozambique
in particular were distressingly common, most
infamous of which was the Wiriyamu massacre,
in which Portuguese security forces massacred
400 civilians in retaliation for a FRELIMO attack
which inflicted six casualties on Portuguese soldiers in 1972.27 Portugal’s actions in Mozambique were so egregious that UK Labour Party
Leader Harold Wilson described them as part of
an overall Portuguese policy of genocide with
“no parallel . . . since Nazi times.”28
These massacres overshadowed a more insidious means of eliminating opposition, specifically
CBW. While not used via delivery systems on
the battlefield, Portugal would poison prisoners
of war and, allegedly, poisoned water supplies.29
Furthermore, in Mozambique, Portugal followed
a process similar to the “strategic hamlet” concept that the U.S. used in Vietnam, though multiple Catholic missionary sources state that such
hamlets were intentionally undersupplied with
health services and the population underfed to
foster disease to kill potential FRELIMO supporters and “let as many Africans as possible
die,” with many of the hamlets (known as aldeamentos) compared to Nazi death camps in the
official UN report.30
Contrasting with Mozambique, Portugal instead
used herbicides extensively as weapons of war
in Angola, as a way to circumvent a U.S. arms
embargo on “all arms for use in Africa.”31 While
herbicides are not technically considered chemical weapons, their use would subsequently be
banned by the 1978 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.32

“The more we killed, the happier we were. We were
fighting terrorists.”
– former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith35

Rhodesia is an excellent example of how tactical superiority is not the best measure by which
to determine the outcome of a war. Between
1966 and 1972, Rhodesian security forces killed
300 guerrillas and captured an additional 500
while suffering only 14 soldiers killed in the
same time period.36 Rhodesia habitually relied
on statistics for total insurgents killed while ignoring the broader political context in which it
existed. This is exemplified by its adoption of a
CBW program, which was extremely effective
against insurgents but only further isolated Rhodesia and hardened resolve against the government. Rhodesia could never win the hearts and
minds of its populace, for it was a government
specifically for a privileged few over the masses.
The Rhodesian government relied on force and
brutality, but as it lost the support of its few allies
and black Rhodesians who came identify more
with the insurgents over government forces, it
became evident that while Rhodesia probably
would not lose the war, they definitely could not
win it.
With Portugal’s withdrawal in 1975, the
Mozambican border opened a new front in
the Rhodesian war, which made it significantly
easier for ZAPU and ZANU insurgents to
escape to foreign hideouts and reorganize. As
Rhodesia’s security situation became more
untenable, the Ministry of Defence began, in the
last quarter of 1974, to work with toxicologist
Robert Symington to develop a CBW program.37
Poisonings of clothing, food and medicine began
in 1977 and did not end until the conclusion of
the war in late 1979, though the first possible
use of CBW were cholera outbreaks in 1973.38
Biological agents utilized include cholera,
anthrax and perhaps botulinum, and chemical
agents included thallium, parathion (a nerve
agent), telodrin, and warfarin.39 The Rhodesian
Medical Directorate at Army Headquarters
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stated they were researching a means by
which to identify organophosphate poisons in
water supplies to protect their own troops from
insurgent poisonings, but this is more likely to
have been a cover to hide the fact that water
supplies poisoned by security forces would
subsequently accidentally be used by different
Rhodesian units and cause casualties to friendly
forces.40
The Rhodesian CBW effort amply demonstrates
that internationally isolated regimes can produce
significant quantities of chemical and biological
weapons if they are sufficiently dedicated.
Agricultural and industrial chemicals provided
cheap alternatives to typical conventional
chemical weapons, and particularly when used
in individual assassinations and poisonings can
be horrifically effective.41 Further masking the
extent of the biological component of Rhodesia’s
program is the potential use of viruses naturally
occurring in the region, such as cholera and
anthrax, which masked intentional use and
still to this day leave questions as to natural or
man-made intent on several outbreaks. Even
though the existence of the Rhodesian CBW
program is confirmed without a doubt, there is a
severe paucity of primary sources as most were
apparently destroyed or did not exist in the first
place. Limited documentation portrays definitive
Rhodesian security force usage of poisonings,
and insurgent commanders frequently feared
poisonings and other unconventional operations
against them.
Nicholas Nkomo, a commander in the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA, military arm of ZAPU), stated that the Rhodesian
CBW program was the most effective strategy
deployed against his troops by the Rhodesian
government.42 The CBW program was largely
run by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), with many specific instances of
poisonings and attacks attributed to the Selous
Scouts, a special forces unit that worked directly
for the Special Branch (a part of the CIO) rather than the military. The Selous Scouts would
also insert cholera into water supplies, disseminated contaminated clothing to insurgents, and
poisoned wells, leading to hundreds if not thousands of civilian deaths in addition to insurgent
casualties.43 The Selous Scouts were responsible for 68 percent of all insurgent kills and cap-
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tures in the areas they operated in, far surpassing any other Rhodesian combat unit.44
The total number of guerrillas and civilians killed
by the Rhodesian CBW program is the subject of much debate, with figures ranging from
around 800 to over 3,500; this does not factor
in hundreds of Mozambican civilians who may
have also drank contaminated water, or “friendly
fire” incidents when security forces unwittingly
drank from previously-poisoned supplies.45 For
a war with a total estimated casualty figure of
20,000 people, this is a significant quantity
whose deaths were attributed to the CBW program, even with the conservative estimate.
RSA CBW Usage
“The free world wants to feed South Africa to the Red
Crocodile [communism], to appease its hunger.”
– RSA Prime Minister P.W. Botha46

The RSA’s CBW program was known as Project
Coast and was initially developed due to fears
of the Soviet Union providing Cuban and Angolan forces with CBW.47 Despite protests that the
program was initially solely based on defense
against CBW, it is apparent from previously top
secret SADF documents that offensive use of
CBW was part of the program from the start.48
Furthermore, despite protests that Project Coast
only began in response to alleged Cuban use of
chemical weapons, Project Coast began in 1981
and the first alleged Cuban chemical attack was
in 1984.49 In all likelihood, much like the RSA’s
nuclear weapons program, Project Coast most
likely came about due to the RSA’s feeling of
betrayal after their CIA-supported incursion into
Angola in 1975, which was subsequently condemned overtly by the US government. The U.S.
banned military aid to the RSA shortly thereafter.50 Seeing themselves almost alone against
the Soviet Union and its allies, the RSA sought
weapons of mass destruction to even the odds,
stating in an official order to the entire SADF that
“the best manner to prevent chemical or biological weapons use against a country is to have
similar capabilities that credibly can be applied
during retaliation.”51
Confusion underlined SADF doctrine on usage of
chemical weapons, in that they were potentially
useful because “[c]hemical weapons . . . provide
the user with the advantage that specific military
and political goals can be achieved before such
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action can provoke international resistance.52”
This is due to the ambiguity of detecting and
properly identifying the source and cause of a
chemical attack, which is illustrated by the fact
that it is still inconclusive if there were chemical
attacks in Angola and, if so, by whom, over 30
years after the war ended. Furthermore, the
value of propaganda regarding CBW cannot
be understated; it seems that unsubstantiated
Soviet and Angolan claims of chemical warfare
attacks by the RSA at the battle of Cuvelai in
1984 were propagated primarily to excuse the
atrocious performance of the 11th Angolan
Brigade and its SWAPO allies that were
destroyed in that conflict while only killing seven
RSA soldiers in return.53,54
The RSA held its numerous African enemies in
contempt – though they highly respected Soviet
and Cuban forces – as evidenced by this excerpt
from the RSA’s policy on CBW, which also tacitly
admits that CBW had been used by the RSA in
some form:
“Hierbenewens hou die aanwending van chemiese
wapens teen primitiewe of bygelowige volkere die
voordeel in dat dit aan die bo-natuurlike toegeskryf
kan word.” [translation: In addition, the application of
chemical weapons against primitive or superstitious
peoples holds the advantage of them attributing [the
effects] to the supernatural].55
Apart from the diary of Igor Zhdarkin, a Soviet
advisor to the Angolan army, who states that the
RSA used chemical weapons delivered via artillery against the Angolan 59th Mechanized Brigade in October 1987 at the Battle of the Lomba
River,56 there is no primary source evidence of
the RSA’s use of chemical weapons on the battlefield. Zhdarkin had a very low opinion of the
Angolan troops he was attached to, but even
so the single reported usage of chemical weapons makes no tactical sense as RSA conventional artillery were dominating the battle, with
all four Angolan brigades participating suffering
60-70% casualties.57 Deception also played a
role in the RSA’s CBW program, and this may
have confused Zhdarkin. Efforts were made
to convince the Cubans and Soviets that the
SADF was deploying chemical weapons on the
battlefield which in reality were simply colored
smoke, as “signs of a chemical warfare attack
. . . would force the Cuban and Angolan forces

to don [chemical] suits, which would cut combat effectiveness in half.58 Given the disparity
in force size, as the SADF was almost always
outnumbered by Cuban and Angolan forces, deception operations mimicking chemical attacks
were considered to be a force multiplier, though
actual instances of this are difficult to identify.
The only other credible allegation of CBW use
was in Mozambique in 1992, when a FRELIMO patrol may have come under chemical attack. The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, which was established to identify
human rights abuses under apartheid, investigated and, after reviewing reports from five different scientific teams, was unable to conclude
whether chemical weapons were used as the
results were inconclusive.59 Regardless of definitive facts, Cuban forces believed the RSA
possessed nuclear and chemical weapons and
troops were issued gas masks and protective
gear – though, oddly, this very gear is what convinced the RSA that it was Cuba and the Soviet
Union that planned to CBW.60
While RSA use of CBW on the battlefield is at
best inconclusive, there is no doubt whatsoever
of CBW internally against domestic opponents.
The development of agents was twofold – many
were produced for political assassinations, while
another branch worked on riot control agents to,
as former SADF chief Constand Viljoen put it,
“calm people down, make them friendly, if at all
possible," to avoid "another Sharpeville [massacre] where my forces would have to kill people to
bring them under control."61 The branch working
on political assassination was significantly more
prolific.
One of the most damning documents proving
South African’s program was used to kill dissidents is the “Verkope Lys” [Shopping List] found
in a trunk owned by Wouter Basson, head of
Project Coast, with toxins used for poisonings
and their known uses in Table 1 below. This is
just a small subset in a period of time in 1989 as
to what poisons and bioweapons were available
for use by security forces. Known biological organisms that Project Coast researched included “anthrax, cholera, salmonella, botulinum . . .
E. coli . . . necrotizing fasciitis, hepatitis A, and
H.I.V. . . . and the Ebola, Marburg, and Rift Valley hemorrhagic-fever viruses.”62
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Table 1a. “Shopping List” provided by Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) for covert assassination missions in
1989, adapted from a table and multiple paragraphs from United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Report
on Project Coast, with translations from Afrikaans by Marizel Mihal63
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Table 1b. “Shopping List(Cont)” provided by Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) for covert assassination missions in 1989, adapted from a table and multiple paragraphs from United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Report on Project Coast, with translations from Afrikaans by Marizel Mihal63
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actually worsened the patient's symptoms.
The first recorded use of CBW by South Africa is
A captured soldier told of being trained in chemical
the use of scoline and tubarine to assist in the
warfare by Cuban specialists. [Chemical] Testing
execution of “hundreds” of SWAPO prisoners
kits exactly like those taken from Soviet soldiers in
beginning in 1979 to handle overcrowding
Afghanistan were found.
in prisons.64 There was little to no oversight
of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), the
UNITA claimed to have discovered a large cache
organization that handled most political
of Soviet-made chemical weapons in Luanda,
assassinations in the late apartheid era, and this
presumably intended for a massive offensive with
led to many bizarre, brutal ideas being put forth.
chemical weapons, against which UNITA would have
Activities ranged from the nefarious, such as
been defenseless. As a result of this information,
sending HIV-positive security force members to
Savimbi acquired 20,000 gas masks.
brothels known to be frequented by insurgents
Andreas Holst, a German, recovered bomb fragments
in the hopes of spreading the virus65 and the
with Russian inscriptions, which on testing in Ghent
attempted development of a “black bomb,” a virus
revealed cyanide-containing compounds. Tests
that would only infect black South Africans and
carried
out by Belgian toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx
not whites,66 to the faintly ridiculous, including
were confirmed in a parallel investigation in a British
leaving poisoned razorblades in the office of an
laboratory.”70
anti-apartheid lawyer in the hopes that he would
use the blades to shave, cut himself, and die of However, a CIA report issued in 1989 and declassified in 2013 disputed these findings, statblood poisoning.67
ing that there was no evidence of lethal CBW
In the chaotic near-civil war between the ANC
agents used in Angola, attributing the illnesses
and Inkatha following the legalization of the
to consumption of improperly prepared cassava
ANC, security forces would use the opportunity
plants, an abundant food in the region.71 Raw
to settle scores with the insurgents by acting as
cassava contains cyanide, though it seems odd
a “Third Force,” in the conflict. Simultaneously,
that guerillas who lived in, and subsisted priProject Coast took decidedly more illegal
marily on, cassava plants wouldn’t know how to
activities, including drug production and
prepare it.72 An additional counter-argument to
distribution, including ecstasy and mandrax.68
RSA claims of Soviet or Angolan use of chemAssassinations of all sorts proliferated, from
ical weapons against UNITA in 1989 is that it
bombings, shootings, stabbings, and poisonings,
may have been a field test of an RSA delivery
until the election of 1994.
system that went awry and struck UNITA troops
Soviet Union and Proxy CBW Usage
instead of the enemy.73
I’m sure the Cubans will go ahead with this. This is the
new military tactic.”
– discredited toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx69

There are repeated allegations of Soviet/Cuban/
Angolan chemical weapon use against the RSA
and UNITA, to include the following allegations
by UNITA as reported by Physicians for Civil
Defense in 1990:
“According to UNITA military intelligence leader General
Peregrino Wambu Chindondo, chemical weapons
used by Soviet-supported forces have caused 83
cases of severe respiratory distress, with 38 fatalities.
Paralysis occurred in 293 persons, leading to death
in 42. Dr. Manassas, director of the UNITA hospital
in Jamba (the capital of ``free Angola''), noted that
medications that in early cases brought improvement
or relief increasingly either lost their effectiveness or
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What further weakens the case of Cuban or Soviet use of chemical weapons in Angola is the
fact that University of Ghent toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx was the only individual to ever
put forth these claims, and he is a problematic source at best. Evidence demonstrating that
Heyndrickx had financial and personal links to
Project Coast’s Wouter Basson would come to
light after he made CBW allegations against Cuban forces in 1988. A second blow would come
when the dean of his own pharmaceutical faculty described his reports on CBW use in Angola
as “unsubstantial and useless.”74 Finally, and
perhaps most fatally to his findings, Heyndrickx
was convicted of falsifying lab results and subsequently expelled from the University of Ghent
in 1995.75 All of these factors point to Heyndrickx being a deliberate source of disinformation, either to justify Project Coast’s existence or
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to provide cover for its activities by muddying extended to after the war’s conclusion.80 Finalthe waters as to who used CBW in Angola, if ly, an alternative explanation to the anthrax outbreak of 1978-1980 was not that it was caused
they were used at all.
by Rhodesian security forces, but was part of
The most curious case of disinformation in the
the internal struggle for power between ZAPU
context of chemical warfare was the career of
and ZANU as the war came to a close with an
Soviet Lieutenant-General Konstantin Shaganoinsurgent victory, and this was the reason the
vitch, a chemical warfare officer who was placed
Zimbabwean government has not pushed for a
in charge of all Cuban, Soviet and Angolan forcstronger investigation into the event.81
es. Shaganovitch was so well-known that the
final Anglo-Cuban offensive of the war and sub- Conclusion
sequent battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987 was
termed “The General Shaganovitch Offensive” We were literally taught to hate. If you look at the seby British war correspondent Fred Bridgland.76 curity course I went on, for five weeks we were subjected
Numerous books and articles mention him, and to, and we swallowed all of this, the ranting and raving of
General Shaganovitch was even discussed in a person that I’ll describe as a cross between Hitler and
the British House of Lords in a debate over what Eugene TerreBlanche [leader of the Afrikaner WeerstandsBritish policy should be in Angola.77 General beweging - AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), a
Shaganovitch’s assignment was seen as proof South African neo-nazi group)]. About the satanic, godless
that the Soviet Union intended to use chemical Communists and their black surrogates that were going to
weapons against the SADF; after all, why else swamp us. Officially we were taught to hate. It was a culwould the Soviet Union give operational com- ture of hatred.” – Warrant Officer Paul Erasmus, classmate
mand to a chemical officer?
of Eugene de Kock, founder of Koevoet and commander of
the C10 counter-insurgency unit82
There was just one issue with this speculation:
General Shaganovitch did not actually exist.78 Countries that are internationally isolated alWhether intentionally or not, it seems that “Kon- ready, just as South Africa was and North Kostantin Shaganovitch” was both a combination rea is currently, can lead such countries into
and mis-transliteration of the names of two dif- examining any means necessary for their surferent Soviet generals assigned to head the An- vival, and they will attempt to inculcate that “surgolan mission, neither of whom were chemical vival by any means necessary” mindset in their
warfare specialists: Lieutenant-General Vassily population. Small-scale chemical and biologiShakhnovich and Lieutenant-General Konstan- cal weapons use can be notoriously difficult to
tin Kurochkin. Both of these men had since left detect, which makes them attractive options to
Angola by the time of the 1987 offensive. The governments facing internal insurgencies. While
Soviet commander at the time of the offensive continued emphasis on identification and dewas actually General Petr Gusev.79 Whether struction of chemical weapons stockpiles, such
this confusion was a means by which South Afri- as in Syria, are admirable and necessary, they
ca sought international aid and condemnation of are a relatively easy goal compared to facing
its Soviet and Cuban adversaries, or a mistake programs such as the ones South Africa and
by over-eager intelligence analysts, may never Rhodesia employed. Recent years have seen
be known, though discussions of the fictional an uptick in CBW use in assassinations by coungeneral continue to plague accounts of the Bat- tries such as Russia and North Korea, and these
types of programs are significantly more difficult
tle of Cuito Cuanavale.
to detect and prevent than conventional battleFinally, the Rhodesian government was not the
field use. Despite robust international condemonly organization to use poisons in its war against
nation and embargoes, Rhodesia, South Africa
ZANU and ZAPU, as the insurgent groups themand North Korea all independently developed
selves planned and may possibly have done the
and fielded significant quantities of weapons of
same thing. An early plan, apparently never carmass destruction. The parallels are obvious and
ried out, involved poisoning a water source used
disturbing.
by “Europeans” with arsenic, and the Shona (a
Zimbabwean ethnic group) had a rich heritage Even when the use of CBW is overt, the lack of
of herbalism and using poison, which apparently strong condemnation and actual consequences
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for the use of CBW degrades the deterrent value the international community has against their
use. CBW use in Africa has received barely any attention from the international community, and
this emboldens those who would use these weapons in future conflicts. The low cost and relative
secrecy involved in their use when employed correctly means that many states may continue to
look to CBW, particularly against internal insurgencies or political enemies.
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Estimating Operational Internal Dose from
Predicted Localized Fallout
MAJ James J. Frey
Air Force Institute of Technology
Introduction
The internal dose rate hazard from fallout generated by a near-surface nuclear detonation has
been computed using International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication
119 inhalation dose coefficients and the Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC) fallout
modeling code as incorporated into two Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)-maintained nuclear
forensic mission planning tools. Incorporating internal dose contributions from a full intersection
of isotopes present in both ICRP 119 and DELFIC’s modeled isotopic inventory, the potential ratio
of simulated internal to external dose rate contributions was on the order of 10-3 or less within the
time and spatial domain of forensic interest. The results indicate that the internal dose hazard can
be reasonably ignored as an operational planning factor during nuclear forensic ground collection
missions, even when employing conservative assumptions regarding resuspension and inhalation
efficiency across the modeled particle size distribution.
Background
In the immediate aftermath of a near-surface nuclear detonation, an enormous quantity of material
entrained into the rising fireball will be intermixed with fission products generated during the explosion and lofted up to tens of kilometers into the atmosphere. This fallout, distributed via a combination of particle settling and atmospheric transport, can pose a significant and possibly lethal
external dose risk in areas near to ground zero (GZ) and the ability to accurately model this surface
deposition must be a high priority for any hazardous material dispersion codes which intends to
model nuclear weapon effects.1,2 Prominent fallout modeling tools used within the Department
of Defense, such as the Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC), make no attempt to
predict the potential internal dose hazard from this distribution of radioactive material, even when
many of the inputs required to at least bound potential internal dose to personnel within the fallout
field are generated during the simulation process. This omission has some grounding in both
data collected during U.S. atmospheric testing and in modeling studies completed using an early
version of DELFIC, supporting the conclusion that the relative magnitude of internal dose due to
inhalation of airborne fallout material to external dose due to β-γ radiation from the same material
was ~10-3 – 10-6 depending on the distance from GZ.3,4 This analysis revisits this topic from the
. Major (MAJ) James Frey received a direct commission into the U.S. Army Medical Department as a
Nuclear Medical Science Officer (Area of Concentration 72A) in March 2013 after completing the Masters
in Health Physics program at Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR and is currently pursuing a PhD in
Nuclear Engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Past
health physics assignments include Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command at Redstone Arsenal,
AL and both Headquarters, 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE)
Command and the Army Public Health Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. His email address is
james.frey@afit.edu.
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perspective of ground collection teams who may be required to enter this fallout field during early
times post detonation to obtain nuclear forensic samples of interest. It leverages continued development of DELFIC-based planning tools and a more recent inhalation dose model to determine the
operational relevancy of the potential internal radiological hazard given the predicted external dose
at a given location and also provides insight into the selection of appropriate respiratory protection
so as to minimize the total dose to personnel during a collection mission.
DELFIC Simulation Post-Processing
Adapting the methodology employed by Levanon and Pernick, outputs of the Airborne Planning
Tool (APTool) and Fallout Planning Tool (FPTool), two DELFIC-based modeling packages developed and maintained by the ORNL Detonation Forensics and Response Group, were combined
to generate spatial distributions of fallout material with isotopic data accessible to support internal
dose assessments.4 The Apple II test shot, a 29 kiloton (KT) tower detonation conducted in 1955
at the Nevada Test Site during Operation Teapot, was used as the basis for the simulation nuclear
event and historical weather parameters as air sampling and animal study data were collected
against which results could be compared during future work.3,5 The time domain of interest for dose
rate computations was defined as 36 to 120 hr post-detonation (H+36 to H+120). This window
was judged by the author and supported by past ground collection exercises to be a reasonable reflection of time bracketing the earliest arrival of an off-site collection team through to the collection
of sufficient forensic samples to support full characterization of the event. Given this time domain,
submersion or inhalation dose from the passage of the radioactive cloud was not addressed as
ground collection personnel would not be present during initial fallout deposition. A visual depiction
of the relevant geographic features used to frame this analysis are shown in Figure 1, overlaid over
historical off-site plume dispersion contours.

Figure 1. Summary of Apple II deposition pattern and pertinent geographic reference features. Map contours adapted
from DNA 1979.⁵
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Although both planning tools act as a graphical
user interface and intermediate layer to the underlying DELFIC cloud rise source term modeling, in the case of APTool the distribution of
radioactive material within the nuclear cloud at
time of stabilization is handed-off to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA’s) Hybrid Single Particle Lagrangian
Integrated Trajectory Model (HYSPLIT), which
computes the more-detailed transport modeling for airborne sample collection applications.
This hand-off entails the generation of time-dependent isotopic inventory data, captured in the
form of Oak Ridge Isotope Generation (ORIGEN) .f71 files. One inventory file is generated
for each of the lognormal particle size classes
employed by DELFIC in modeling the cloud rise,
with entries at each of the steps in the time domain H+1 to H+121 hours (120 hrs starting at t
= 1 hr). Accessing these binary files and formatting them for further analysis required the use of
the ‘f71tocsv’ file conversion utility included in
ORNL’s SCALE nuclear safety and design code.
Setting the distribution parameters to the DELFIC defaults, with 100 particle size classes ranging from a minimum boundary value of 2.584 μm
(size class 100) to a maximum diameter boundary of 6.527 mm (size class 1), a full distribution
as a function of particle size was then computed
for each of the 433 isotopes generated during
the cloud rise. Inventory data obtained from APTool provided the necessary insight into fallout
composition to determine isotopic distribution
from deposition models generated by FPTool.
Both DELFIC front-ends use identical source
term and cloud rise mechanics, but FPTool computes isotope data in a way not available to an
end user via the default interface.⁶
As DELFIC sets particle size class boundaries
such that each class has an equal mass fraction
of all material distributed within the cloud, specific activity data was computed from the.f71 files
after removing isotopes with zero activity across
all time steps and particle size classes. Using
the mathematical computing language MATLAB
(MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA), the resulting 3-D
isotopic inventory data array SA in becquerels
per gram (Bq/g), N isotopes by M time steps by
D particle size classes, was combined with ICRP
119 internal dose coefficients to yield a time-dependent weighted isotopic inventory in units of
sievert per gram (Sv/g) of intake of material from

a specific particle size class
SDC,i,j,k = DC * SA,i,j,k,			

(1)

where SDC refers to the N x M x D specific internal dose coefficient array and DC in Sv/Bq is a
vector of dose coefficients applied individually to
all entries of the ith isotope in SA.
The ICRP 119 inhalation committed dose coefficients, based on the ICRP 66 lung model, incorporate fractional deposition as a function of
particle size for various compartments within
the pulmonary system and addresses limited
clearance into the gastrointestinal (GI) tract of
inhalable particles which do not penetrate into
the extrathoracic region.⁷ As an important operational caveat, internal dose coefficients are
developed primarily for radiation protection purposes and reflect the committed dose to tissue
that would accrue over a full working lifetime
(50 years), assuming no post-intake countermeasures to enhance biological removal are
employed. The actual rate of internal dose absorbed from any given isotope depends strongly
on the effective combination of its radiological
and biological half-life. To avoid inadvertently
generating internal dose contributions from the
incidental ingestion pathway already accounted
for by the ICRP 66 lung model, only the inhalation dose coefficients were used to produced
specific internal dose factors as a function of
particle size class. The 5 μm aerodynamic median activity diameter (AMAD) dose coefficients
were selected specifically, as the lower bound of
the smallest physical particle size class at 2.584
μm was still larger than the 1 μm AMAD used for
the smaller of the two ICRP 119 inhalation dose
coefficient categories.8
To support fully automated computation of internal dose factors from the DELFIC-modeled
time-dependent inventory, AMAD and physical
particle size diameter were treated as equivalent quantities and the ICRP 119 lung clearance
type yielding the largest dose coefficient for
each isotope was used as the basis for conservative internal dose estimates. An upper bound
of 100 μm was set as the limit of inhalable particle size, a larger and therefore more conservative size threshold value than used in some
previous fallout internal dose modeling studies,
with the intake efficiency ϵin as a function of particle diameter dae computed by the American
Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists
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(ACGIH) sampling efficiency shown in Figure 2 used as a mechanism for modeling the increased
contribution of smaller particle size classes to the tabulated internal dose.

Figure 2. Inhalation efficiency as a function of particle size. Plot adapted from ICRP 66.⁷

Although more detailed pulmonary deposition
equations are available, accounting for respiration rate, tidal volume and other related factors, the simplified ACGIH model has the benefit
of only depending on a parameter generated
during the course of the DELFIC simulation process.7,9 With this particle size-specific intake,
summing over specific internal dose contributions for all isotopes within a particle size class
yields DF, a M x D time-dependent specific internal dose factor matrix in Sv/g.
DFj,k = ∑Ni=1SDC,i,j,k ∙ϵin,k			(2)
The dispersion pattern output generated by
APTool is geared towards sample collection
planning at some distance from GZ, but currently
lacks the flexibility and refinement of the ground
collection mission tools present in the more
established FPTool. Specifically, DELFIC map
type 17 (smallest diameter particle) and map
type 13 (mass of fallout per unit area in particle
size range) contour plots were generated using
the documented nuclear event parameters for
Apple II to bound the potential internal dose
hazard area and to compute an internal dose
hazard rate at a given location in the spatial
domain. The resuspension factor RF, which is
the ratio of airborne radioactivity concentration
to surface contamination, is well established
as a mechanism to estimate radiological air
concentration in cases where only ground
deposition data is available.10 The magnitude
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of RF varies widely based on the radiological
material and environmental conditions in
question, with reported values ranging from
10-3 to 10-9.11 Absent an expression for RF as
a function of particle sizes in the range used in
DELFIC, not found during the literature review
for this study, the time dependent model
RF= 10-6e-λres t + 10-9,			(3)
was used to compute a time-dependent resuspension factor to be applied against all inhalable
(≤ 100 μm) particle size classes, although the
assumed characteristic decay constant λres in 1/
day was large enough that the RF changed very
little during the simulation time domain.11 A fixed
respiration rate of V′ = 1.2 m³/hr, the average
value for the Reference Worker used as the basis for the ICRP 119 dose coefficients, was then
applied to the resulting areal fallout mass concentration MA in each particle size class to determine the particle-size mass intake rate I′ in g/hr
to ground personnel at a given model location.8
I'M,k = MA,k ∙ RFj ∙ V' 			

(4)

As a process to automate the extraction of 2-D
map array data from FPTool model outputs was
not available during this study, the locations
of the animal stations used during the Apple II
inhalation hazard study were used as control
points, although some amount of interpretation
was needed to determine map grid locations
from the verbal descriptions provided.³ The
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internal dose rate at the jth time step D′int, j was then simply the product of DF and I′ summed across
k = 100 particle size classes, noting that due to particle settling mechanics only a small fraction of
the particle size classes will contribute to the areal density distribution at any given location in the
fallout field.
D'int,j =∑Dk=1 DFj,k ∙ I'M,k								(5)
Using the Define Routes toolset from FPTool applied against successive map type 3 (exposure
rate at H + t) outputs at relevant times of interest, a ratio of internal to external dose rate hazards
could then be computed at each sample point to assess the relative magnitude of the contribution.
A visual summary of the workflow used in this analysis is depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Conceptual framework for estimating internal dose and dose rate from DELFIC modeling output.

Internal Dose Modeling Results
A DELFIC type 17 map, computed over the default Forensic spatial domain of 51.2 km per side with
GZ at the origin and 100 m cell size in both the x and y directions, is shown in Figure 4 and provides
a telling early indicator of the potential for internal dose hazard to ground collection personnel and
the minor extent to which uncertainty in the geographic location of the control points would likely
impact the conclusions of this analysis.

Fig. 4. DELFIC Type 17 map, modeling smallest particle size deposited within (25.6 km)² spatial domain, Apple II
test shot, Yield = 29 KT, Height of Burst = 152 m.
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Within this area of interest to particulate nuclear forensic collection and analysis, the smallest
particle deposited during the DEFLIC dispersion simulation is 194.7 μm, well above the 100 μm
inhalable particle threshold. Further simulation runs shifted to FPTool’s expanded Consequence
Assessment (CA) default spatial domain, increasing by a factor of ten both the grid size length and
the total x and y distance.
From the specific activity array SA, various facets of the isotopic activity characteristics of the inhalable particle size classes were explored, with Figure 5 depicting the time evolution of total specific
activity for DELFIC’s largest (4.619 mm), smallest (3.652 μm) and aggregate particle size classes,
while comparing it to the time behavior of the Way-Wigner external dose rate decay approximation
which forms the basis of the seven-ten rule.¹

Figure 5. Power law fit to total specific activity as a function of time for select default DELFIC particle size classes.

The extent of fractionation of isotopic activity is shown in Figure 6, both in aggregate and for fallout
fission product isotopes identified as of significant health physics interest in previous studies, and
in both cases is normalized to activity in the smallest particle size class.⁴

Figure 6. Total specific activity in each DELFIC default particle size class, normalized to specific activity for smallest
particle size. Plot for I-133 overlaid on that of I-131.
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Applying the computed internal dose rate D′int, j to the animal stations used as reference points, Figure 7 completes the analysis by computing a bounding ratio of modeled internal to external dose
rate as a function of time, accounting for time of arrival of the fallout at the specific station and the
subset of particle sizes deposited at that location.

Figure 7. Ratio of modeled internal to external dose rate as a function of time (H+1 to H+121) at animal station reference points, constant respiration rate of 1.2 [m³/hr].

Operational Relevance
As introduced above, the DELFIC map type 17 output is sufficient to address the immediate concern of internal dose rate hazard within the anticipated operational area. In the case of the Apple
II-based near-surface burst, fallout of potentially inhalable particle sizes does not begin depositing
until around 130 km down-plume from GZ. This settling mechanic provides a multi-layer reduction
in the relative internal dose hazard, as turbulent diffusion of smaller particle sizes during transport
results in less fallout material available overall for resuspension at these increased ranges. This
is especially important given the high fractionation of the medium-lived fission products that may
contribute the most to internal dose for a given intake mass, shown clearly in Figure 6. Of the ten
fission products of primary interest for internal dose purposes, only Cerium-144 and Zirconium-95
are broadly partitioned across particle size classes and so might expect to make a substantial contribution to inhalation dose for areas nearer to GZ.⁴ Only five or six particle size classes contribute
to isotopic inventory distribution at any given animal station location, as shown in Figure 8, so only
a small subset of the 100 particle size class-specific map 13 outputs are needed to assess the
potential internal dose hazard at these reference points.

Figure 8. Areal density of predicted fallout as a function of particle size class at animal station reference points.

Countering WMD Journal

Issue 23

55

Table of Contents

The time behavior provides some additional insight as to why the internal dose risk relative to the
external dose hazard is small during early times post-detonation and might be reasonably ignored
as a planning factor. Figures 5 and 7 show at least a rough overall power law dependency with
time for all particle sizes within the potentially inhalable size range, even when accounting for
isotope-specific internal dose coefficients that depend on biokinetic behavior in the body instead
of just radiological properties. The aggregate specific activity computed by the DELFIC isotopic
modeling decays faster than the associated external dose rate hazard from the same material, as
predicted by the t-1.2 Way-Wigner approximation. From Figure 7, the hazard ratio of internal to external dose rate increases with time but with a significant decrease in the total potential dose rate
to exposed personnel, incorporating both the internal and external component. By the time this
ratio approaches unity, the nature of the radiological hazard has transitioned from acute to longterm. The value ranges of internal to external dose rate, ~10-3 near the end of the potential mission
time-frame, affirm conclusions drawn by previous authors and provides important context in the
selection of PPE for any ground personnel tasked with entering the fallout field region during early
times. Respiratory protection postures that result in an individual performance decrement and an
increased time to complete mission requirements may prove counterproductive, as any committed
dose averted by limiting the inhalation of fallout particles would be overshadowed by the increase
of external dose due to longer exposure times. A more robust exploration of this topic, examining
the impact of yield and height of burst on the relative dose hazard ratio discussed above with a
particular focus on the case of a 10 KT surface burst, would provide additional fidelity on the types
of nuclear forensic missions in which this risk analysis may be insufficient.
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Saving Our Own: Urban Search and Rescue after
a Domestic Nuclear Detonation
Mr. Robert T. Wagner
United States Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Homeland Defense/
Civil Support Office
The following article is an adaptation of the master’s thesis “Saving Our Own: Maximizing
CBRN Urban Search and Rescue Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities”, which was
published by the Naval Postgraduate School in March of 2021.

Introduction

Following a nuclear detonation in a domestic, urban setting, victims will require

rescue from collapsed buildings. In the United States, these efforts fall under the
purview of urban search and rescue (US&R), which is defined by the U.S. National
Search and Rescue Plan as “the location, rescue (extrication), and initial medical
stabilization of survivors trapped in confined spaces.”¹ Considered independently,
conventional US&R operations are highly technical and require advanced levels
of skill in rope, confined space, trench, vehicle, machinery, and structural collapse
rescue techniques.² However, post-nuclear detonation environments present
the uniquely combined hazards of secondary collapse, nuclear fallout, and fire
to US&R responders, and each must be properly addressed for US&R efforts
to be successful after such an incident. Specifically, protection from the hazard
of nuclear fallout presents the added complexity of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) personal protective equipment (PPE) usage, which
limits responder dexterity and vision and requires work/rest cycles, and radiation
exposure, which requires the use of stay times.³ Therefore, emergency response
agencies with the potential to perform US&R after a domestic nuclear detonation
should incorporate the performance of US&R skills while donning CBRN PPE into
their responder training, and they should address the threat of fire and need for
large numbers of trained rescuers in their response planning.
"What I'm saying is, if it's possible, you damned well think about it."
-Dr. Jack Ryan in Tom Clancy's The Sum of All Fears

Mr. Robert T. Wagner is an Urban Search and Rescue Training Instructor at the United States
Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Homeland Defense/Civil Support Office at Camp
Dawson, WV. Additionally, he is a Hazardous Materials Specialist at the National Urban Search
and Rescue Response System's Indiana Task Force 1. He has a B.S. in Criminal Justice from Indiana University and a M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense) from the Naval
Postgraduate School. He was previously a Firefighter/Paramedic at the Indianapolis Fire Department. His email address is robert.t.wagner36.civ@army.mil.
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Hazards Presented to Rescuers by Post-Nuclear Detonation Environments
Upon detonation, a nuclear weapon causes a variety of effects, including blast pressure, thermal
radiation, ionizing radiation, optical effects, and electromagnetic pulses.⁴ These effects can be
classified as either prompt or delayed, depending upon when they occur in relationship to the
detonation. Certain effects—such as ionizing radiation—exist in both categories. As explained in
the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans:
Nuclear detonations produce ‘prompt’ effects that radiate outward from the detonation location and ‘delayed’ effects. Prompt effects usually occur within the first minute after a detonation and include an intense flash of light, blast shockwave, extreme heat, prompt radiation,
and Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse. The delayed effects are primarily the neutron-activated debris around the detonation site and the atmospherically dispersed radioactive fallout.⁵
Figure 1 provides an approximated timeline for the presentation and duration of these effects and
their associated hazards following a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device detonation.

Figure 1. Expected Timeline of Events for a 10-kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device Detonation.6

Since they would arrive to the scene well after the detonation, of most concern to US&R responders are the delayed effects and their associated hazards. As seen in Figure 1, these hazards can be
defined as secondary structural collapse, nuclear fallout, and fire. In this order, the following section
examines each of these hazards through the lens of US&R response.
Secondary Structural Collapse
The prompt effect of blast pressure is what initially causes buildings to collapse and entrap victims,
which then requires a US&R response.⁷ In the immediate hours after the detonation, the threat of
additional, progressive collapse in structurally compromised buildings is also possible, called secondary collapse.⁸ However, this phenomenon is a standard, anticipated hazard in any structural
collapse emergency, and it is normally mitigated by standard US&R practices, primarily shoring.⁹
In the context of a domestic nuclear detonation, it is widespread destruction that can amplify this
hazard.
Nuclear Fallout
The effect of ionizing radiation makes US&R efforts in post-nuclear detonation environments particularly unique. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Ionizing radiation is a
form of energy that acts by removing electrons from atoms and molecules of materials that include
air, water, and living tissue. Ionizing radiation can travel unseen and pass through these materials.”10 This ability to affect living tissue makes ionizing radiation hazardous. At certain dosages, it
can cause serious acute and delayed health effects.11
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Again, since they would arrive to the scene
after the prompt effects have occurred, ionizing
radiation’s delayed effects and associated
hazard of radioactive fallout are most precarious
to US&R responders. Lingering long after the
initial event, this residual radioactive material
is found both deposited around the blast site—
called groundshine—and suspended in the air,
which makes it environmental and atmospheric
in nature. While airborne fallout can be spread
by wind, making it a significant contamination
hazard, groundshine is initially more energetic,
making it a greater exposure hazard.12
To ensure the health, safety, and operational
effectiveness of US&R responders, they must be
protected from this exposure and contamination.
According to the Department of Health and
Human Services’ Radiation Emergency Medical
Management webpage, “Radiation exposure
occurs when all or part of the body absorbs
penetrating ionizing radiation from an external
radiation source.”13 Conversely, “Contamination
results when a radioisotope (as gas, liquid, or
solid) is released into the environment and
then ingested, inhaled, or deposited on the
body surface.”14 Therefore, the time responders
spend in radiation fields must be limited, and
barriers must be used to prevent radioactive
material from contacting and remaining on their
anatomies.
Radiation exposure in humans is measured as
a dose, and the primary tool for minimizing an
emergency responder’s dose is the principle
of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).15
ALARA calls for minimizing time around,
maximizing distance from, and using barriers
to shield against sources of radioactivity.16
Additionally, CBRN incident response agencies
should set total dose limits for emergency
operations. As an example, the Environment
Protection Agency recommends responders not
be permitted to receive more than a 25 roentgen
equivalent man once-in-a-lifetime dose in
lifesaving operations, except on a voluntary
basis.17 Similarly, the National US&R Response
System has set a single deployment radiation
dose limit of 50 roentgen equivalent man.18
Concurrently, US&R responders must be
protected from fallout contamination with
consideration for the routes of exposure:
inhalation, absorption, ingestion, direct contact,

and injection.19 In a post-nuclear detonation
environment, this is achieved using PPE.
Respirators, eye protection, over garments,
gloves, and boots are generally sufficient for
a radiation field.20 However, since collapsed
buildings typically present with sharp steel and
other injection hazards, US&R work in such an
environment calls for more robust, penetration
resistant PPE.21
Fire
A third, and often less emphasized, hazard
to US&R responders following a nuclear
detonation is fire. As is the case with ionizing
radiation-related hazards, fire is the result of both
prompt and delayed effects.22 In Whole World
on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, & Nuclear
Weapons Devastation, Lynn Eden describes
how the prompt effects of blast pressure and
thermal radiation—called nuclear flash—result
in fires following a hypothetical 300 kiloton,
near-surface blast nuclear detonation near the
Pentagon in Arlington, VA. She says:
At this [3.5 miles] and greater ranges from
the detonation, fire ignitions would result
from the tremendous release of thermal
energy, which would deposit radiant
light and heat on exposed surfaces,
causing the simultaneous combustion of
many surfaces and structures. Ignitions
would also be caused by the breakup
of structures from the blast wave and
accompanying winds. Structural breakup
would cause fires by releasing flammable
materials (such as gas, chemicals,
and other hazards as gas lines and
industrial processes were disrupted), by
exposing and shorting electrical lines and
equipment, and by exposing additional
ignitable surfaces. Such fires are called
“blast disruption” fires.23
However, these types of fires are not necessarily
uncommon to routine structural collapse
incidents. In fact, structural collapse is a common
occurrence secondary to large fires in buildings,
as is believed to have been the case at the World
Trade Center on September 11, 2001.24 Even in
the absence of fire as the impetus, disruptions
to utilities and stored hazardous materials
create serious fire hazards in most instances of
building collapse.25 In Fire Department Special
Operations, Retired Deputy Assistant Chief
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John Norman of the Fire Department of the City
of New York discusses the routine threat of fire
in relationship to additional collapse hazards at
structural collapse incidents. He warns:
While secondary collapse is a major threat,
it is not the only danger we face at these
events. Fire and explosion are serious
threats at any collapse scene, due to the
likelihood of ruptured gas and electric
lines within the remains of the structure, as
well as any occupancy hazards that may
be present, such as storage of gasoline,
propane cylinders, or other flammables.26
Like nuclear fallout, the phenomenon of
mass fire is unique to post-nuclear detonation
environments. In Whole World on Fire, Eden
goes on to describe how delayed atmospheric
effects can subsequently result in mass fires
following a nuclear detonation. She states:
Within tens of minutes after the cataclysmic
events associated with the detonation, a
mass of buoyantly rising fire-heated air
would signal the start of a second and
distinctly different event – the development
of a mass fire of gigantic scale and ferocity.
This fire would quickly increase in intensity.
In a fraction of an hour it would generate
ground winds of hurricane force with
average air temperatures well above the
boiling point of water (212°F, 100°C). This
would produce a lethal environment over
a vast contiguous area. The character of
mass fire results from the simultaneous
combustion of a large area containing a
fuel load typical of a city or suburb.27
It should be noted that scientists and scholars,
especially in comparison to blast effects, have
passionately debated the occurrence and
extent of a mass fire event following a nuclear
detonation.28 As the Nuclear/Radiological
Incident Annex to the Response and Recover
Federal Interagency Operations Plans states,
“The likeliness of a firestorm is unknown in an
urban environment; some theories suggest
modern construction and designs may buffer
the fire’s ability to grow uncontrollably.”29 Indeed,
like any other effect, thermal effects are largely
dependent upon a variety of factors. These
factors include height of the detonation in
relationship to the surface of the earth, energy
of the weapon in question, and shielding.30
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Regardless, Eden found that “the uncertainty
in the range of damage associated with mass
fire can be estimated and modeled, and is not
greater than the uncertainty associated with
blast damage.”31 Further, she concluded, “For
nuclear weapons of approximately 100 kilotons
or more, the range of devastation from mass fire
will generally be substantially greater than from
blast.”32
Regardless of the impetus, fire effects and their
associated hazards must be addressed for
US&R efforts to be successful in post-nuclear
detonation environments. Even in the absence
of a mass fire event, fires secondary to the
prompt effects of thermal radiation and blast
disruption will burn long after the detonation.33
As the Planning Guidance for Response to a
Nuclear Detonation warns, these fires “pose
a direct threat to survivors and responders.”34
This threat is especially true for those trapped
and operating in collapsed buildings. As
Norman points out in Fire Department Special
Operations, both rescuer and victim safety and
survival depend upon the mitigation of such fires.
He states, “At fires that result from explosions or
collapses, it is critical to conduct fire suppression
efforts simultaneously with rescue efforts.”35

Figure 2. Hazards Presented to US&R by Post-Nuclear
Detonation Environments.

As Figure 2 illustrates, the previously listed
hazards of secondary collapse, nuclear fallout,
and fire must be addressed in concert for
US&R lifesaving efforts to be successful after a
domestic nuclear detonation. Each presents a
life safety threat to both victims and responders
that requires appropriate consideration and
mitigation. Accordingly, the next segment of
this article examines the implications of this
unique overlapping of hazards for US&R in postnuclear detonation environments, particularly on
the matter of nuclear fallout-induced radiological
contamination.
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Urban Search and Rescue in Radiologically He observes, “Structural collapse after a terrorist
bombing adds USAR issues to the already
Contaminated Environments
complicated issues of postblast investigations
Considered independently, US&R is a task- and CBRN contamination.”40 He later concludes,
heavy discipline. Mastery requires proficiency “Structural Collapse in a contaminated
in a wide range of skillsets, including rope, environment adds a layer of complexity to
confined space, trench, vehicle, machinery, rescue operations.”41 This complexity is the
and structural collapse rescue, each of which result of additional considerations that must be
requires extensive training.36 Professional accounted for during such a response, including
firefighters and rescuers often spend years work/rest cycles, diminished dexterity and vision,
attending courses to obtain the relevant and stay times.
qualifications, and proficiency and expertise is
generally built over a career full of responses to Work/Rest Cycles
On the matter of simple rescues in CBRN
real US&R incidents.
environments, Kaszeta points out, “Rescue
Since the discipline of CBRN response is also is only made complicated in the presence of
task-heavy and complex, the threats of radiation contamination or of a percutaneous hazard,
contamination and exposure – posed by nuclear thus forming an acute hazard to unprotected
fallout – add additional layers of complexity to responders.”42 Nuclear fallout is such a
US&R in post-nuclear detonation environments. contaminant, requiring the use of CBRN PPE.43
In CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public However, using PPE during periods of high work
Events: Planning and Response, Dan Kaszeta volume or high stress situations can induce
addresses these added complexities in the heat stress on responders, requiring frequent
general context of radiologically contaminated rest periods and worker rotations.44 Planning
environments. Towards the end of this work, he for these work cycles becomes exponentially
presents case studies of “practical scenarios” complex when the factors of PPE donning
related to CBRN incident responses and and doffing time and decontamination are
identifies common problems and potential considered.45
solutions. Scenario M, titled The “Dirty Bomb”
and Structural Collapse, describes a hypothetical Diminished Dexterity and Vision
terrorist attack on a large meeting of global Additionally, PPE usage significantly reduces
financial and political leaders with a radiological responders’ dexterity and limits their fields of
46
dispersal device (RDD). As Kaszeta describes vision. This reduction is concerning when
it, “This scenario addresses two potentially performing a task-heavy discipline like US&R,
overlapping situations, the radiological-dispersal which requires fine motor skills and a high
device (RDD)—the so-called ‘dirty bomb’—and degree of situational awareness. According to
the possibility of structural collapse, requiring Norman in Fire Department Special Operations:
sophisticated urban search and rescue (USAR)
Technical rescue signifies the involvement
methods.”37
of a more complex operational environment that often requires specialized tools
Naturally, it should be noted that an RDD attack
or equipment as well as a higher degree
is vastly different from a domestic nuclear
of know-how to achieve a successful outdetonation in both physics and magnitude. An
come. Another term that has come to sigRDD is a conventional explosive device that
nify the tasks involved is Urban Search
simply spreads a radioactive contaminant upon
and Rescue or USAR. The urban environits detonation, which makes it much smaller in
ment is where most (but not all, by far) of
force and effect than a nuclear weapon.38 Further,
the more complex accidents occur.47
while conventional explosions do have thermal
effects, they are usually not nearly as serious or In the National Park Service Technical Rescue
self-perpetuating as nuclear detonations.39
Handbook, Ken Phillips agrees by stating that
Still, Kaszeta’s case study addresses the unique, technical rescue work is a very dangerous
48
individual challenges presented to US&R efforts activity. Mistakes can be fatal, and most are
49
by radiologically contaminated environments. the result of human error.
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Stay Times
The final consideration is stay times in radiation
fields, which was alluded to in the previous
section. According to FEMA, “Stay time is
the amount of time a responder is allowed to
operate in a radiation field before a predefined
dose limit is reached.”50 Above certain doses,
radiation exposure can result in acute radiation
syndrome, an increased propensity to contract
cancer in the future, or death.51 Therefore, dose
limits must be established for US&R responders.
By dividing this dose limit by a given dose rate,
stay times can be calculated.52

Later, he laments, “This is the area where
CBRN/HAZMAT response and urban search
and rescue (USAR) converge, and much more
work needs to be done in this gap.”57

To effectively render aid after such an event, this
void must be addressed preemptively. To this
end, emergency response agencies with the
potential to perform US&R after a domestic nuclear detonation should address the added complexities induced by CBRN PPE usage and the
threat of fire in their pertinent planning and doctrine. More specifically, they should incorporate
the performance of US&R skills while donning
Stay times provide timeframes that prevent full PPE into their responder training, and they
overexposure of workers operating in radiation should anticipate the need for large numbers of
fields, as would be the case for US&R in a post- trained rescuers in their response planning.
nuclear detonation environment.53 As FEMA Perform US&R Skills in CBRN PPE during
explains, “By knowing this ‘stay time’ time based Training
on the predefined dose, responders can make Currently, outside of certain confined space resa knowledgeable decision about their own cue skills, National Fire Protection Association
safety from radiation, and they can perform (NFPA) 1006: Standard for Technical Rescue
their response tasks. In hazardous materials Personnel Professional Qualifications does not
response terminology, this is referred to as ‘work recommend that US&R trainees perform technimission duration.’”54 Based upon these stay cal rescue skills in CBRN PPE during their initial
times, US&R responders should be rotated out qualification training.58 However, as previously
of the radiation field and relieved by fresh forces stated, US&R is a highly technical discipline that
in a post-nuclear detonation environment, as requires a high degree of situational awareness,
failing to do so could jeopardize their safety and the added limitations on dexterity and vision
overall operational effectiveness. As Kaszeta incurred by these garments notwithstanding.
explains, “If you do not monitor the accumulated Therefore, rescuers within this mission space
dose of your responders, you may ruin them for ought to be provided with frequent opportunities
future work incidents. Monitor the dose closely to practice relevant US&R skills in full CBRN
and rotate teams to make sure people do not PPE, including during their initial training.
reach their exposure limits.”55
Plan for Fire
Recommendations
While the likelihood of a mass fire event after a
Because it would be entirely unprecedented and nuclear attack is unclear, the widespread pressignificantly catastrophic, a domestic nuclear ence of fire hazards in collapsed buildings and
detonation would challenge even the best- post-nuclear detonation environments is cerdevised emergency response plans, particularly tain.59 Although it is not necessarily the role or
in the field of US&R. Despite this, many relevant expectation of collapse rescuers to engage in
emergency response agencies have failed to fire suppression activities, a lack of firefighting
adequately address the complexities presented knowledge and planning could render US&R
by post-nuclear detonation environments in responders ineffective. Therefore, rescuers with
their applicable planning and doctrine. As the potential to respond to a domestic nuclear
Kaszeta points out, “While most USAR efforts detonation should be prepared to address the
acknowledge that hazardous materials of hazard of structural fires. To this end, planning
various descriptions may be present in structural- for such an event should anticipate the need for
collapse scenarios, not many organizations a large quantity of firefighting resources, and
have taken on the task of both USAR and US&R responders within this mission space
CBRN concurrently. This area represents an ought to be provided basic structural firefighting
operational-capability deficit in many places.”56 training.
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Anticipate the Need for Manpower
Finally, responders’ exposure to radiation and propensity for heat stress while working for long
periods in PPE necessitate the use of work/rest cycles and stay times.60 As such, the frequent
rotation of working personnel makes US&R in post-nuclear detonation environments extremely
labor intensive. Therefore, abundant manpower is vital to conducting these operations successfully,
and response agencies should anticipate the need for large numbers of trained responders in their
response planning.
Conclusion
To successfully rescue victims after a domestic nuclear detonation, rescuers must be capable of
overcoming the unique challenges presented to US&R efforts by post-nuclear detonation environments. These challenges include the hazards of secondary collapse, nuclear fallout, and fire.61
More specifically, mitigation tactics for the hazard of nuclear fallout add the complexities of work/
rest cycles, diminished dexterity and vision, and stay times.62
However, it should not be assumed that rescuers will be able to perform at an advanced level after
a nuclear attack. After all, a domestic nuclear detonation would arguably constitute America’s worst
day and challenge even the best-devised emergency response doctrine, especially in the realm of
US&R. Therefore, emergency response agencies with the potential to perform US&R after a domestic nuclear detonation should incorporate the performance of technical rescue skills in CBRN
PPE into their responder training, and they should address the threat of fire and need for large
numbers of trained rescuers in their response planning.
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Uranium Enrichment

Clandestine Uranium Enrichment Methods
CPT Thomas Parker and CPT Johnathon Kroc
United States Army Special Operations Command
LTC(R) David Morrow, PhD.
Applied Research Associates

Introduction
Since the inception of the atomic era during World War II, scientists have wrestled with the
laws of physics to enrich natural uranium to weapons-grade. That struggle has produced
many different methods over the past 70 years, the most common being gaseous diffusion
or gaseous centrifuge. Both use immense amounts of power and massive facilities to
produce poor yields of uranium-235. In the 1970s, a new approach emerged, using a
laser to ionize uranium-235 while leaving the unwanted uranium-238 behind. The method,
called the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS), is incredibly power-efficient and
produces an extremely high yield of uranium-235 in a short time. [1,2] It is also relatively
simple and can be hidden in plain sight at a research facility. The simplicity poses a
genuine danger where countries may be enriching weapons-grade uranium without
international knowledge or safeguards. Once complete, AVLIS can be used to advance
atomic weapons programs without other countries' awareness. This article will prove
that AVLIS and its enrichment abilities give any country with the money and expertise
the ability to produce highly enriched uranium. Established countries with money and
political objectives of this nature are the main threat to a clandestine use of AVLIS to
obtain weapons-grade uranium.[3].
Operation
AVLIS operates by vaporizing natural or spent uranium fuel and passing an ionizing laser through
the vapor. The laser ionizes the uranium-235 in the vapor, and an electric field is induced to pull the
ionized particles to a condensation region. (Figure 1)[2])
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Figure 1: Simplified diagram of the AVLIS system [2]

Theories of Operation
Ionization of isotopes
The clandestine use of an AVLIS may be diminishing technological barriers to special nuclear material. Natural uranium is approximately
.711% uranium-235. Uranium-235 is a fissile isotope for use in nuclear reactors and weapons,
uranium-238 is not useful for reactors or nuclear
weapons. The difference in weight causes the
electrons of each isotope to have different ionization energies and, therefore, different ionization wavelengths. The difference is caused by
the force of gravity between the nucleus and the
electrons. The relative size of the isotope plays a
role in determining ionization energy. Since the
heavier isotope has more neutrons and a larger nucleus, it is closer to its electrons, causing
that electron to be held relatively tighter.[6] The
actual ionization wavelength for uranium-235 is
classified; however, the known range of wavelengths is 500-550 nm.

The first lasers used for AVLIS were dye lasers.
[7] Light is pumped into a reflective box with a
particular color dye. Then, once the required
energy has built up, the energy is released in
a pulse. Dye lasers are very inefficient due to
the continuous pulses required to maintain the
ionization. Now you can buy a tunable 50-watt
laser that meets the same requirements on the
open market. [5]
Vaporizer
There are many methods to vaporize uranium;
however, using an electron beam gun is
best. The electron beam fires highly energetic
electrons at the material at an angle between
30 and 60 degrees. [8, 9] The extreme kinetic
energy of the electrons is transferred to the
target material atoms as heat which causes
evaporation. [10]
Vacuum chamber
Creating a vacuum around the uranium vapor is
crucial to the operation of AVLIS. Uranium vapor
is so highly reactive; it poses severe containment
issues. When in contact with the atmosphere, it
will immediately bind with the water vapor or
corrode when combined with oxygen. [11, 12]
If the uranium is allowed to combine with any
other atoms or molecules, it will completely
change the ionization characteristics, and there
will be no enrichment. [3]

For AVLIS to operate, there must be selective
ionization of uranium-235 isotopes in the vapor.
Its wavelength defines the energy of a photon.
With a 500 nm wavelength, the energy of the
photon emitted by the laser is 2.48 eV. Three
photons must be incident on the isotope at once
to cause complete ionization due to the required
energy of 6.19 eV per atom.[4,5] Once that electron reaches the final energy level, it can escape Material Handling Requirements
causing ionization or release its energy and fall Tantalum and yttria-coated graphite are the only
back to the ground state. [6]
materials that fulfill the requirements to contain
the
uranium vapor produced during AVLIS. [2]
Required Equipment
Tantalum is common throughout the world
Lasers
and, therefore, not difficult to obtain. Yttria has
Since the inception of AVLIS, lasers efficiency similar properties as tantalum, but has some
has exploded. What used to take up a whole technological barriers. In many cases, yttria is
room can now fit in the palm of your hand. [3] connected to tantalum to gain the qualities of
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both. However, the combined material is hard to obtaining one. Even if an organization cannot
get and strictly controlled.
buy an electron beam, it is possible to build one
that
can meet the requirements of AVLIS. [5]
Expertise Required
Analogous
to lasers, there are many aftermarket
There are several fields required to build
electron
beams
available from many different
a successful AVLIS, specifically experts in
sources
around
the
world. Lastly, even in the
spectroscopy, lasers, quantum physics, and
slight
possibility
that
the organization cannot
chemistry. A spectroscopy expert is crucial to
get
an
electron
beam,
there are other ways to
ensure that the laser is tuned correctly to ionize
vaporize
the
uranium
that
could take the place
the vaporized uranium. Laser experts will need
of
the
electron
beam,
such
as an x-ray machine.
to tune the lasers to specified wavelengths
Obtaining
tantalum
and
yttria
have the same
determined by the spectroscopy expert.
issues
as
electron
beams
and
lasers.
However,
Quantum physicists will be needed to assist in
materials
research
projects
commonly
use
the determination of the wavelengths as well as
both
because
of
the
unique
properties
that
they
determining the power necessary to produce
ionization. Moreover, quantum physicists will possess. Tantalum is sold on the open market
be needed to build and control the electron in large sheets but is trade restricted by the
beam gun. Lastly, and one of the most critical United States. All other requirements to build a
experts is a chemist. The uranium must remain complete AVLIS are of no issue to obtain. This
a consistent atom or molecule so the laser can poses a real threat because if a nation is looking
to receive unique nuclear material, AVLIS is
ionize without needing adjustment.
a relatively easy way to do so. There is much
Clandestine AVLIS Construction
technical expertise required for this device,
Compared to other enrichment methods, AVILS so a small organization without much money
is the simplest, requires the least amount of will most likely avoid this process. However,
components, and requires the least energy. larger organizations like foreign national labs,
Therefore, the ability of a research university to universities, and research facilities can quickly
build such a device is not beyond imagination. achieve such a feat. It makes it very difficult to
Many of the items needed to make AVLIS are determine whether or not a facility is attempting
entirely available on the open market without to build AVLIS because all equipment required
trade restrictions. Extremely high-powered for this process is marketable for many other
lasers, high-powered electron beams, and legal research activities.
tantalum/yttria materials are trade restricted.
However, there are relatively easy ways around Observables
such restrictions. Many other countries do not A complete AVLIS has very few observables both
have the same trade laws as the United States. in its construction and operation. The equipment
Any research university or research group can required, for the most part, will not raise any
buy many small lasers to do the same work concern for international trade regulations.
as one large laser to avoid laser restrictions. Therefore, it is not observable because all the
Furthermore, when asked what a powerful equipment can be used in legitimate research
laser is for, Photonics is generally considered activities. Although many enrichment methods
a reasonable answer. There is a large market use vast amounts of power, AVLIS uses 5% of
for used lasers not only in the United States the power of gaseous methods for the exact yield.
but in other countries as well. [15] Once an In other words, 84 AVLIS lasers can produce
organization obtains a laser with the specified the same amount of enriched uranium in less
requirements, building an AVLIS under the guise time than 150,000 centrifuges. [2, 16] Therefore,
of research is entirely possible.
the power usage is not observable because it
To obtain an electron beam is slightly more is easily hidden within the electronic noise of
complex than lasers but still not complicated any actual research. However, AVLIS requires
without raising red flags. Powerful electron continuous power for many days due to the
beams are used in research all the time. A high enrichment for a small amount of material;
research organization would have no issues however, mass computing and other analysis
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all require more continuous power usage than
AVLIS would.[5,15] The most likely observable
is the conglomeration of all necessary experts
in one collaborative research organization or
facility. However, tracking such experts and
equipment will be extremely difficult. There are
so many different options to build an AVLIS that
chasing the pieces becomes near impossible.
Tracking a country's exports in the necessary
fields while difficult is more reasonable than
tracking equipment. Overall, the observables
of a clandestine AVLIS are minimal and pose a
threat of enemy states gaining unique nuclear
material.
Nuclear Export Controls
There are many controls on nuclear materials.
Many different United States Government
departments and agencies have a say in export
controls and international agencies such as the
IAEA. The State Department has a nuclear section
in its International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) and the Commerce Department in its
Export Administration Regulation. [18,19] The
most precise regulation is found in the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's Part 110, Title 10
Code of Federal Regulations: "Export and
import of nuclear equipment and material." [20]
It lays explicitly out components and tolerances
for nuclear materials. Unfortunately, none of
these export regulations have kept up with laser
technology or the current isotope enrichment
methods.

strength of 1.95 GPa or more," "aluminum
alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength
of 0.46 GPa or more," or "filamentary materials
suitable for use in composite structures and
having a specific modulus of 3.18 × 106 m or
greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength
of 7.62 × 104 m or greater." [22] Containing
these high specification materials is a vital
safeguard against enrichment by traditional
methods. Unfortunately, due to the explosion of
laser technology, AVLIS equipment has yet to
be adequately export-controlled.
Proliferation Concerns
The most significant concern for the AVLIS
systems is proliferation on a magnitude
previously unseen. It is tough to hide enrichment
plants due to their size and power consumption,
but the AVLIS method consumes less power
and has a smaller footprint that is much easier
to conceal. The lasers are not regulated to
the same degree as centrifuge or diffusion
components. With modern laser technology
exploding, a laser once only used in labs can
now be built in a basement. The concern is
that a photonics research center at a university
could be converted or double as a weapons
enrichment facility, which has already occurred
on a small scale.

It is possible to purchase all required components
for an AVLIS system online. Additionally, it
was discovered that the lasers one would use
for AVLIS could be bought online without any
oversite. [5] While all of the components have
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Title 10,
the capability of being purchased, it does not
Part 110 describes components under their
mean that their acquisition in bulk or sequence
licensing authority. They control features and
will not have effects or trigger an investigation.
materials that could be used for enrichment.
There are safeguards and controls in place for Recommendations
centrifuge and gaseous diffusion, but not for AVLIS is inherently a simple and efficient
AVLIS systems. The NRC forbids the export process that makes uranium enrichment
of "specially designed or prepared thin, porous relatively easy, compared to other methods. The
filters, with a pore size of 10–100 nm, a thickness opportunities for nefarious clandestine use are
of 5 mm or less, and for tubular forms, a diameter genuine. There is no good way to truly ensure
of 25 mm or less, made of metallic, polymer or that no organization is building or has a working
ceramic materials resistant to corrosion by UF6." AVLIS. However, tracking experts or attempting
[21] It also forbids the export of unique materials to control the aftermarket sales of high-powered
used in centrifuges. The materials needed for lasers and electron beams will help to reduce
the high-speed centrifuges have incredibly high the chance of proliferation. If further safeguards
tolerances. They are defined in Part 110 as are not put in place, AVLIS is a real proliferation
"Maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile threat.
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A Review of Breeder Reactors
MAJ Luke A. Tyree
WMD Coordination Team 4, 20th CBRNE Command

Introduction
Breeder reactors have long been a topic of interest to the nuclear science community.
This is because they make more fuel than they consume, which would be of great benefit
to the energy industry. They also are a source of plutonium which causes them to be a
proliferation risk. As with most issues pertaining to nuclear topics, the breeder reactor is
viewed on varying degrees along the scale of peaceful to militant use. The United States
gave up its breeder reactor program in the 1990s due to the risk of global nuclear weapon
proliferation it presented while other countries continue to pursue breeder reactor technology.
This paper will explore the topic of breeder reactors. Considering the proliferation risks
associated with breeder reactors, those involved in nuclear counterproliferation should be
knowledgeable on breeder reactor technology and be aware of where breeder reactors
are being used.
Reactor Theory
Before delving into breeder reactors, it is important to understand some basic nuclear reactor
theory as it pertains to these devices.
The principal source of the energy for the nuclear reactor occurs through a reaction in the nucleus of
heavy atoms called nuclear fission. Fission occurs when certain nuclei absorb a neutron and split
apart. Nuclear fission can be viewed as a two-step process.¹ The first step is when a fissionable
nucleus absorbs a neutron to become a compound nucleus. If the nucleus can be induced to
fission with a low energy neutron, that nucleus is considered to be fissile.² Lamarsh considers the
threshold between when a large nucleus can be called fissile is if fission can be induced through the
absorption of a zero-energy neutron. The most commonly discussed fissile nuclei are uranium-235
and plutonium-239; however, other fissile nuclei are uranium-233 and plutonium-241. If a nucleus
will fission after a neutron of sufficiently high energy is absorbed, the nucleus is considered to be
fissionable.³ The second step of the two-step fission process is that the compound nucleus then
splits into two or more smaller fission fragments along with neutrons and kinetic energy within the
resultant fission fragments and neutrons.⁴
There is a probability that neutrons impinging upon a particular nucleus will interact in a certain way.
That probability of interaction is called the microscopic cross section, σ, and its unit of measure
is in barns (b). One barn is equal to 10-24 cm². There are multiple ways that a neutron could
interact with a given nucleus. Some of these interactions include elastically scattering (elastic
scattering cross section, σe), getting absorbed and not resulting in fission but rather the emission
of gamma radiation (radiative capture cross section, σγ), and getting absorbed and resulting in
fission (fission cross section, σf). Each one has its own microscopic cross section. The sum of
Major Luke Tyree is the Nuclear Operations Officer for WMD Coordination Team 4 at the 20th CBRNE
Command, in Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. His WCT is regionally aligned with the INDOPACOM area of
responsibility and the Korean theater of operations. He has a B.S. in Physics and Mandarin Chinese from
the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY, and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from Purdue
University at West Lafayette, IN. He was previously assigned to a Nuclear Disablement Team at the 20th
CBRNE Command where he trained extensively on nuclear infrastructure. His email address is luke.a.tyree.
mil@army.mil.
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the microscopic cross sections for all possible
interactions of neutrons with nuclei is known as
the total cross section, σt. The total scattering
cross section is the sum of the elastic and
inelastic cross sections, σs = σe + σi. The sum
of the cross sections of all absorption reactions
is the absorption cross section, σa, which is the
same as all microscopic cross sections that are
not one of the two scattering cross sections ,
σa=σt - σs.⁵ An important thing to note is that the
microscopic cross section is energy dependent
– the energy of the impinging neutron will affect
the value of the cross section. This is a very
important concept for nuclear engineering
applications so it is worth repeating: cross
section is a function of energy.6

The average amount of neutrons released per
fission for a particular nuclide is represented
by ν.⁹ Recall that not all neutrons that are
absorbed in the fuel, or captured, result in fission.
Considering this, another important parameter
in nuclear reactor analysis applications is the
capture-to-fission ratio which is defined by 10

Duderstadt and Hamilton define η as the
average number of neutrons produced per
neutron absorbed in fuel.11 For a reactor to be
critical, the value of η must be greater than 1. For
values less than 1, the reactor will gradually lose
neutrons.12 For nuclear reactor fuel consisting
Nuclear fission is the fundamental process of a single isotope, the following relation holds
upon which the nuclear reactor is designed. true13
The fission of one fissile nucleus will produce
neutrons and energy. Those neutrons will result
in additional fissions of other fissile nuclei and
so on. If the neutron population of the reactor When a neutron is born from a fission event, it
system continues to grow, it is a self-sustaining has a high amount of energy. These high energy
nuclear reaction. The reaction’s viability to neutrons are referred to as fast neutrons and
sustain itself can be quantified through the have energy on the order of 1-2 MeV. Neutrons
multiplication factor, k.
Lamarsh defines that are of lower energy of approximately 0.0253
multiplication factor as ⁷
eV are referred to as thermal neutrons. Fission
that occurs from a fissile nucleus absorbing
a thermal neutron and undergoing fission is
referred to as thermal fission. The average
energy for prompt neutrons released from
The above expression explains how neutrons U-235 thermal fission is 1.98 MeV and the most
from one generation are compared against the probable energy is 0.73 MeV.14 The fission cross
neutrons from a preceding generation. The section for fissile nuclides is smaller for high
multiplication factor will indicate whether the energy neutrons than for low energy neutrons.
assembly of fissile material has a neutron The neutrons are slowed down, or thermalized,
population that is attenuating, in a steady state, through a series of scattering interactions
or growing. If the value of k is less than 1, then between the neutrons in the reactor system
the fissile material assembly is considered to and a moderation material. Commonly used
be subcritical. The value in the denominator of moderators include water, heavy water (D2O),
the above expression for k is greater than the and graphite (carbon). These moderators are
numerator, and each successive generation of also often used as the coolant for the reactor,
fissions is less than the previous generation. If and nuclear reactors that rely on the fissions from
the value of k is equal to 1, then the assembly of thermal neutrons (neutrons that have energy of
fissile material is considered to be critical, and the approximately 0.0253 eV) are known as thermal
neutron population is at a steady state. Nuclear reactors. Those reactors that rely on a fast
reactors seek to achieve a k value of 1. If the neutron spectrum are known as fast neutrons.
value of k is greater than 1, then the assembly of The coolant for one type of fast reactor, the liquid
fissile material is considered to be supercritical. metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR), is sodium.
The value of the numerator is greater than the This coolant is used because it is not an effective
denominator in the expression for k above, and moderator which keeps the neutron population
the neutron population is growing.⁸
primarily in the fast energy spectrum.15
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In addition to fissile and fissionable nuclides,
another type of nuclide that is of interest in the
nuclear energy field is the fertile nuclide. When
fertile nuclides undergo radiative absorption,
it results in a series of nuclear decays that
ultimately yield a fissile nuclide. Two of the most
useful absorption and subsequent decay chains
are the following.

These are useful absorption and subsequent
decay chains because of the abundance in
which U-238 and Th-232 deposits are found
throughout the world.16 The process of fertile
nuclides absorbing a neutron and undergoing
transmutation to a fissile nuclide is known as
conversion. If more fissile material is produced
from fertile material than is consumed in the
reactor, then instead of being called conversion
it is called breeding and the reactor is called a
breeder reactor. For a reactor to breed fissile
material, the value of η must be greater than 2.
This is because one neutron must be used to
maintain criticality while another will be required
to continue breeding.17 U-233 has the largest η
at thermal energies and so the Th-232, U-233
cycle offers a better option for thermal breeding.
The light-water breeder reactor (LWBR) and the
molten salt breeder reactor make useful thermal
breeder reactors using the thorium cycle. The
U-238, Pu-239 cycle lends itself better to fast
breeding under as little neutron moderation as
possible, or under as “hard” a neutron spectrum
as possible. A hard neutron spectrum refers to a
faster (or higher energy) neutron spectrum and
a soft neutron spectrum refers to a more thermal
(or lower energy) neutron spectrum. The LMFBR
which uses liquid sodium as the coolant was
introduced earlier. While the sodium coolant
does have a softening effect on the neutron
energy spectrum, sodium moderates neutrons
much less efficiently than water or graphite. So
LMFBRs leverage a fast, rather than a thermal,
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neutron spectrum to run the nuclear fission
chain reaction. A way that these reactors are
qualified is through the conversion ratio which is
defined as the rate of the creation of new fissile
material divided by the rate of destruction of
existing fissile material. Should the conversion
ratio exceed unity (more fissile material is being
created than being destroyed), the conversion
ratio is considered to be a breeding ratio.18
While the value of η increases with neutron
energy, the neutrons are less likely to interact
with fertile and fissile nuclides and the values
of capture and fission cross sections decrease.
To leverage neutrons leaking out of the reactor
core, the core of breeder reactors is surrounded
by a blanket. The blanket is composed of fertile
material, either thorium-232 or uranium-238
depending upon the particular reactor design,
and it is designed specifically to capture neutrons
and create more fissile material. Breeding of
new fissile material can also be accompanied
by a significant amount of fission so the blanket
must be cooled along with the reactor core.19
A highly intensive process known as fuel
reprocessing is required to extract the
converted fissile material from the material that
is not wanted in spent nuclear fuel such as the
highly radioactive fission products.20 Whether a
particular fuel cycle employs fuel reprocessing
and recycles fuel will determine whether that
fuel cycle is an open or a closed fuel cycle. If
the spent fuel is used only once and then
ultimately put into dry storage, that is known
as an open fuel cycle. This fuel cycle can also
be referred to as the once-through fuel cycle or
the throw-away fuel cycle.21 If the spent fuel is
recycled (there is still a lot of fissile material that
remains in spent nuclear fuel), then that fuel
cycle is considered to be a closed fuel cycle. To
extract the fissile material that is converted in
a breeder reactor, fuel reprocessing is required.
Generally, countries that leverage breeder
reactor technology employ a closed fuel cycle.
See Figure 1 for a diagram of both the open and
closed nuclear fuel cycle from the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The breeder
reactor would fit into the “reactor” portion of this
process flow.
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first nuclear power plant to generate electricity.
EBR-I operated until 30 December 1963 after
which it was shut down.23

Figure 1. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle.22

History of Breeder Reactors in the United
States
On the morning of 26 April 1944, Enrico Fermi,
Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner, Alvin Weinberg,
and others met to discuss ways in which nuclear
fission might be applied to provide power to
cities. One issue at the top of everyone’s mind
was the scarcity of uranium at the time. So, the
concept of the breeder reactor – where more
fissile material is produced than is consumed
– was very attractive. Fermi recruited Walter
Zinn to the project, and Zinn became the first
director of the newly named and reorganized
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in 1946.
On 19 November 1947, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) authorized ANL to build a
liquid metal cooled fast neutron reactor which
was named the Experimental Breeder Reactor-1
(EBR-I). The design team for EBR-I chose to
cool the reactor core with a sodium potassium
(NaK) alloy which would burn in air. Due to
public safety concerns of building the reactor
near Chicago, a remote site was chosen near
Arco, Idaho. The site had formerly been the
site for testing naval ordnance, and it became
known as the National Reactor Testing Station.
This site later became its own national laboratory
apart from ANL, and later named Idaho National
Laboratory (INL). EBR-1 was designed to both
breed plutonium and generate electric power.
On 20 December 1951, EBR-1 went critical and
lit four 200-watt light bulbs becoming the world’s

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) was
also built at the National Reactor Testing Station
(later a site within INL) and criticality at low
power without sodium coolant was achieved on
30 September 1961. It then achieved criticality
with sodium coolant on 11 November 1963, and
it achieved design power on 25 September 1969.
EBR-II successfully demonstrated a sodium
cooled fast breeder reactor functioning as an
electric power producing nuclear reactor. One
feature of EBR-II that helped make it successful
was the adjoining Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF –
now known as the Fuel Conditioning Facility at
INL) that allowed for the onsite reprocessing
and recycling of the spent highly enriched
uranium (HEU) fuel that was used in EBR-II.
The FCF reprocessed spent fuel from EBR-II
and fabricated fresh fuel from 1964 until 1969.
In 1967, EBR-II shifted from a demonstration
power plant to an irradiation facility instead.
EBR-II along with the FCF served as research
and development facilities for the Integral Fast
Reactor (IFR) concept out of ANL. The IFR
program was terminated in 1994 and EBRII subsequently shut down its operations in
September of 1994 after 30 years of operation.24
The IFR was an ANL effort that rose in the wake
of the failed Clinch River Demonstration Breeder
Reactor (CRBR). The CRBR was intended to be
an LMFBR demonstration plant, and the CRBR
began with statutory authorization to several
commercial power companies that included
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and
Commonwealth Edison Co. (now Exelon) along
with the AEC. Westinghouse Electric Corporation
was ultimately selected to manufacture this
proposed demonstration LMFBR. Construction
of the CRBR was projected to begin around
1974 or 1975 with power generation to begin
around 1981 or 1982. The site of the CRBR
was selected to be located on the Clinch River
on the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, AEC site. TVA
would operate the plant, and it would supply
power to the TVA grid. The reactor was to be
a loop-style sodium cooled fast breeder reactor
that ran off plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.
However, beginning in 1972, the LMFBR and
CRBR programs began to generate particularly
fierce public opposition.25
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Building on a 28 October 1976 decision by
President Ford, on 24 March 1977, President
Carter directed the indefinite deferral of
commercial reprocessing and plutonium
recycling of spent nuclear fuel within the United
States. President Carter also suspended the
licensing process that was needed to gain a
Limited Work Authorization for the CRBR in the
same 24 March 1977 directive. The decisions
by Presidents Ford and Carter were in large part
a response to India’s use of separated plutonium
that it acquired through the assistance of the
United States as part of the “Atoms for Peace”
program. India had used this plutonium to
execute a successful nuclear weapons test in
1974. At that time, there was growing concern
resulting from Brazil, Pakistan, and South Korea
all having made contracts with France and
Germany for purchasing reprocessing plants.
The United States suspected that all three of
these countries were interested in pursuing a
nuclear weapons program with the separated
plutonium these reprocessing plants would
provide them with.26
Despite opposition from the Carter Administration,
Congress continued to fund the CRBR even
though site construction could not proceed. The
project merely ordered parts and stored them in a
warehouse in the hopes that the political climate
would change. In 1981, President Reagan
restarted the CRBR construction licensing

process. By the end of 1982, the design was
mostly complete with most components either
ordered or on hand. However, on 23 October
1983, Congress terminated funding for the
CRBR for FY1984. On 15 December 1983, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission terminated the
licensing process for the CRBR and vacated the
Limited Work Authorization that it had granted
the previous year. These actions essentially
ended breeder reactor development in the
United States.27
The IFR was put forth as a project following the
failure of the CRBR project and the corresponding
regulatory environment at the time that
prohibited commercial spent fuel reprocessing.
The IFR was touted as a critical step in making
the breeder reactor concept economical,
proliferation-resistant, and acceptable from
an environmental standpoint. The IFR would
leverage pyroprocessing and electrorefining
as the method of extracting plutonium from the
spent fuel. The IFR received federal funding for
approximately a decade until ultimately it too
was cancelled under the Clinton Administration.
Funding for the IFR was terminated in 1994. As
a political compromise however, the FCF was
allowed to continue operations with research
there being renamed the “actinide recycling
project” and being applied to the long-term
management of nuclear waste.28 See Figure 2
for a timeline of the previously mentioned events.

Figure 2. Timeline of the LMFBR History in the United States. (Image created by the author.)
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There are many reasons why something as
promising as breeder reactors ultimately failed
in the United States and in Europe. Frank von
Hippel, in an International Panel on Fissile
Materials (IPFM) publication, argues that the
reasons behind developing and implementing
breeder reactors in the early days of nuclear
power research and development can be
attributed to the following four assumptions.29
1. Uranium is a scarce resource and uranium
deposits would quickly be used up if the
nuclear fission reactors achieved widespread use.
2. Breeder reactors would quickly be able to
compete with the light water reactors that
are currently used.
3. Breeder reactors could be as safe and
reliable as light water reactors.
4. The proliferation risks posed by the recycling
of fissile materials, particularly plutonium,
that results in a closed fuel cycle could be
managed.
Frank von Hippel is among those who feel
that each of these assumptions proved to be
incorrect.
Uranium ultimately became more prevalent and
economically viable resource than originally
thought. During the years preceding World
War II and the Manhattan Project, uranium
deposits were mined largely for their radium
content. Aside from a few uses such as serving
as color for ceramics and in steel alloys, most
of the uranium that was mined for its radium
content was discarded as waste. After its use
for fission was discovered and demonstrated,
it was initially thought that uranium deposits
were a rare occurrence throughout the world.
The United States briefly sought to monopolize
these deposits as a way of controlling nuclear
weapon proliferation in the hopes of limiting the
special nuclear material that other countries had
access to. In addition to continuing to discover
useful uranium deposits, it was discovered that
uranium could be extracted from a large variety
of different ore types. Even ocean water contains
about 0.002 ppm uranium.30 Useful uranium ore
deposits were discovered in countries around
the world.
Contrary to breeder reactors rapidly being
able to compete economically with light water

reactors, breeders are still an enormously
expensive undertaking and have not been able
to compete with light water reactors yet. Unless
the cost of uranium were to become significantly
higher than it currently is, breeder reactors will
have trouble competing with light water reactors.
It could be argued that one contributing cost to
the great expense of breeder reactors is that
they were never built at large scale production
capacity but rather a demonstration breeder
reactor here and a demonstration breeder
reactor there. Frank von Hippel asserts that
there are few that would argue that even with
breeder reactors being built at capacity, their
capital costs would be able to drop below 25%
greater than what it costs to produce power from
comparable water-cooled reactors.31
Fast neutron reactors typically use sodium
as the coolant. There are admittedly some
safety benefits to using sodium over water as
the coolant. For example, loss of coolant is a
major safety concern for water cooled reactors.
A break in the primary loop, or the coolant loop
that is immediately in contact with the reactor
core, can result in a loss of pressure and the
water flashing to steam. For sodium cooled
fast reactors, unless the break occurs below
the reactor vessel, the sodium is kept at low
pressure so the sodium will continue to cover
the core and provide coolant to the core. If the
break occurs below the reactor vessel, the liquid
sodium coolant will flow out where the break
is and leave the reactor core exposed. While
there are safety benefits to the LMFBR design,
there also are some severe safety concerns
with using sodium as a coolant. One issue is
that sodium is highly reactive with water and
burns if exposed to air. Russia’s BN-350 and
BN-600 reactors and Japan’s Monju reactor
have all experienced sodium fires which caused
significant delays and shutdowns. The sodium
used in the fast reactors is also very radioactive.
Sodium-23 is the stable isotope of sodium that
is used in the coolant loops. When subjected
to the high neutron radiation environment that
surrounds an active reactor core, sodium-23 can
absorb a neutron to become sodium-24 which
has a 15-hour half-life. The primary sodium
coolant loop becomes extremely radioactive.
When considering the hazardous situation
that would be created by a combination of this
radioactive sodium with water, a radioactive
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sodium fire would be very dangerous. To
mitigate this potentially catastrophic scenario,
an intermediate sodium loop is inserted between
the primary sodium loop cooling the fast reactor
core and the steam generators so that it is the
non-radioactive sodium that passes by the
steam and not the radioactive sodium from the
primary coolant loop. Adding this additional
intermediate sodium loop with associated
pumps adds to an already expensive facility.32

the fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) is currently
operational. India plans to use a three-stage
process where it first would breed plutonium
from uranium-238. That plutonium would then
be used for stage II where it would be burned in
fast breeder reactors where thorium-232 would
be used in the blanket to make the fissile material
of uranium-233. Stage III would consist of
burning the uranium-233 to generate power and
to convert more thorium-232 into uranium-233.
Sodium cooled fast reactors also have some It is currently working on its first prototype fast
35
serious reliability concerns.
The fact that breeder reactor (PFBR) as part of Stage I.
sodium cannot come in contact with the water Russia currently has two fast reactors operating
in the air makes repairs very complicated. The in Beloyarsk units 3 and 4 – the BN-600
liquid sodium is highly corrosive, and if there (600MWe) and the BN-800 (880 MWe) which
is a maintenance issue within the reactor, the are both sodium cooled. It currently is working
reactor must be shut down, the fuel must be on the completion of the BN-1200 fast reactor
removed, the sodium must be drained, and which is planned for unit 5 at the Beloyarsk
the system must be flushed to ensure there nuclear power plant. There are also plans in
is no residual sodium left that could cause an Russia to commission a 300MWe lead cooled
explosion or a sodium fire. This whole process BREST-OD-300 fast neutron reactor to be built
could take months or even years. This results in in Seversk as part of the Siberian Chemical
long periods where the reactor is not producing Complex.36
power, further degrading its economic viability.33
China currently has an operational pilot 20
By the nature of the breeder reactor fuel cycle, MWe fast reactor – the China Experimental
fissile material – especially plutonium – must Fast Reactor (CEFR). The CEFR went critical
be extracted from the spent nuclear fuel and in 2010.37 As of earlier this year, China has
the reactor blanket through reprocessing started work on building a second spent fuel
techniques. This provides access to plutonium reprocessing plant that is anticipated to be
that could then be diverted for use in weapons. complete by 2030. China is also building fast
There are concrete examples of the diversion breeder reactors. Among others, this work on
of plutonium from use towards energy to use reprocessing facilities and fast breeder reactors
towards a weapons program. In 1974, India has concerned the US defense establishment.
used some of the first plutonium that it extracted In April of 2021, Admiral Charles Richard, the
as part of its breeder reactor program to conduct commander of US Strategic Command, told the
what it called a “peaceful nuclear explosion”. Senate Armed Services Committee that “with a
Typically, the plutonium inside spent nuclear fast breeder reactor, you now have a very large
fuel is considered to be self-protecting because source of weapons grade plutonium available
the fission products make it so radioactive that to you, that will change the upper bounds of
handling it becomes extraordinarily difficult what China could choose to do if they wanted
boarding on the untenable. As part of any to, in terms of further expansion of their nuclear
breeder reactor program, the fissile material capabilities.”38 The China National Nuclear
(and for fast breeder reactors that fissile material Corporation is building two China Fast Reactors
is plutonium-239) is extracted from those highly (CFR-600) on the island of Changbiao in Fujian
radioactive fission products that make the spent province. These reactors are sodium cooled
nuclear fuel self-protecting. Doing this inherently fast reactors designed to produce 600 MWe.
results in proliferation risk.34
The first of these two reactors is scheduled to
start producing power in 2023 and the second
Current Breeder Reactor Programs
is scheduled to start producing power in 2026.39
While breeder reactor technology did not take
off in Western countries, the concept is very As the United States seeks ways to lower its
much alive in India, Russia, and China. In India, carbon emissions, there is currently significant
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interest in advanced nuclear reactor designs
within the United States from companies such
as Westinghouse, GE Hitachi, and X-energy.
The US based company TerraPower is explicitly
pursuing breeder reactor technology. It is
currently working on several reactor designs
that include the Natrium Reactor Design, the
Traveling Wave Reactor Design, and the Molten
Chloride Fast Reactor Design.40

specialized tasks of control, defeat, disable, and
dispose. If a country has been found to have
been diverting fissile material from a breeder
reactor to a weapons program, the organizing
principle of protect becomes more relevant
regarding the breeder reactors. If there is a
way of removing the breeder reactor from the
country’s nuclear weapons production network,
that would eliminate the supply of fissile material
and
it would hinder the ability to produce nuclear
While there is interest in breeder reactor
44
weapons.
designs, there are currently no operational
breeder reactors in the United States. France, Under the respond organizing principle, there
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United is the specialized activity of CBRN response
States have all seriously pursued breeder and the specialized tasks of attribute, mitigate,
reactor development and construction with sustain, and support. Regarding this organizing
operational breeder reactors at various points.41 principle, understanding the country of concern’s
Not all of these breeder reactor efforts were breeder reactors would assist in determining the
tied to weapons programs, but rather, many nature of the plutonium in the weapons that are
were designed for peaceful energy purposes. being produced.45
Currently however, only India, Russia, and In addition to the organizing principles of prevent,
China are operating breeder reactors. In the protect, and respond, there are the crosscutting
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article “It’s Time activity and tasks of understand the environment,
to Give Up on Breeder Reactors” by Cochran threats, and vulnerabilities and locate, identify,
et al., the authors make the observation that “[t] characterize, assess, and predict. This activity
he persistence of breeder programs in Russia, and these tasks are applicable throughout
India, and China is testimony to the ability of the countering weapons of mass destruction
their nuclear establishments to tap into national (CWMD) spectrum of activities. It is important
treasuries despite the fact that breeders will not for those agencies and organizations that are
be able to compete with light water reactors for involved in the CWMD community to be aware
the foreseeable future.”42
of breeder reactor programs within strategic
Breeder reactors are designed to produce
fissile material, and that fissile material has the
potential to be diverted to a weapons program.
JP 3-40, Joint Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction, provides the organizing principles
of prevent, protect, and respond. To counter a
country’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons
of mass destruction, paying attention to the
country’s breeder reactors can provide a focal
point for information on weapon production
pathways.
Under the prevent organizing
principle, there is the specialized activity of
WMD pathway defeat and the specialized tasks
of dissuade, deter, delay, disrupt, destroy, deny,
and assure. By having relevant agencies, units,
and organizations perform these specialized
tasks against a key node in the nuclear fuel
cycle, this can aid in preventing the country from
acquiring nuclear weapons.43

competitors and countries of concern. Analysis
of these facilities can provide warnings and
indicators of emerging and existing nuclear
weapon programs.46

Breeder reactors are appealing from the
perspective of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and
creating more fissile material than they consume.
They are also a proliferation concern as they
extract fissile material from spent nuclear fuel.
Even though there are no operational breeder
reactors in the United States, it is important for
those involved in nuclear counterproliferation to
understand breeder reactors and be aware of
where they are being used in the World.

For additional information on breeder reactors,
here are a few suggested online resources.

For additional information on how breeders work:
Breeder Reactors by Walter Mitchell, III and
Under the protect organizing principle, there is Stanley Turner from the US AEC’s Understanding
the specialized activity of WMD defeat and the the Atom Series (1971).
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<https://www.osti.gov/includes/opennet/
includes/Understanding%20the%20Atom/
Breeder%20Reactors.pdf> accessed on 25
November 2021.
For additional information on the history and status of
different countries’ breeder programs as of February
2010:
Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and
Status by Thomas Cochran et al. from the February 2010 report by the International Panel on
Fissile Materials.

<https://fissilematerials.org/library/rr08.pdf> accessed on 25 November 2021.
For a good comprehensive history of fast breeder reactor development in the United States:
“Fast Reactor Development in the United States”
by Thomas Cochran et al. published in Science
& Global Security (2009).
< h t t p s : / / w w w. t a n d f o n l i n e . c o m / d o i /
full/10.1080/08929880903445514> accessed
on 25 November 2021.

* The author would like to thank Major Adam Seybert for his valuable feedback during the editing of
this article.
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Designing a Graphite Moderated Sub-Critical
Assembly for the United States Military Academy
Nuclear Engineering Program
2LT Collin R. Combs, 2LT Adrian Garlant and
2LT Jerod W. Warren
United States Military Academy Class of 2021 Nuclear Engineering Program
[Editor note: This is the work of a USMA Nuclear Engineering Capstone Design
Project during the 2020-2021 academic year. USMA will repurpose graphite blocks
from AFFRI in order to have a graphite moderated subcritical assembly in addition to a
water moderated subcritical assembly. A second capstone design group is working in
2021-2022 academic year to construct the assembly and an updated article is expected
next year.]

Introduction
Problem Statement
The Department of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (PANE) at The United States Military Academy
(USMA) requested the design and construction of a Graphite Moderated Sub-Critical Assembly.
This assembly will be utilized by future Nuclear Engineering students for experimental learning and
research.
Previous Work
The Pennsylvania State University Subcritical Graphite Reactor Facility serves as a great base of
research for the USMA design. The assembly has been used for research since its construction
as a graduate student project in 1958. The assembly measures 266 cm x 161.5 cm x 178 cm and
utilizes up to five neutron sources of PuBe or 252Cf. The graphite assembly features removable
uranium rods that are loaded horizontally and have a removable cadmium cover. Depending on
the geometry of the fuel, the assembly can be used for diffusion length, thermal neutron field, or
approach to criticality experiments.¹
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Graphite Exponential Pile measures 231 cm x 231
cm x 297 cm and utilizes uranium slugs as fuel. Like the assembly at Pennsylvania State University,
the rods are horizontally loaded and can be configured in multiple geometries to manipulate the
neutron flux. The assembly typically utilizes a 12 x 12 geometry of fuel slugs and has a vertical line
Second Lieutenant Collin Combs is a student at the Engineer’s Basic Officer Leadership Course (EBOLC) at
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He has a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the United States Military Academy
at West Point. Upon graduation of EBOLC, he will be assigned to the 299th Combat Engineer Battalion at Fort
Carson, Colorado. His email address is collin.r.combs.mil@mail.mil.
Second Lieutenant Adrian Garlant is a Field Artillery BOLC Student in Fort Sill Oklahoma. He has a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering
from the United States Military Academy. His email address is adrian.garlant.mil@mail.mil.
Second Lieutenant Jerod Warren is a student at the 1-145th in Fort Rucker, AL. He has a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the United States Military Academy. He was previously assigned as a student at the United
States Military Academy His email address is jerod.w.warren.mil@mail.mil.
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of smaller diameter holes through the center of
the assembly for detector insertion. Furthermore,
the assembly has a pedestal of graphite on the
bottom, in an area where fuel cannot be loaded.
MIT uses this graphite pedestal to thermalize
neutrons before they enter the assembly and
increase its criticality.2

is a program designed to model problems such
as radiation shielding, reactor design, and other
nuclear science applications.

The moderator plays a large role in the
determination of many of these variables. The
fuel utilization factor f is the ratio of thermal
neutrons absorbed in the fuel to thermal
neutrons absorbed in all materials. A good
moderator such as graphite has a low thermal
Theory
neutron absorption probability and therefore
The moderating properties of graphite have been allows for a higher f.
well studied since its first use as a moderator in
the Chicago Pile-1. For a material to moderate Constraints, Limitations, and Specifications
neutrons, it must have a low atomic number (Z) The USMA assembly was specified to have
as neutrons are moderated through scattering. multiple fuel loading configurations, a design
Given that graphite is composed of mostly which allows for k-value and diffusion length
carbon with an atomic number of six, incident experiments and can fit reasonably in the
neutrons can lose a significant amount of energy department’s nuclear experimentation room.
after a single collision. Another material property The graphite blocks to be used measure 10 cm
of graphite that makes it a good moderator are x 10 cm x 150 cm.
its microscopic cross sections. Measured in
In order to meet the specifications, the graphite
barns, the microscopic cross section translates
moderator must be removed in a way that
to the probability that a neutron interacts with the
allows for fuel rods to be inserted in multiple
nuclei of the target atom. Ideal moderators have
locations. The graphite moderator blocks must
very high microscopic scattering cross sections
be cut to allow the 3.35 cm diameter fuel rods
and very low microscopic absorption cross
to be inserted, as seen in Fig 1. Additionally,
sections. Under these conditions, neutrons
the assembly must allow for detector insertion
are much more likely to lose energy through a
in multiple locations to conduct experiments.
collision than be absorbed in the nuclei of the
Lastly, the entire assembly dimensions must not
moderator. The use of moderator allows the
exceed 2m x 2m x 2m in order to be used in the
slowing of the neutrons to thermal speeds and
desired nuclear laboratory room.
thus the probability of the neutron causing a
The design is limited by the physical properties
fission in the fuel is significantly higher.
of the graphite moderator. Graphite is a solid,
The diffusion length of graphite is also an
and therefore fuel rods cannot be inserted into
important factor in the design of the assembly.
the assembly simply by displacing the graphite
Diffusion length refers to the average distance
moderator as with water moderated assembly.
a neutron travels before it is absorbed. Graphite
Additionally, graphite’s diffusion length is much
has a diffusion distance of approximately 59
larger than other thermal reactor moderators
cm; for comparison, light water (H2O) has a
such as water. This means that neutrons
3
diffusion length of 2.85 cm . This means that a
moderated by graphite must interact with more
significantly thick moderator blanket is required
graphite atoms before they are thermalized and
for ample neutron moderation in graphite This is
can be absorbed. This presents a challenge
a challenge as the available space and material
to the design due to increased fast neutron
will limit the thickness of moderator in the design.
leakage.
One application for the graphite-moderated
subcritical assembly is for k-value calculations. Methods
The k-value describes neutron production as it is Before constructing the assembly, modeling and
the ratio of neutrons in a generation to neutrons simulation software confirmed the validity of the
in the previous generation.
A subcritical design. MCNP6, VISED, and SolidWorks were
assembly requires a k-value below 1.0. The used to model the design. MCNP6 was utilized
k-value may be modeled by utilizing Monte to model the graphite assembly and to conduct
Carlo N-Particle Transport (MCNP6). MCNP6 diffusion length and criticality calculations.
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VISED is a visual editor powered by MCNP6 which produces a visual representation of the MCNP6
input. VISED was used primarily to confirm the geometry was valid. SolidWorks provides another
visual representation of the assembly with materials specified. Mechanical drawings can also be
created through SolidWorks to show specifications of the design.
Results
Unit Cell Design
Unit cells are the building blocks which will be used to build the assembly in MCNP6 or SolidWorks.
In order to use materials efficiently and maximize the volume of graphite in the assembly, each unit
cell in the assembly will have the same dimensions as an individual graphite block. The assembly
will be comprised of two main unit cells. The first is a unit cell of graphite moderator, and the
second is being a unit cell comprised of a fuel rod and graphite moderator. The unit cells are shown
in Fig. 1.

Figure 1. Unit cell of graphite moderator (left) and fuel rod in graphite moderator (right)
(Author produced drawing)

Of note, on the right side of Fig. 1, a 3.75 cm x 3.75 cm x 150 cm rectangular prism of graphite is
removed from the bottom left of the unit cell in order to place the fuel rod. This size was chosen to
accommodate any imperfections in the fuel rods, as well as to facilitate easy loading and unloading
of the fuel rods. Furthermore, the corner of the unit cell was chosen for the location of the cutout
as it requires only two cuts to remove the graphite prism. This method of machining allows the
removed graphite to be retained geometrically intact. Although there is a small amount of material
lost due to the sawblade kerf, the removed graphite can be inserted to have a nearly solid graphite
block. The cut block with material reinserted will be modeled as the unit cell on the left of Fig. 1.
Assembly Design
The assembly was created following completion of the unit cell designs. In order to maximize
the size of the assembly within size constraints, the design need to use the 300 graphite blocks
efficiently. This was achieved by stacking the graphite blocks in rows and columns with the long
axis of the blocks oriented in a single direction. An arrangement of 15 rows of 20 horizontal blocks
was chosen and is shown in Fig. 2.

Figure 2. Arrangement of graphite blocks in the assembly. Blue cells are uncut graphite and black cells are cut
graphite. (Author produced drawing)
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This arrangement of the assembly places the overall dimensions at 2.0 m x 1.5 m x 1.5 m. Due
to the number of graphite blocks available, this arrangement uses the highest whole number
integer closest to a square. Furthermore, assuming the assembly will only be loaded in a square
configuration, this arrangement also creates a pedestal of graphite similar to MIT’s assembly which
will aid in diffusion length experiments.
Given the chosen arrangement, the maximum fuel rod loading capacity would be a 13 x 13 square
with a 10 cm pitch. However, 181 out of the 300 graphite blocks will be cut to the specifications in
the right of Fig. 2. These cuts may serve as both fuel rod locations and detector insertion points.
Therefore, there exists multiple configurations of the fuel rods with pitches starting at 10 cm and
increasing by increments of 10. Due to graphite’s moderation properties, any increase in criticality
from the number of loaded unit cells may be offset by an increase in leakage due to a lower number
of neutrons being thermalized as a result of the missing moderator in the corresponding location.
This is because roughly 14% of the moderator’s volume is removed for every loaded unit cell.
MCNP Analysis
MCNP6 was the main method of evaluation for the design. It provides accurate modeling of neutron
transport and yields results practical for design determinations. The first loading configuration
tested used 49 fuel rods in a 7 x 7 arrangement with a 10 cm pitch. A cross sectional view of this
loading configuration is shown in left of Fig. 3.

Fig. 3. Cross Section of 7 x 7 loading configuration with 10 cm pitch (left) and 20 cm pitch (right) modeled in
MCNP. (Author produced drawing)

Due to graphite’s large diffusion length, if the loading configuration was modeled at max capacity,
the Keff would be roughly similar while drastically losing efficiency. At max loading, 169 fuel rods
would be used. This increase in the number of fuel rods would minimally raise the Keff as the
amount of graphite lost due to the fuel rods being inserted would lower the Keff.
Therefore, it was decided to maintain 49 fuel rods as a base number and increase the pitch to 20
cm and observe its effects. A cross sectional view of this loading configuration is shown in right of
Fig. 3. A summary of the results is shown in Table I.

Table 1. MCNP modeled Keff comparison of pitch configuration (Author produced table)
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Final Design
Upon receipt of the graphite blocks, 181 will
be cut in accordance with Fig. 1. They will be
machined using a table saw with a carbidetipped blade to avoid cracking in the graphite.
Figure 4 shows the results of a practice cut on
scrap graphite.

Fig. 6. Aluminum frame to house graphite assembly (Author
picture)

In addition to the aluminum shell, borated
polyethylene sheets measuring no less than 1
cm thick will be secured to all sides of the shell
to provide neutron shielding for operators. An
MNCP6 input was created to model the shielding
Fig 4. Experimental cut of graphite unit cell (Author picture) for the assembly. The shielding consisted of a 1
The machined graphite blocks can be manual cm shield of borated polyethylene. The shield
configured as either of the two unit cellspr. Fig. 5 was able to reduce the neutron flux by a factor
depicts unloaded and loaded unit cells near full of 3 at the edge of the assembly. Additional
insertion of a graphite moderating rod (left) and calculations are needed to determine the exact
an aluminum cladding tube in which the uranium amount of shielding needed on each side of the
assembly.
fuel will be contained (right).
Finally, standard operating procedures (SOPs)
for diffusion length and approach to criticality
experiments will be developed for future students
to follow in laboratory experiments. These
SOPs will include operating instructions, proper
methods for data collection, protective equipment
needed, general safety, and inspection checklist
to ensure proper maintenance of the assembly.
This design will be passed on to a follow-on
group who will continue with this multi-year
capstone design. The groundwork is laid with
MCNP6 and SolidWorks files. Proof of concept
machining tests have been performed. Initial
Fig. 5. Examples of unloaded (left) and loaded (right) unit shielding calculations are complete. The group
cells (Author picture)
that takes on this project will focus on the
Additionally, the assembly can be described as logistics of getting the graphite blocks on site
20 columns of 15 blocks stacked on each other, and then actual construction of the assembly.
as there is no internal structure to house the
assembly. To ensure the assembly is structurally
stable and safe to operate around, a frame was
constructed using slotted aluminum. The frame,
loaded with some test graphite blocks, is shown
in Fig. 6
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United States Military Academy Cadet in the Department of Chemistry and Life Science working in laboratory iwhich is a
requirement for many of the courses within the department.
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Army Officer Corps Science, Technology,
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Foundation
Gaps Place Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (CWMD) Operations at Risk – Part 1*
LTC Andrew R. Kick¹, MAJ Stephen Hummel1,2, LTC Matthew Gettings¹,
CPT Patrick Bowers¹, and COL F. John Burpo¹
1. Department of Chemistry & Life Science, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY 10996, USA
2. Biology Department, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
*Note – This is the first of three articles from the authors describing the risk to Joint Operations incurred by an
Army that is vulnerable to the STEM challenges faced in a great power competition involving CWMD operations.
In this article, we describe the problem. In articles two and three of the series, we will elaborate on the problem
utilizing the Joint Publication 3-0 as our guide and recommend solutions to address this gap.

Situation:

Step inside nearly any university research lab and you will find few students destined to become

Army officers. In January 2021, the Pentagon published the annual report on U.S. Defense Industrial Base Industrial Capabilities.1,2 The findings are alarming: the lack of STEM educated Americans
may lead to a “permanent national security deficit”.³ Both Russia and China are producing several
times more STEM graduates than the U.S.⁴ As a result of lacking enrollment by American students,
the technical programs of U.S. universities are seeking foreign students to fill the gap.⁵ More than
half of foreign students in the U.S. universities are enrolled in STEM degree programs.
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During 2010-2019, approximately 42% of graduating STEM program Ph.D. students in the U.S.
were from foreign nations.6,7 In 2020, the majority of these students arrived from India (18%) and
China (35%).8,9 Consequently, the U.S. DoD and defense contractors suffer from a shrinking population of U.S. citizens with technical degrees capable of passing background investigations to
obtain the necessary security clearances to support our Nation’s technical defense requirements.10
Although the report focuses on education deficit in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning,
similar trends remain true across the spectrum on STEM fields such as bioengineering, materials
science, and chemical engineering, all critical to developing and transitioning key technologies
for the Warfighter, as well as providing necessary expertise for the defense industry and higher
echelon military staffs. Less than 20% of electrical engineering and computer science students
are Americans.11 This has a direct impact on national security given our increased reliance on
artificial intelligence and cyber systems.12 Perhaps in response to this STEM education deficit as
articulated in the Pentagon Report, President Biden signed an Executive Order adding the Office
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) as a cabinet-level agency.13
Not only are Chinese students dominating STEM fields in U.S. universities, China’s national power
is further demonstrated by superior performance among graduate doctoral programs. In August
2021, the Center of Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) presented data which demonstrated that China is fast outpacing U.S. STEM PhD Growth.14 Since 2003, more Chinese graduate
students earned PhDs in STEM fields than U.S. domestic graduate students.15 Many of the Chinese PhDs are attained at top-tier U.S. institutions. By 2025, China is forecasted to produce more
than three times as many STEM PhD graduates as the U.S.16 The result is not by chance. China
has spent significant resources developing its universities to strengthen Chinese human capital as
part of “comprehensive national power”.17 China’s success is not simply due to increased funding
rather its focus and national resolve on increasing its STEM capacity.18,19

Figure 1. Data obtained from Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology. 20
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For perspective, though, a lack of STEM dominance among American students is not a new problem. After the U.S.S.R. successfully launched Sputnik into orbit in 1957, the U.S. government
took aggressive action to improve science and math education.21 In 1958, the National Defense
Education Act authorized $1 billion to “overhaul the American education system from schools to
universities at the federal level”.22 Soon, talented students benefitted from advanced placement
in science and math courses where calculus became part of their high school curriculum. These
specialized tracks enabled a large increase in STEM degrees beginning in the 1960s.23
The U.S. federal government by policy and funding levels continues to put a high premium on Science and Technology (S&T) research and education (~$120 billion annually between FY 20102017), which is the largest federal government investment of any world nation.24 This problem
and national vulnerability is well-known and is concerning to our national leadership. Key United
States of America National Strategy documents identify that STEM competence, competition,
and dominance is a national security priority: National Security Strategy (2017),25 National Defense Strategy (2018),26 a 21st Century Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for America’s National Security (2016),27 National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism (2018),28 and the National Biodefense Strategy (2018).29 Though described differently
across these documents, S&T advancement and primacy is linked to our Nation’s strength and
defense. Despite this emphasis and unifying theme, the Army Officer Personnel Management
System (OPMS) and Officer Education System, to include Professional Military Education (PME),
do not prioritize or effectively support our National Strategy because STEM competency is not
prioritized through commissioning sources, educational opportunities, or PME.
Thesis:
The Army Officer Corps is developing a widening gap in STEM-discipline undergraduate and
graduate degree expertise placing the United States at risk for Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction operations. Accordingly, STEM proficiency at the undergraduate-level and graduate-level is a critical component for all Army branches (not only Functional Areas / Medical Service Corps) and requires resourcing, opportunity, and advancement commensurate to its priority
in the National strategy.
Need:
Army Officer regulations, practices, and priorities rightly emphasize leadership and command.
Officers lead the Army. Commanders at all levels from the company to the component / combatant command apply mission command to command and control units to achieve the assigned
mission.30 Command is referred to as more “art than science because it depends upon actions
only human beings can perform” and “incorporates intangible elements of authority, responsibility, decision making, and leadership”.31 ADP 6-0 elevates the art of war above the science of
war; however, in CWMD multi-domain operations incorporating the six warfighting functions into
effective decision making within mission command requires not only tactical competence but
STEM competence. In CWMD multi-domain operations, the science of command surpasses the
art of command. As illustrated in ADP 6-0, Figure 1-2, Combat Power Model,32 the Commander
and her / his staff must possess the S&T competence to unify these disparate functions: as each
function becomes more technically complex, STEM competence and the critical thinking / technological competence provided through advanced STEM degrees are necessary on the tactical
and operational levels to facilitate right decision making.
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Figure 2. The combat power model illustrates the relationship between the six warfighting functions with
command and control being the unifying function.33

A simple word search of key Army doctrine demonstrates the lack of emphasis on STEM / S&T
competence in decision making and Army operations:
• ADP 3-0, Operations34 (science always in relation to warfare, operations, or understanding)
• ADP 5-0, The Operations Process35 (science always in relation to operations or understanding)
• ADP 6-0, Mission Command36 (science always in relation to command, warfare, or information)
• ADP 6-22, Army leadership and the Profession37 (science, no link to STEM / S&T)
• 2019 Army Modernization Strategy38 (S&T emphasized but not in relation to officer competence)
• Army Chief of Staff Papers #1 and #2, March 202139,40 (S&T emphasized but not for officer
competence)
• The Army People Strategy, October 201941 (only in relation to talent management improvement, not actual STEM competence)
• ATP 3-90.40, Combined Arms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction42 (one mention of
forensic science)
As far as the Officer Education System, the FY20 and FY21 U.S. Army Accessions Mission Letter43 for Officer Commissioning sources establishes a goal of 25% of contracted cadets assess in
an undergraduate STEM program with overproduction encouraged (this excludes AMEDD with
specific STEM accessions requirements). Indeed, the Army exceeds this goal for commissioning:
the number of Army ROTC graduates with STEM degrees averaged ~30% in FY19-21 and the
number of United States Military Academy graduates with STEM degrees is historically stable at
approximately 50%.44 Within PME, for senior company grade and junior field grade officers, STEM
advanced degrees opportunities become available through three routes: a United States Military
Academy (USMA) Advanced Civilian Schooling (ACS) fellowship, the broadening opportunity program or through Functional Area designation and qualification. Outside of those categories (and
exceptions), PME and graduate-level education is devoted to non-STEM fields. And in fact, officers
who pursue advanced civilian education opportunities in STEM will likely experience a delay in
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promotion due to an insufficient number of field-grade (O-5) evaluations, or pausing their promotion year group, as a result of their time in graduate school compared to officers who remain in
operational assignments. At the Senior Service College / Fellowship level, PME is again focused
on competence in strategy, federal government / international relations, and leadership instead of
STEM competency.
This dichotomy between declaring a need for leaders competent in STEM and prioritizing the fulfillment of that need can be seen through the Army’s FY2021 Broadening Opportunity Program
catalog.45 The catalog, which lists the assignments the Army will fund for broadening opportunities,
has 15 opportunities for broadening assignments with graduate degree outcomes. Of those 15
opportunities, only two have the directive to focus on STEM related topics, the Purdue Military
Research Initiative (PMRI) and the Army Futures Command Artificial Intelligence Scholar Program,
and while the PMRI attempts to focus on STEM related degrees, it is not a requirement of the program. The cost of these respective programs available to STEM focused leaders versus their nonSTEM counterparts is additionally concerning. PMRI falls into the “low cost” category for the Army’s
Advanced Civil Schooling program, meaning the Army pays under $26,000 per year per graduate
student. Compared to the remaining 13 non-STEM focused programs, three are high-cost category
which can be as much as $55,000 per year per student with an additional three programs that are
either medium-cost or high-cost category depending on student selection. In essence, the Army
places between a $17,000 and $29,000 premium on non-STEM related graduate degrees.
Accordingly, Field-grade and General Officers serving in critical Command billets from Battalion
through Component / Combatant Commands largely lack the STEM expertise to integrate the
technological advances of the warfighting functions most effectively. Among active-duty Army general officers, 10% earned a graduate degree in a STEM field and 30% completed undergraduate
STEM programs.46 Though possibly surrounded by staffs for functional area competence, their own
limited understanding of STEM creates vulnerability and risk either through over reliance on S&T
experts or personal bias with respect to S&T issues. These commanders have commanded at the
most challenging operational assignments resulting in positions of command with increasing authority; however, the Army has not prioritized continued STEM education in their career progression
and leader development.
Despite STEM-education and excellence being a National-priority as described in Executive Strategic policy documents, the Army does not prioritize STEM education either in accessions (30-50%
accessed) or in the PME system. The Army is currently not aligned with the National Strategy for
STEM dominance in the face of future CWMD operations in a great power competition. The Army’s
failure to emphasize STEM competence in the Army Officer Corps outside of Functional Areas creates risk to mission accomplishment in CWMD multi-domain operations. The Army must prioritize
STEM education in accessions and throughout PME to prepare commanders for effective S&T
informed decision making within mission command in CWMD multi-domain operations.
Approach:
In the next two CWMD Journal issues, the authors will argue our thesis utilizing JP 3-0 as a frame
of reference for CWMD Operations. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, describes a Joint Operational Model
with notional phasing for predominant military activities.47 Applying the Joint Operational Model to
a regional or great power competition involving CWMD operations provides a construct to evaluate
how Army Officer STEM competence support Joint Operational success in each phase. Our next
article (Part 2) will address the risk of our current efforts as we operate in Phases 0 and 1 (Shape
and Deter) CWMD operations in multiple theaters of operation. Our final article (Part 3) will examine the transition to decisive action / unified action with Phases 2 - 5 (Seize the Initiative through
Enable Civil Authority). Through this project, we will explore and identify specific risks to Joint Operations incurred by an Army that is ill-prepared to meet the STEM challenges faced in a great power
competition involving CWMD operations. The goal of this project is to support our thesis through
demonstrated facts and scenarios in order to convince Senior Leaders that a new prioritization of
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officer education to achieve STEM competence from undergraduate commissioning through senior
service college or equivalent is required for the Army to support Joint CWMD operations in multidomain operations.

Figure 3. Applying the Joint Operational Model to a regional or great power competition involving CWMD
operations provides a construct to evaluate how Army Officer STEM competence support Joint Operational
success in each phase. Part 2 of our series will address Phase 0 and 1. Part 3 of our series will address Phases
2 – 5.48
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LTC Matt Gettings, during his Ph.D. research at Purdue University, holds a test container of silver salts, a new
lead-free explosive that he synthesized in an Army funded research laboratory at Purdue.
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Developing Future CWMD Leaders - DTRA Nuclear
Science & Engineering Center Research Fellow
and Summer Internships
MAJ Joshua D. Frey
DTRA Nuclear Science & Engineering Research Center

Introduction
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is the DoD’s Combat Support Agency responsible
for enabling DoD, the U.S. Government, and International Partners to counter and deter
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Emerging Threats. [1] It does so through
its core functions: enabling strategic deterrence, support to treaty monitoring and
verification, partnering to reduce global WMD threats, identifying vulnerabilities and
mitigation strategies, and developing and delivering rapid capabilities. DTRA’s history
is long and engrained in the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear diplomacy, and
the realization of militarily useful technology to confront the challenges of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. One of its most important roles within the
force development process is capability development for joint warfighter requirements to
counter and deter WMD and emerging threats.
The Research and Development (R&D) Directorate provides the largest organizational
component for technology maturation and risk reduction within DTRA, with the Nuclear
Technologies Division (RDNT) being the primary developer for detection, survivability,
weapon effects, assessment, integration systems, and software. RDNT uses multiple
avenues to conduct technology maturation and risk reduction for materiel capability
development. One of its primary mechanisms is through University Research Alliances
(URA) to access the intellectual and research capital within civilian institutions. Additionally,
RDNT established the Nuclear Science & Engineering Research Center (NSERC) in
2007 at West Point as the program manager for academic year research and summer
internships within the DoD Degree Granting Institutions. Focused on engaging the
faculty and students at the three service academies and two DoD graduate schools,
the NSERC supports research focused on RDNT mission priorities and leverages the
unique combination of student and faculty operational experience and defense-focused
education and research programs to provide a novel research capability to the DTRA.
MAJ Joshua Frey is the Deputy Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Nuclear Science &
Engineering Research Center in West Point, NY. He has a B.A. in Physical Sciences and Religion from
the Ripon College, and M.S. degrees in Environmental Management, International Relations, Nuclear
Engineering, and Materials Science from Webster University, Troy University, and the Air Force Institute of
Technology respectively. He was previously assigned as a Nuclear Disablement Team Operations Officer
and G5 CWMD Planner at the 20th CBRNE Command, Operations Officer and CBRNE Response Team
Leader at the 23d CBRNE Battalion, 2ID, and CBRN Reconnaissance Platoon Leader at the 4/3d and
RSS/3d Cavalry Regiment. His email address is Joshua.d.frey4.mil@mail.mil.
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Research Program Support to DoD Academia
The NSERC supports five research programs at the United States Military Academy (USMA), United States Naval Academy (USNA), United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Air Force Institute
of Technology (AFIT), and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). This research spans the full breadth
of the nuclear technology mission space, with projects aligned to RDNT mission areas: Detection, Effects, Survivability, Integration, and Assessments; and cross-cutting lines of effort: Conventional-Nuclear Integration/Battlefield Nuclear Warfare, Nuclear Planning Tools, Nuclear Wargaming and Analysis, Quantification of Nuclear Survivability and Effectiveness, Countering Nuclear
Threats. The NSERC also supports other research projects in fundamental nuclear physics and
emerging projects that require initial seed support to mature projects until they receive a long term
sponsor, such as a National Laboratory collaboration.
NSERC Research Fellows
The NSERC Research Fellowship is a new program managed by the NSERC to provide direct
support to officers performing academic research during Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) in civilian
academic programs. Initially begun in 2019 in support of USMA Senior Rotator faculty pursuing
PhD research prior to returning to the academy, it supports DTRA-RDNT focused research by any
military student, regardless of the school they are attending. By doing so, DTRA gains greater
access to the intellectual capital of the numerous officers not attending a DoD graduate school
and the resources within civilian schools, while also providing an independent source of funding
for equipment, supplies, and travel. Often students must choose research projects that are funded
through their research advisor or academic department based on previously awarded grants, and
so are limited in the ability to perform defense-relevant research. The NSERC Fellowship provides
greater freedom to officers pursuing Defense-focused projects that align with their interests and
can be continued at a service academy upon graduation.
2019 Fellow: LTC William Koch
The first NSERC Fellow was LTC William Koch, an Academy Professor and former FA40 at the
US Military Academy conducting research into miniaturization of Time Projection Chamber (TPC)
detectors for a Soldier-portable directional neutron detection system. LTC Koch began this work
as his Master’s thesis at MIT, continuing the project at USMA as a junior faculty member and as a
PhD student after selection as an Academy Professor and his return to MIT. He has since returned
to USMA where he is continuing the research as a cadet capstone research project to design a
functional prototype TPC neutron detector backpack.
One technique for detecting special nuclear material is via the spontaneous fission neutrons produce from the isotopes of either uranium or plutonium. The Department of Defense is constantly
seeking the development of the next generation of portable detection systems to support the missions of radiation field mapping and counterproliferation searches. By capitalizing on the historic
developments in a typical high energy physics experiment and modernizing the technology, a backpack portable detector can be produced that can fill this capability gap.
A TPC is typically a very sophisticated detector that provides significant information on every interaction. Using modern technology to replace thousands of digitizers with a single digital camera,
this technology is now robust enough to be re-imagined in a backpack-scale package. Data collected from a graduate program demonstrate that this technology is functional with a low-power,
light weight image intensifier, reducing the power and size constraints to within the limitations of a
backpack.
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Figure 1. The historic decrease in the size of TPCs, driven by the use of modern Charge-coupled Device CCD
cameras, has resulted in TPCs that could feasibly be carried by one Soldier.

Simulations show that a fully portable TPC being operated while carried past a fast neutron source
at a deliberate walk can locate the source to within 60 cm on a single pass by a single backpack
with a closest approach of two meters. Further, any indication of the source provides a location,
so false negatives can simply be studied more closely to confirm or deny the presence of illicit
material. [2]
With this setup, each interaction between a fast neutron and target gas nucleus provides a crude
direction. As data is collected and the location of an illicit source is determined, the data can be
unfolded to provide an energy spectrum of the fast neutron source. This provides the capability
to conduct source characterization, distinguishing between more typical neutron sources, such
as Californium-252 or alpha-Beryllium neutron sources, and illegal fast neutron sources such as
Weapons Grade Plutonium. With this updated technology, an operator can carry this backpack into
a search operation to locate and characterize hidden sources of illicit nuclear material with minimal
search time. [2]

Figure 2. Left, modeled source localization with closest approach of 2 m. Right, modeled source localization with closest
approach of 0 m. Modeling shows that source localization can achieved with similar accuracy. [2]

This research is ongoing at USMA with a group of cadets to develop a prototype backpack detector
as part of their First Class year engineering design capstone. Testing of this prototype is planned
to be conducted at a mobile source user facility. Additionally, cadets will develop a data fusion
and analysis tool to support operator situational analysis. Finally, further studies by LTC Koch and
USMA cadets will focus on varying the TPC gas mixtures in order to optimize the detector gain.
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2020 Fellow: LTC Jacob Capps
The second NSERC Fellow is LTC Jacob Capps, an Academy Professor and former FA52 at the
US Military Academy. LTC Capps is currently attending Oregon State University where he is researching heavy inorganic oxide and doped Potassium dihydrogen phosphate (KDP) scintillators
for fast neutron detection, including GEANT4 (GEometry ANd Tracking), modeling. The NSERC
funded the purchase of detection electronics necessary for data collection, as well as travel to
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for consultation with GEANT4 specialists on staff. Additionally, USMA cadets Nathaniel Holloway and Louis Alfeld served as summer interns working with
LTC Capps during 2021.
LTC Capps research focuses on the optimization of scintillator materials for detection of neutron
and gamma particles for the identification of special nuclear material. Heavy organic inorganic
scintillators have a very high efficiency for detecting the fast neutrons, but have a high production
cost for the scintillator crystals. By creating a composite scintillator material (ZEBRA) using layers
of Cerium-doped Gadolinium Orthosilicate (GSO:Ce), Polystyrene, and Polymethyl methacrylate
(PMMA), similar neutron detection efficiencies can be achieved at a lower cost.

Figure 3. Composite ZEBRA (left) vs. Non-composite (single crystal) Lu2-xGdxSiO5 (LGSO). [3]

LTC Capps has made extensive use of GEANT4, a modeling code for simulating particle transport
in matter, to characterize the optical and nuclear response of the ZEBRA composite scintillator.
These simulations improved the understanding of the energy deposition, number of neutron interactions, and the index of refraction for the different layers of the ZEBRA scintillator, as well as the
number of scintillation photons produced per ionizing interaction. The properties derived from this
model were then used to model the Plutonium-Berilium (PuBe) source spectrum measured by the
detector. [3]

Figure 4. Left, GEANT4 side/top view of GSO:Ce crystal with 100 4.5 MeV neutrons interacting with the crystal face and
a PMT located on the top plane. Right, GEANT4 output of the energy spectrum of a PuBe source incident on GSO:Ce
of 50,000 events. [3]
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Cadets Alfeld and Holloway assisted in the preparatory work for these simulations by developing
the model for measuring the light output from the ZEBRA scintillator. Additionally, they performed
experiments to determine the optimum photomultiplier and light blocking materials for construction
of the experimental apparatus used by LTC Capps to validate the model.
The most recent work by LTC Capps was to experimentally validate the accuracy of the model
using an actual ZEBRA scintillator and PuBe source at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Initial analysis of the results found the model to be 96% accurate to the physically real experiment.
Future studies will include modeling of alternative channel layer materials and further validation of
the model via experiment. [3]
Future NSERC Fellows
The NSERC Research Fellowship program supports research aligned with DTRA Nuclear Technologies mission areas performed by military officers with the intention of continuing that research
at their service academy upon graduation and is not limited to any institution or service. This fellowship provides funding to purchase supplies and equipment required to conduct research that
will return with the officer to their assigned service academy to continue the research as academic
year capstone or independent study projects by cadets or midshipmen. Additionally, NSERC will
continue to support the research for the duration of the faculty member’s assignment at their service academy.
The NSERC fellowship is open to any military officer interested in performing DTRA-RDNT focused
research during their ACS assignment. Officers interested in performing research in the RDNT
mission areas are invited to contact the NSERC with a description of their research interests and
funding needs. This program is not limited to a specific number of participants, only by the availability of continued funding to support the officer’s research program.
NSERC Summer Internships
The largest single program supported by the NSERC is service academy and ROTC summer
internships. These experiences provide a research-focused, operationally relevant experience to
cadets and midshipman that exposes them to both the nuclear enterprise and the countering weapons of mass destruction mission space. It is intended not only to develop future leaders who are
cognizant of and competent in nuclear and CWMD issues, but also to provide real value to the
internship sponsor organizations to analyze and understand operationally or strategically relevant
problems and provide solutions or recommendations to the organization. Ranging in length from 2
weeks to 2 months, each internship is tailored to offer a learning experience about the nuclear and
CWMD enterprise while also providing value to either the host organization or another customer.
Conventional-Nuclear Integration Wargaming at the Naval Postgraduate School and USSTRATCOM
With the increased emphasis on great power competition necessitating the revitalization of conventional-nuclear integration, the NSERC sponsored multiple interns at a handful of locations to work
on this problem. Four interns interned with the Naval Warfare Studies Institute’s (NWSI) Wargaming Center, a research center within the Naval Postgraduate School, another three interned with
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and the National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI),
and a final cadet interned directly with the NSERC.
The interns at NWSI worked through a tailored version of the Wargaming Center’s Basic Analytical
Wargaming Course, normally offered as a mobile training team or graduate-level course, focused
on nuclear weapons employment on the conventional battlefield. The cadets developed a tabletop
wargame with guidance from the DTRA RDNT Assessments Division that could be used to educate
tactical commanders about nuclear weapons effects on conventional forces and provide a quick
and easily iterative means to apply lessons learned and adapt to battlefield nuclear warfare in order
to minimize the impact of hostile nuclear employment on friendly forces.
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The second group of cadets, working with USSTRATCOM and the NSRI, focused on two different
projects. At NSRI, Army ROTC CDTs Hayden Maxwell, Taylor Catlin, and Frank Miele along with a
handful of civilian NSRI Strategic Deterrence interns developed a virtual delivery option for NSRI’s
Limited Nuclear Conflict Tabletop Exercise. Previously an in-person event, the cadets developed
a methodology for the wargame that could be used in a fully virtual environment, then implemented this into a complete full-stack web application with supporting materials. This wargame
solution was briefed to Lt Gen Thomas A. Bussiere, Deputy Commander, USSTRATCOM and Maj
Gen (Ret) Richard Evens, NSRI Director. [4] Meanwhile, CDT Amanda McDonough worked with
USSTRATCOM staff to gather unclassified data and real-world strategic and operational understanding of nuclear weapons employment to support an academic year Capstone project at USMA.
Finally, the NSERC hosted Navy ROTC Cadet Catherine Yang to develop an algorithm and graphical interface for a tool to adjudicate nuclear weapon effects on tactical units in a simulated wargame.
This tool allows the user to define a unit composition using dismounted infantry, motorized infantry,
and tank platoons, each with a defined P50 (pressure for 50% kill probability). The algorithm then
determines the radius from ground zero where this pressure would occur, checked if the unit was
within that radius, and assessed whether the unit was destroyed. By applying the Monte Carlo analysis technique to perform hundreds of iterations, the algorithm can adjudicate the effects of nuclear
weapon employment in a user defined scenario. [6] This research has formed the starting point for
a USMA academic year Capstone project, in which cadets will work to implement a more advanced
algorithm and integrate it as a plug-in for the Army’s OneSAF wargame simulation software.

Figure 5. Left, a combined arms company executes a flanking maneuver to attack an enemy force. Each platoon in the
company moves at a different velocity and has a different “hardness” against nuclear blast effects. Right, the probability
of damage distribution for the infantry platoon determined from 10,000 iterations of the simulation. [5]

Using wargaming as a method to explore the survivability of military formations and the reactions of
tactical and operational leaders to the employment of nuclear weapons on the battlefield is an important growth area for the nuclear enterprise, and the NSERC plans to support the development
of this expertise within the DoD academic community into the future. The cadet internship program
provides an opportunity for sponsor organizations to train junior leaders about their mission and
to receive the necessary manpower to work through the questions facing the nuclear and CWMD
community in an analytical manner.
Providing Useful Solutions to Real Problems: Interns at USANCA
While the broad problems facing the nuclear and CWMD communities are far too large and complex to solve in a few weeks, organizations often face a deluge of small tasks that require significant dedication of time. NSERC interns have successfully developed solutions to these problems
to improve workflows, perform error checking on critical data, and improve the capability of staff
officers and leaders to accomplish their mission.
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The U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA) has faced significant growth in its mission
and influence with the increasing emphasis on nuclear operations within the Army. Two USMA
cadets, CDTs Riley Hoyes and Kevin Trajgiel, developed solutions to internal requirements and
contributed to important strategic documents for Headquarters, Department of the Army.
CDT Hoyes’ project focused on improving the workflow for converting large, consolidated data files
from USANCA customer agencies into formatted inputs for processing in nuclear effects models.
She developed an R script that receives a single file containing the consolidated data for hundreds
to thousands of events and parses this data into individual files. The script also error checks these
files to ensure they are correctly formatted for the receiving modeling codes. This scripting project
allowed the data processing time to decrease from ~30 minutes to ~1-2 minutes per event. [6]

Figure 6. Process Diagram for converting Strike Data to Fallout Model outputs. [6]

CDT Kevin Trajgiel, on the other hand, focused on the emerging strategic documents, such as
the Army Biodefense Strategy and the Conventional-Nuclear Integration Strategy, being produced
at USANCA. He analyzed these and past strategy documents to identify common themes and
priorities to support revising the Army’s CWMD Strategy. This project resulted in high-quality staff
analysis briefed to the USANCA Director that will directly support the writing of a new Army CWMD
Strategy in the near future.
Future Internship Sponsors
The NSERC summer internship program is dependent on the continued support of the organizations and leaders within the nuclear enterprise and CWMD community to host interns and provide
intellectually stimulating projects that individual or teams of cadets and midshipmen can work on
during their time with the organization. Additionally, successful internships have also involved engagements with senior leaders, other parts of the organization, or training and education to improve
the interns ability to contribute to their project. Organizations interested in sponsoring a cadet or
midshipman can contact the NSERC to discuss the projects available, timeframe for the intern, and
any limitations or constraints such as clearances.

Notes
1. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. "Defense Threat Reduction Agency" Accessed August 11, 2021,
https://www.dtra.mil/.
2. Koch, William L. “Backpack Portable TPC”. Presentation to DTRA NSERC. August, 2021.
3. Capps, Jacob W., Smith, Craig F., Schellman, Heidi M. “Modeling and Characterization of Composite
Scintillator Design”. Report to DTRA NSERC. September, 2021.
4. Ideus, Katelyn. “NSRI strategic deterrence interns present transformed wargame, experience to
USSTRATCOM leaders.” National Strategic Research Institute. Accessed September 16, 2021. https://
nsri.nebraska.edu/news/news-releases/2021/08/nsri-strategic-deterrence-interns-present-transformed-wargame-experience-to-usUSSTRATCOM-leaders
5. Yang, Catherine. “Integrating Nuclear Effects into Wargame Simulations”. Presentation to DTRA NSERC.
August 20, 2021.
6. Seybert, Adam. “Cadet Summer Research”. Presentation to DTRA NSERC. September 8, 2021.
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United States Military Academy Cadets in the Department of Chemistry and Life Science complete laboratories in many
of their required courses and also engage in faculty-mentored independent research projects. Since 2018, Cadets have
been co-authors on over 45 peer-reviewed publications. Cadet research enhances their STEM education and enables
Department of Chemistry and Life Science Cadets to be successful and win multiple national competitive scholarships
every academic year.
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Reinvigorating a Technical Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction Distance Learning Graduate
Certificate Program
Dr. James Petrosky, Dr. Gaiven Varshney, Dr. Jeremy Slagley
and Ms. Sara Shaghaghi
Air Force Institute of Technology
Current Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) demands can be divided broadly into
policy and science. The science of chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear weapons informs
the limits of development, production, employment, operation, detection, risk characterization,
human and material protection, and medical intervention. In short, the science of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) should precede and inform the development of policy. It is to this end that the
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) CWMD program was re-established, providing a technical
educational option for practitioners to understand the science behind a very technically challenging
subject.
THE PAST
Graduate educational programs can focus on either science or policy. Since the AFIT graduate
school is focused on technology-based education, it was only fitting that AFIT developed and
operated the science-based graduate certificate program in CWMD for nearly a decade. The initial
program was developed for United States Air Force (USAF) scientists that had a background in a
technical field but were assigned to organizations that required integration of chemical, biological,
and nuclear protection. In its later years, however, the program was primarily supported by Army
functional area(FA) 52 counterproliferation officers. Due to low enrollments the program was sunset
Dr. James Petrosky , LTC (Ret), is a Professor of Nuclear Engineering and the Director of the Nuclear Expertise for
Advancing Technologies (NEAT) Center at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. He has a B.A.
in Engineering Physics and Computer Science from Millersville University of Pennsylvania, an M.S. in Engineering Physics
from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and a Ph.D. in Engineering Physics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. His email
address is james.petrosky@au.af.edu.
Dr. Gaiven Varshney is a Research Assistant Professor of Nuclear Engineering and the Co-chair of the Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction Graduate Certificate program at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH. She has a M.S. in Analytical Chemistry from Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), India, an M.Phil. in Applied Chemistry
from Zakir Hussain College of Engineering and Technology, AMU, India, and a Ph.D. in Applied Chemistry from Zakir
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in 2018.
THE PRESENT
In 2020, with a renewed interest in CWMD
operations, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) CWMD office sought to establish
a technical CWMD expertise development
program and turned to AFIT to re-establish the
technical CWMD certificate program. Following
substantial coordination and assurance from
DHS that program funding was in place, AFIT
began planning and coordination to re-establish
the CWMD certificate program. During the
COVID lockdown in 2020, AFIT AFIT restarted
the program through the recently established
Nuclear Expertise for Advancing Technologies
(NEAT) Center¹ and recruited and enrolled
students from the Air Force, Army, and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) for the
October 2020 start. In September 2021, the
first 30 students were awarded their graduate

Dr. Gaiven Varshney (co-chair and CHEM 597 instructor) and Dr. Anna
Bucy (CWMD administrative assistant) prepare the first 30 graduate
certificates for mailing.

certificates in CWMD.
The AFIT CWMD program is shared by the
Departments of Engineering Physics and
Systems Engineering & Management. The
program is housed in the NEAT Center, headed
by Dr. James Petrosky. The NEAT Center is a
technical partner and a bridge for developing
technical talents and human capital for mission
partners focused on protecting the US. NEAT
is engaged in research, education, and
publication that enhances Defense, Air Force,
and Department of Energy organizational crossknowledge. The education strategy offers a
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broad portfolio of courses and programs oriented
toward technical nuclear subjects, including
technically oriented nuclear forensics graduate
courses and research that develops national
level expertise of interest for key mission
partners. The close ties between education and
research and national security efforts are clear,
making AFIT a primary institute for innovation
and relevance.
Several changes were necessary for the
program reestablishment to broaden the student
population. These included adding material on
biological effects and physiology, which is of
increased interest due to the current pandemic.
Additionally, there was an effort to rebuild the
program with a consistent format and structure,
following AFIT’s extremely popular Nuclear
Weapons Effects, Policy, and Proliferation
(NWEPP)² graduate certificate program. This
structure has proven to provide the best
flexibility for students who must balance their
primary duties with distance learning education,
while providing interactions between faculty and
students at the graduate level. Content changes
also included some reorganization of materials
to provide similar approaches to common
materials, such as application of mathematical
models for prediction of outcomes and using
common software such as ExcelTM.
The program maintained the focus on basic and
applied sciences behind each of the CWMD
topic areas but brought new subject matter
related to consequence management to the
forefront. The substantial faculty experiences
on the broad applications of CWMD, both
military and civilian, represent over 100 years
of biowarfare, chemical and nuclear weapons,
and physiological response technical expertise.
This experience led to the assembly of valuable
and applicable course materials, and many real
time conversations during webinars and office
hours. Together, these resulted in many relevant
lectures, and discussions related to students'
current work areas. The students ranged from
PhDs to new Lieutenants, and from CWMD
researchers to CWMD responders.
The Biological Weapons Effects and Technology
course materials were especially relevant against
a backdrop of an international pandemic. Many
students commented on the specific relevance
and daily applicability of the course materials,
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for both scientific studies and development of
policy. The course covered technical aspects
related to infectious disease epidemiology,
biological agent production methods and history
of use, and characteristics of bio-pathogens that
lend to weaponization.

among students.
The project-based approach in the final course in
the certificate supported the goals of integrating
the science, having knowledge of the current
literature, and informing policy decisions. These
goals are a unique aspect of the AFIT CWMD
program. Unlike training, graduate education
requires students to analyze and evaluate the
information in order to make assessments
and decisions. This is enhanced by faculty led
student projects and evaluation and feedback
on the topic. Students’ innovative ideas emerge
and are rigorously examined and the scientific
process is applied multiple times to hone skills.

The Chemical Weapons Materials, Effects, and
Technology course included an intense organic
chemistry review and a basis for the complex
methods for creating chemical weapons. The
course then covered how chemical weapons
are employed, the process by which chemical
weapons can cause harm, the technical issues
associated with detection and decontamination
of chemical weapons, and the selection criteria
THE FUTURE
for choosing a chemical weapons route.
Thanks to the Department of Homeland Security
CWMD office’s continued support, AFIT has
expanded offerings of the CWMD program into
2022. The program will be able to offer multiple
offerings of courses and substantially increased
enrollment. This expansion will allow AFIT to
reach more organizations and bring in a broader
group of students. This expansion is no small
measure, as our experience with having students
from outside of the DoD, including DHS, NNSA,
and LLNL, substantially enriches the course
interactions and led to an improved program.
Dr. Petrosky, (NENG597 instructor) presents a webinar related to The current expansion includes students from
shielding methods.
Air Force, Army, Navy, NNSA, LLNL, and FBI;
The Nuclear Weapon and Radiological Effects all part of the national CWMD team.
course included an understanding of radiation
Additionally, we are seeking changes to course
and how it is transported through various
content to include more information on the
environments. The course presented students
“countering” aspect of WMDs and including this
with various web available references to
into the project work and discussions. We are
determine exposures and shielding effects in
seeking ways to include this in a consistent
order to survive a radiological incident or attack.
way across all courses. Lastly, we are looking
The course was completely re-written to focus
to build “step up” course materials to provide
on domestic radiological events with some
students with natural science and math skills,
historical context. This change made this course
and problem-solving techniques before starting
uniquely different from other “targeting” oriented
the program. These are being done to ensure
nuclear courses at AFIT.
student success and enhance learning as many
The Physiological Effects of CBRN course students have not used these skills for some
(which is expected to be the final course in the time. Lastly, based upon the huge student
certificate) explored human physiology relevant and organizational interest, we are seeking to
to WMDs, covering major organ systems reestablish the CWMD Master of Science (MS)
anatomy and physiology. The students selected distance learning graduate degree program,
a particular agent and conducted a focused which will include the CWMD certificate courses.
study on it using the previous course materials If your organization may be able to sponsor this
as support. This course engaged students via program, contact us at CWMD@afit.edu.
individual and team projects in order to apply
the course materials and establish networks
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THE CWMD GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAM
The CWMD graduate certificate program is hosted by AFIT’s NEAT Center,
within the AFIT Graduate School of Engineering and Management. The
program is shared by AFIT’s departments of Engineering Physics and
Systems Engineering and Management. The CWMD program includes
four courses delivered via distance learning modality. The courses all
include remote asynchronous content delivered via CANVAS learning
management system, and weekly synchronous webinars. Each course
represents four graduate quarter credit hours (a total of 16 credits
for the certificate) and these credits can be used in certain approved
master’s programs as transfer credits. The intent is for the program to
be completed by non-traditional students part-time in one year.
CWMD Certificate Courses
• BIOL 597 Biological Weapons Effects and Technology
• CHEM 597 Chemical Weapons Materials, Effects, and Technology
• NENG 597 Nuclear Weapon and Radiological Effects
• CWMD 596 Physiological Effects of CBRN
Admission requirements:
• A Bachelor’s degree in a science, engineering, or medical related field (Physics, Biology,
Chemistry, Nuclear Engineering, Industrial Hygiene Environmental Science, Physiology, or Epidemiology)
• College algebra required and calculus is desired with a grade of C or better.
• A cumulative undergraduate GPA of 3.0 (on a 4.0 scale).
• US Citizenship
Waivers to the above criteria may be granted on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, those who do
not meet the above criteria are encouraged to apply.
More information is available at: https://www.afit.edu/EN/programs.cfm?a=view&D=21 or contact
us by email: CWMD@afit.edu.

Notes
1. Nuclear Expertise for Advancing Technologies Center – focused on building and enhancing careers on
DoD technical subjects.
2. The Nuclear Weapons Effects, Policy and Proliferation graduate certificate program includes 3 weekly
lessons followed by a live webinar.
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How to Submit an Article to the
Countering WMD Journal
The Countering WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United States Army Nuclear
and Countering WMD Agency. We welcome articles from all U.S. Government agencies and
academia involved with CWMD matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved by the
Countering WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. The journal provides a forum for
exchanging information and ideas within the CWMD community. Writers may discuss training, current
operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general
interest to CWMD personnel. Articles may share good ideas and lessons learned or explore better
ways of doing things. Shorter, after action type articles and reviews of books on CWMD topics are
also welcome.
Articles submitted to Countering WMD Journal must be accompanied by a written release from
the author’s activity security manager before editing can begin. All information contained in an article
must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. It is the author’s responsibility to
ensure that security is not compromised; information appearing in open sources does not constitute
declassification. The Countering WMD Journal is distributed to military units and other agencies
worldwide. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations.
A fillable security release memorandum is provided at http://www.belvoir.army.mil/usanca/.
The Countering WMD Journal is published twice a year: Fall/Winter (article deadline is typically
15 September) and Spring/Summer (article deadline is typically 15 March). Send submissions via
email to usarmy.belvoir.hqda-dcs-g-3-5-7.mbx.usanca-proponency-division@army.mil, or as a
Microsoft Word document on a CD via mail, to: Editor, CWMD Journal, 5915 16th Street, Building
238, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5514.
As an official U.S. Army publication, Countering WMD Journal is not copyrighted. Material
published in Countering WMD Journal can be freely reproduced, distributed, displayed, or reprinted;
however, appropriate credit should be given to Countering WMD Journal and its authors.
You can get more information about submitting an article to the Countering WMD Journal,
download an article format, or view and download digital versions of the Countering WMD Journal
at our website http://www.belvoir.army.mil/usanca/.
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